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Abstract 
The vast majority of approaches to ‘citizenship as status’ see the concept as static and 
often use binary modes of categorisation and analysis, such as that between citizen 
and non-citizen. These accounts are problematic on several fronts; firstly, they obscure 
the diversity of encounters that occur in the context of citizenship, and secondly, they 
regard the concept as relatively unchanging. By focusing on the ways that citizenship is 
encountered within lived lives, this thesis provides a novel approach to the study of 
citizenship that can better grasp the fluidity as well as the transformative capacities of 
the emergent encounters that make up individuals’ ongoing negotiations of 
citizenship.  
Using fifty in-depth qualitative interviews conducted in Australia and Greece with 
multiple citizenship status holders, I interrogate the ways in which encounters with 
bureaucracy, imaginaries and acts of imagination, as well as encounters of address, 
create, shape, and rupture conceptions of citizenship as status. More specifically, by 
applying an alternative methodological approach and highlighting the role of both 
repetition and rupture, this thesis illustrates, in the first instance, how these 
transformative encounters with bureaucracy are more than just ‘gates’ that one passes 
through, but how they resonate far beyond their immediate contexts. Secondly, in 
Abstract 
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building on the literature on the subject of imaginaries, I consider the diversity of 
ways in which citizenship comes to be imagined, and the importance of seeing these 
acts of imagination as both personal and collective, while retaining the possibilities of 
non-determinist outcomes. Finally, I interrogate the role and impact of addressing and 
being addressed in the context of citizenship, and the ways that these speech acts 
come to situate us within the world, but also how they account, at least in part, for the 
ceaseless transformations of citizenship itself. This thesis illustrates how it is through 
such ongoing and personal negotiations, that citizenship emerges within lived lives. 
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Preface 
We	are	entering,	I	suspect,	upon	a	time	of	troubles.	It	is	not	just	the	terrorists,	the	
bankers,	and	the	climate	that	are	going	to	wreak	havoc	with	our	sense	of	security	
and	stability.	Globalization	itself	–	the	‘flat’	earth	of	so	many	irenic	fantasies	–	will	
be	 a	 source	 of	 fear	 and	 uncertainty	 to	 billions	 of	 people	who	will	 turn	 to	 their	
leaders	for	protection.	‘Identities’	will	grow	to	be	mean	and	tight,	as	the	indigent	
and	the	uprooted	beat	upon	the	ever	rising	walls	of	the	gated	communities	from	
Delhi	to	Dallas.	
Being	 ‘Danish’	 or	 ‘Italian’,	 ‘American’	 or	 ‘European’	won’t	 just	 be	 an	 identity;	 it	
will	 be	 a	 rebuff	 and	 a	 reproof	 to	 whom	 it	 excludes.	 The	 state,	 far	 from	
disappearing,	may	be	about	to	come	into	its	own:	the	privileges	of	citizenship,	the	
protections	 of	 card	 holding	 residency	 rights,	will	 be	wielded	 as	 political	 trumps.	
Intolerant	 demagogues	 in	 established	 democracies	 will	 demand	 “tests”	 –	 of	
knowledge,	 of	 language,	 of	 attitude	 –	 to	 determine	 whether	 desperate	
newcomers	are	deserving	of	British	or	Dutch	or	French	‘identity’.	They	are	already	
doing	so.	In	this	brave	new	century	we	shall	miss	the	tolerant,	the	marginals:	the	
edge	people.	My	people.	(Judt	2011)	 	 					
							 	 							-	Tony	Judt	(2011)	The	Memory	Chalet,	Vintage,	pp.	207-208	
It has long been a pet hate of mine to hear the far-too-common accusation that 
individuals are ‘studying themselves’. While I can understand the apprehension of 
those who perceive some studies to be too biased or author-focused, I believe that the 
subjects which invoke the most passion and therefore the best work are those that 
have often touched us personally. As such, I am using this preface as an opportunity 
to sketch out the birth of my fascination with this subject; the birth of my passion 
with it. 
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I am the great-granddaughter, the granddaughter, and the daughter of immigrants 
who came from many different countries and settled in different places; with such a 
diverse background, questions of citizenship, identity, and identification seem to be 
evoked surprisingly often. Identity is something very complex and I have always been 
interested in the ways in which we ‘name’ individuals both in everyday encounters 
and through diverse bureaucratic forms; questions often asked merely out of a source 
of curiosity fix us into place. This is where my interest in citizenship emerged. 
Furthermore, I have spent a lot of time overseas, and through the crossing of borders I 
reflected on the importance of citizenship to individual freedom and opportunity. But 
these opportunities are not limited to simply taking the smaller queue at immigration 
control, or having easy access to certain labour markets; this type of bordering occurs 
in other places and in countless other ways. 
I have mostly been fortunate enough to be a citizen of the places where I have lived, 
so when I found myself living somewhere where I did not have the right papers, these 
difficulties came as quite a shock to me. A student visa for a single year should not be 
hard to get, right? Especially with the correct letters and documents? I was wrong. 
Countless hours in queues, often waiting long before the office opened, just to be 
seen that day, lost days of work, and wild goose chases for elusive documents that 
were ‘vital’ to one official only to be told the opposite by the next. Chatting to people 
in these situations, and the stories that they recounted made my own stressful 
situations seem incredibly tame. Yet, these experiences and encounters, and their 
formative capacities are absent in most people’s understandings and almost non-
existent in the academic literature; we criticise the ‘queue jumpers’, having never seen, 
heard or felt the ‘queue’ ourselves. This having been said, we must also be careful not 
to apply too deterministic an analysis to these encounters: they are experienced in very 
different ways. 
Other events also stand out to me: I used to intern at a well-known Human Rights 
NGO. One day when I came to work, and there was a man crying in the entry 
surrounded by a couple of my colleagues. He had found out his father was dying back 
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in West Africa; he wanted to return to say goodbye and pay his last respects. Under 
the conditions of his interim visa however, he was not allowed to leave the country. If 
he left, he would not be able to legally return and the bureaucratic process towards 
residency that he had been working on for the better part of the last eight or so years 
would be rendered void. We had no answers for him – there was no way to leave and 
legally return – the man had a choice; his future or his father.  
What struck me at the time was not only his absolute despair, but also the clear 
injustice of it; on reflecting on the situation afterwards, I started to question the 
invisibility of these narratives and these embodied experiences of citizenship, and in 
many ways this thesis is my attempt at an understanding of the subject that renders 
these situations and practices visible. 
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1. Introduction  
Once	again	I	found	myself	 late	at	night	in	a	taxi.	Somewhere	between	the	public	
transport	 strikes	and	 the	questionable	neighbourhood	where	 I	 lived	 in	Athens,	 I	
ended	up	here	in	the	back	seat	of	a	cab	at	least	once	or	twice	a	week.	The	drivers	
would	ask	me	where	 I	was	going,	 clarify	 some	directions,	double	check	 the	 turn	
off,	and	usually	after	a	minute	or	so	of	silence,	they	would	 inquire	as	to	where	I	
was	from.	Some	asked	if	I	was	from	Cyprus,	or	from	the	North	of	Greece	or	from	
Crete,	 others	 assumed	 immigration.	 I	 found	 myself	 time	 and	 again	 having	 to	
articulate	how	I	got	‘here’.	Within	the	intimate	space	of	the	taxi	with	the	middle	
aged	man	at	the	wheel	–	I	used	to	watch	their	eyes	flicker	between	the	road	and	
the	rear	view	mirror	with	me	in	the	backseat	–	I	would	give	an	account.	This	was	a	
conversation;	 they	 often	 ask	 questions	 or	 make	 comments.	 Through	 every	
articulation	 the	 story	 emerged	 differently.	 There	 wasn’t	 any	 hostility	 in	 these	
questions	 –	 or	 at	 least	 I	 didn’t	 detect	 it	 –	 they	 were	 just	 curious,	 perhaps	 just	
passing	the	time.1	
Citizenship is one of the most highly charged issues of our time. It can determine the 
opportunities available to us, where and how we move, how we are identified by 
others, and even how we identify ourselves: it situates us in the world. There is an 
underlying normative assumption that everyone is a citizen of somewhere, and the 
very lack of a status has been described as being ‘identical with expulsion from 
humanity altogether’ (Arendt [1951] 1973, 297). Questions of citizenship emerge daily 
at the heart of issues such as migration, racism, welfare, employment, and inequality, 
among others. Even something as seemingly unrelated as the sports section of the 
																																								 																				
1This is an auto-ethnographic excerpt from some of my own writing from 2011, at which time I had been 
residing in Athens for almost three years.    
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newspaper may contain accounts of a national team or a quip about the status and 
residency of a player. Despite the banality suggested by the assumption that everyone 
is a citizen of somewhere, the frequency with which citizenship emerges as a burning 
issue, suggests that it occupies an unusual space between every-day and highly-
contested.  
After considering the impact, urgency, and centrality of citizenship, the above vignette 
may seem somewhat misplaced. But, it is precisely this instinct which validates the 
importance of the work that will follow. The neatly theorised literatures, grand 
national narratives, and representations of citizenship in the media, obscure the 
diverse and everyday ways it emerges within lived lives. As such – as in this vignette – 
citizenship may surface within a conversation with a taxi driver, in filling out a form, 
or even through escapist day-dreams at work. 
However the recognition of the impact of these diverse sites and spaces of citizenship 
encounters is largely missing from the traditional approaches to citizenship, 
understood as ‘status’ (hereafter referred to as ‘citizenship as status’). Within the 
disciplinary diversity of citizenship studies, most approaches take a utilitarian view of 
the subject, conceiving of it as both static and functional, instead of realising its 
centrality to a vast range of social processes, power relationships, and forms of 
everyday labour. Scholarship on the topic of citizenship – largely due to the urge to do 
away with divergent and complex accounts – often presents the issue as clinical 
categorisations of ‘status’ and ‘practice’, ‘citizen’ and ‘non-citizen’, and ‘us’ and ‘them’. 
While these distinctions may satisfy our taxonomic urges, they misconstrue the 
complex and emergent ways in which citizenship exists and is transformed within 
lived lives.  
While citizenship may be one of the lightning-rod issues of our time, the ways in 
which we conceptualise and theorise it may obscure more than they illuminate. 
Through the concept of encounter, this thesis will provide a vital and much needed 
sociological analysis of this highly charged issue, which shines a light onto all kinds of 
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social and cultural dimensions that are overlooked by more conventional approaches 
to citizenship. This thesis will address the overarching question of how citizenship is 
encountered and emerges through its ongoing negotiation in lived lives, and more 
specifically through three key sites of encounter, those with bureaucracy, through 
imaginaries and acts of imagination, and in encounters of address. This is done using 
a series of over 50 in-depth qualitative interviews undertaken with multiple citizenship 
holders in both Australia and Greece. 
 Context  
Questions of citizenship have become entangled with some of the most contentious 
issues of our time. As such, citizenship, in its involvement with topics such as 
migration, employment, social cohesion, rights, public policy, and the welfare state, is 
a topic of fierce contestation and heated debate. Its broader existence however, as a 
tool for the organisation of populations, remains largely unchallenged.  
More people than ever before live outside the country of their birth, and these 
numbers only continue to increase (International Organization for Migration 2015, 
3). Regardless of their motivations for movement – be they as a result of conflict, 
economic, lifestyle, or other factors – the consequences, in citizenship terms, are the 
increasing diversity within populations and the growing numbers of people with more 
than one citizenship status. States are then forced to implement systems for the 
management of these populations. These systems of incorporation are vastly unequal: 
the media often highlights the ‘desperate passages’ (C. Martin 2011) of irregular 
migrants and asylum seekers, while at the same time we are seeing the simplification 
and expediting of visas and citizenship processes for the ‘neoliberal’ elite (Springer, 
Birch, and MacLeavy 2016, 450). Furthermore, citizenship, at a state level, relies on a 
‘national’ vocabulary, and as such these issues engage with questions of what the 
nation should and should not look like.  
The electoral upsets of the Trump election victory and Brexit, have ignited more 
general fears regarding populist politics and increasing racism. There is also a more 
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pervasive feeling of instability that is coming from a ‘new apocalyptic imagination 
[that] […] draws a parallel between diverse threats such as global warming, health 
pandemics, natural catastrophes, technological risks, and international crime and 
terrorism’ (Amin 2012, 138). Furthermore, the cohesion of ‘Europe’ has been 
questioned following the Greek Financial Crisis and that of Brexit, bringing 
European Citizenship, and the future of the European Union more generally, into 
question. While Occupy Wall Street, along with other Occupy Movements, may have 
had questionable success in their aims, their rhetoric of the 99% and the 1% have 
engaged the popular imagination (Pickerill and Krinsky 2012) providing a clearer 
metaphor for the increasing inequalities both within and between states (Anand and 
Segal 2014). These internal disparities fracture traditional notions of the equality of 
citizens, and have brought about interrogations regarding the ability and willingness 
of states to cater to their disadvantaged populations, especially in light of the decline 
of the welfare state in many contexts. 
Politically we have also seen numerous changes in the policies associated with 
citizenship. Whereas dual citizenship was once likened to bigamy (Spiro 2010, 114), 
we are witnessing the ever increasing instances of de facto and de jure dual citizenship, 
with around half of all sovereign states accepting it in one form or another (Faist 
2001).  Similarly, the creation of new forms of ‘partial’ or ‘light’ citizenship, such as 
the Turkish Pink Card and the Indian NRI scheme, highlight the introduction of 
other (sub-citizenship) categories (Caglar 2004; Dickinson and Bailey 2007). The 
increasing number and complexity of these ‘citizenship constellations’ (Bauböck 2010) 
in the lives of individuals generate a pressing need to comprehend the multiplicity of 
ways in which citizenship is encountered.  
This research is incredibly timely; not only, as alluded to earlier, is citizenship a highly 
contested issue that relates to some of the key ongoing debates of our time, but it is 
also a tool for the organisation and control of populations, that is so entangled in the 
way we see the world, and govern it, that we can be assured of its presence and 
ongoing impact well into the future. 
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 Definition of Terms  
Because of its fluidity and scope, citizenship can be notoriously difficult to define. A 
common distinction that is often made is that between citizenship as ‘status’ – that is 
the relationship with a state – and citizenship as ‘practice’ – which focuses on the role 
of engagement or activity, or as Kymlicka and Norman present, ‘citizenship-as-legal-
status’ and ‘citizenship-as-desirable-activity’ (1994, 353). Yet in applying such binary 
conceptions one runs the risk of creating false dichotomies: ‘the status and practices 
of citizenship presuppose each other’ (Isin 2009, 369), and as such, the two are 
intimately entangled, and this entanglement will be highlighted in diverse aspects of 
this thesis. 
As a point of departure, this thesis will investigate citizenship as status, where ‘status’ 
is used to denote a link to the membership-related conceptions of the topic – not 
limited to discussions of policy and institutions – as well as addressing issues of 
practice. At its most basic, citizenship as status is ‘a relation between individuals and 
territorial political entities’ (Bauböck 2010, 848) or quite simply ‘membership in a 
state’ (Joppke 2007, 38). This thesis considers these statuses as they emerge, transform 
and are conceived of, in the context of lived lives. This approach focuses not on the 
status per se, but on these more personal encounters: ‘the notion of life course 
reminds us that people do not usually navigate the ambiguous and frequently 
contradictory controls and policies regulating borders and statuses in a bid to make 
general declarations about affiliation and identity as categorical abstractions. They are 
more likely to be pursuing personal projects and intimate relations’ (Amit 2014, 400). 
Furthermore, in investigating status, this thesis will not conceive of citizenship from 
the binary distinctions between ‘citizen’ and ‘non-citizen’. As illustrated by Bosniak, 
‘many of citizenship’s core attributes do not depend on formal citizenship status at all 
but are extended to individuals based on the facts of their personhood and national 
territorial presence’ (2008, 3), thus individuals, such as permanent residents among 
others, are considered as having a variation on citizenship. In order to break away 
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from this binary of citizen/non-citizen, participants with multiple citizenship 
‘statuses’, rather than dual or multiple citizenship, were chosen. ‘Status’ in this case is 
theorised as a broader term that can include citizenship, permanent residency, various 
forms of long term visas, such as spousal, work, and humanitarian visas. Even the 
status of ‘irregular migrant’ denotes a relationship to a particular state. Given the 
enormous diversity between states with regards to immigration and citizenship 
legislation, as well as the frequency and rapidity of changes to them, this approach is 
able to consider how, despite having different ‘statuses’ on paper, the experiences of 
individuals can be very similar. In the same way, individuals with the same status may 
encounter them very differently. 
A further term which requires consideration is that of ‘encounter’, which broadly 
speaking may be considered a ‘distinctive event of relation’ (Wilson 2016, 2). The 
usefulness of this concept emerges from its ability to reflect on the interplay of diverse 
scales, as encounters ‘hesitate between the domain of the particular – the face-to-face 
encounter – and the general – the framing of the particular encounter by broader 
relationships of power and antagonism’ (Ahmed 2000, 9). Etymologically, the word 
‘encounter’ itself hints at the adversarial qualities that are often present in 
interactions across space, but as a concept it also retains elements that ‘include 
questions of meaning, power, temporality, ethics and scale’ (Wilson 2016, 2). Further 
details as to the conceptualisation of ‘encounter’ will be articulated through the later 
stages of this thesis.  
 Citizenship in the Academic Literature 
The academic literature on the topic of citizenship is unfathomably vast. It has a long 
history, and in recent years in particular, we have seen a considerable increase in 
publications on the subject. Any account of the academic literature on the topic of 
citizenship must deal with two interrelated problems – one of volume and the other 
of scope – and a simple and comprehensive account of ‘the literature’ is near 
impossible to give for these very reasons. In their substantial monograph on the topic 
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of citizenship, Isin and Turner emphasise the ‘importance of citizenship as both legal 
institution and lived experience’ (2007, 16), highlighting not only the existence of the 
institutions of citizenship, but how they are subject to processes of lived negotiation. 
It is broadly along these lines that the academic literature used in this thesis has 
emerged. 
Disciplines have developed different orientations towards these more ‘legal’ or ‘lived’ 
approaches. As one would expect, the disciplines of law and politics are situated more 
exclusively within the ‘legal’ orientations towards the subject, whereas the literature 
orientated towards the social and ‘lived’ experiences of citizenship, has emerged 
largely from sociology, anthropology, and human geography. Furthermore, the subject 
has also been characterised by the development of a broader discipline of ‘citizenship 
studies’, which is considerably porous and addresses both these legal and lived 
elements, as well as more philosophical and theoretical questions. Despite the broad 
disciplinary distinctions mentioned above, much of the work done on the topic of 
citizenship is interdisciplinary, and may involve both these ‘legal’ and ‘lived’ 
considerations. 
Historically, many of the earlier theorisations of citizenship focused on these on legal 
and policy approaches. At our current juncture, these are mainly engaged with 
investigating the laws regarding how citizenship is bestowed (Ersanilli and Koopmans 
2010; Goldstein and Piazza 1996), as well as those which are concerned with 
immigration legislation and its impact (Walsh 2014). Of significant interest have been 
the theorisations of dual citizenship within this literature (Blatter, Erdmann, and 
Schwanke 2010; Faist and Kivisto 2007; Bloemraad 2004; Shevchuk 1996, among 
many others), partially because its often de facto existence has meant that approaches 
have had to focus on the absence of policy rather than its presence. Furthermore, due 
to sending states desires to maintain connections with ‘national’ emigrants, other 
researchers have investigated the proliferation of various registration schemes and less 
than citizenship statuses (Dickinson and Bailey 2007; Caglar 2004). The diversity of 
these statuses, and the fact that different individuals may have varied permutations of 
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them, have led to the development of the notion of ‘citizenship constellations’ which 
are ‘structure[s] in which individuals are simultaneously linked to several such 
political entities, so that their legal rights and duties are determined not only by one 
political authority, but by several’ (Bauböck 2010, 848). Focusing on these 
constellations allows citizenship to be viewed from a more individual approach, which 
is something that is lacking within the literature in general. 
One of the key issues within theorisations of citizenship has been the tendency 
towards static conceptions, universalism, and broad generalisations. The text often 
considered to be foundational within the study of citizenship, is that of Sociologist 
T.H. Marshall’s Citizenship and Social Class ([1949] 1950), where citizenship was 
theorised as the evolutionary accumulation of rights. As such, he saw particular rights 
as emerging from specific historical periods: ‘civil rights [can be assigned] to the 
eighteenth [century], political to the nineteenth [century], and social to the twentieth 
[century]’ (Marshall [1949] 1950, 14). This formulation has been widely criticised as 
only being representative of the post-World War II British context, and that the idea 
of an evolutionary accumulation of rights is fundamentally naïve. His narrow 
conception also illustrates the largely Eurocentric approach of much of the literature. 
In a similar vein, in trying to conceive of the divergent orientations to citizenship 
legislation by different states, Rogers Brubaker suggested a historical institutionalist 
approach. This theorisation, which observed the historical development of 
orientations towards citizenship in France and Germany (Brubaker 1992), comes to 
the rather simplistic interpretation that France, largely as a result of its historical 
development, has a more civic orientation, while Germany retains a more ethnic one. 
In recent years, however, this static theorisation has proved to be problematic, as we 
have seen the convergence between these two national conceptions of citizenship 
(Vink and de Groot 2010).  
Rights have also received considerable interest in this domain, with the most notable 
theorisation being Hannah Arendt’s conception of the ‘right to have rights’, which is 
now a common definition of citizenship and is used broadly within research on the 
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topic. This conception emerged from her considerations regarding the number of 
people left stateless as a result of the events of the Second World War: ‘[w]e became 
aware of the existence of a right to have rights […] and a right to belong to some kind 
of organized community’ (Arendt [1951] 1973, 296). This particular formulation 
reinforces the consequences of the spread of citizenship more globally where being a 
citizen of a state is considered a basic human right, and enshrined into international 
law. As is to be expected, conceptions of citizenship responded to broader trends in 
the social sciences at large, and it is in this context that in the mid to late 1990s we see 
a proliferation of texts focusing on post-national forms of citizenship spurred on by 
the introduction of European citizenship in 1992. It is in this setting that we see the 
work of people such as Yasmin Soysal (1994), who, in the context of immigrant 
workers in Europe considered the interplay between human rights demands and 
immigrant incorporation. She theorises, given the development of post-national 
citizenship rights, that rights are determined by ones presence within the state and not 
necessarily by citizenship (Soysal 1994), a stance that has been questioned by more 
recent accounts (Shachar 2009, 2). 
The academic literature on the ‘lived’ domains of citizenship has increased 
exponentially in the last thirty years. These theorisations often consider citizenship in 
relation to another topic, such as migration, identity, or belonging, and as such 
‘citizenship’ may not be articulated as the primary concern of the scholarship in 
question. An example of this is recent work investigating the circumstances and 
processes of asylum claims (Darling 2014; Cabot 2012; Griffiths 2014), which, while 
not strictly speaking developed as part of the literature on the topic, is of significant 
relevance to it. These studies illustrate how these statuses ‘at the edges of citizenship’ 
(Hepworth 2015), come to highlight issues that are central to it. 
The value of these more ‘lived’ orientations is that they account for how the ‘more 
informal designations of citizenship retain a dynamic of their own which demands 
more explicit consideration’ (Painter and Philo 1995, 115). A key investigation of this 
has come from the research of anthropologist Aihwa Ong, which focuses on both the 
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flexibility in positioning that comes with citizenship for certain individuals (1999) 
along with looking at the ways neoliberalism creates exceptions to citizenship (2006a). 
These two texts are widely cited and have made considerable contributions to the field 
of citizenship studies, especially as a result of their interdisciplinary approaches to the 
topic outside the dominant western context, and their ability to account for the 
inequalities within the supposedly equal statuses of citizens. 
Other work has built on this, showing how despite the rhetoric of equality among 
citizens, the personal circumstances of individuals result in very different experiences 
of citizenship. This is the key topic discussed in Margaret Somers’ book The 
Genealogies of Citizenship, which illustrated the treatment of marginal populations in 
the context of Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans in 2005. She illustrates how a 
‘benign view of citizenship has purchase only from the perspective of the insiders […] 
it is the cold instrument of exclusion to those outside its borders, both internal 
borders based on race and gender exclusion, as well as nation state ones based on 
xenophobia and nationalism’ (Somers 2008, 5). This once again reinforces the 
importance of these ‘lived’ approaches to citizenship that are better able to contest 
some the broad historical and theoretical conceptions of the topic which work often 
render these disparate experiences invisible. 
Theorisations around transnationalism (Basch, Schiller, and Blanc 1994) and 
diaspora (Brah 1996), have also contributed to these more lived approaches to 
citizenship, which focus on the different forms that questions of identity and mobility 
can take, especially in the context of migration. Here we also see somewhat of an 
unintentional division of labour with regards to the study of citizenship, with much of 
the scholarship that has emerged from the US being immigration focused, while 
works from Europe are more likely to consider citizenship and integration above all 
else (Favell 2000). One must also remember that citizenship lies at the intersection 
between multiple legal statuses and requirements, but also engages with issues of 
multiculturalism, human rights, gender, globalisation, and public policy, among 
others. As such, it may be academic work done in these vast areas that can and have 
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contributed to the research on citizenship more broadly, thus once again highlighting 
these issues of scope. 
While many of these approaches to investigating ‘lived’ citizenship give us a broader 
understanding of this fluidity and diversity, they have done so mainly by investigating 
the lived experiences of groups of people. Due to the increasing value placed on 
individual negotiation and choice (N. Rose [1989] 1999), new approaches are needed 
to better conceive of the ways in which citizenship is negotiated by individuals and not 
just groups. Human Geography, and recent work done on ‘encounter’ provides a 
method with which to do so: ‘taking the ‘encounter’ as an analytic [gives] an 
understanding of citizenship as an emergent condition that is emplaced and 
embodied, rather than simply a collection of rights to be endowed’ (Hepworth 2014). 
As such, this thesis will expand on the notion of encounter, to examine what the 
ongoing negotiations of citizenship in lived lives can tell us about citizenship more 
broadly. 
Finally, one of the failures of a significant amount of research on citizenship is that it 
defines and analyses the subject by straight-jacketing it into strict binaries and 
categorical frames. As Condor explains of the literature on citizenship: ‘a good deal of 
existing work recognises the complexity, and potential ambiguity of the citizenship 
construct. However extant approaches generally treat conceptual vagueness as [a] 
practical, political and analytic problem. Consequently, authors often attempt to 
impose conceptual order by forming tidy taxonomies of dimensions or models of 
citizenship. Researchers typically contribute to these reifying tendencies’ (Condor 
2011, 197). This thesis seeks to fill some of these gaps in the existing literature, by 
investigating citizenship from the perspectives of the lived lives of individuals, and not 
engaging with these limiting forms of categorisation. Using the notion of encounter it 
will provide an approach that can deal with the diversity and ambiguity of citizenship 
through its ongoing transformations. 
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 Research Questions 
The main aims of this thesis are to investigate citizenship in ways that do not resort to 
these problematic binaries and categorical distinctions, while also considering how 
citizenship emerges through countless interactions and social relations. It will 
contribute to the emerging literature on the role of encounter within citizenship, and 
the ways in which this approach can better account for the diversity and fluidity of the 
subject. In addressing this overarching question, this thesis will carefully consider 
three key sites where citizenship emerges within lived lives – those of bureaucracy, 
imaginaries, and address. More specifically it will ask: 
• What role do encounters with bureaucracy play in the lived experiences of 
citizenship? 
• How is citizenship imagined differently by diverse individuals, and what can 
this tell us about citizenship more generally? 
• How does the normative concept of citizenship change over time and how can 
we better understand it? 
• Given that citizenship has strong links to identity, what role does address have 
with regards to individual conceptions of citizenship? 
Furthermore, in breaking with the ‘methodological nationalism’ (Wimmer and 
Schiller 2002b) that has plagued a great deal of literature on citizenship, this thesis 
will be based on a series of over fifty in-depth qualitative interviews with multiple 
citizenship status holders undertaken in both Australia and Greece, thereby 
investigating experiences and encounters in a way that does not limit them to a single 
national context and that does not resort to the use of limiting binaries. 
 Methodology 
Part of the original contribution of this research is its methodology. On the occasions 
when empirical research is undertaken in the context of the investigation of 
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citizenship as status, these approaches are largely quantitative, and thus there is a 
noticeable lack of qualitative perspectives. Bauböck, a key scholar in the field, 
identifies several gaps in the current research on citizenship and migration, one of 
which is this lack of qualitative empirical analysis (2006, 31). Therefore, the novelty of 
this approach in this field, highlights part of its original contribution. 
The central part of this qualitative methodology is the fifty in-depth interviews which 
were carried out during 2013 and 2014 in both Greece and Australia. The choice of 
these two locations, which differ substantially from one another, provided the 
necessary diversity of participants, who were obtained through snowball sampling. 
These interviews were semi-structured and conversational in nature, where 
participants largely controlled the direction and flow of this encounter; they were later 
transcribed, where necessary translated, and analysed. Participants were selected on 
the basis that they had more than one citizenship status, broadly defined, as outlined 
by the definition of terms section of this introduction. The three key findings chapters 
of this thesis will focus on the three sites of encounter that emerged from this 
empirical research with the most regularity and emphasis, namely those of 
bureaucracy, imaginaries and address. 
In addition to this empirical component, this thesis includes a diversity of sources on 
the topic of citizenship, as well material on other subjects that will emerge within 
particular chapters. Sources come from areas as diverse as sociology, anthropology, 
politics, cultural and political geography, cultural studies, and migration studies, 
among others, to provide a comprehensive analysis of the topic.  
 Thesis Outline 
The remainder of this thesis will be broken into six further chapters and a conclusion, 
all of which will attend to illustrating both the problematic nature of many of our 
current theorisations of citizenship, and the ways in which citizenship is encountered 
within lived lives.  
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In the chapter that immediately follows – Chapter Two – a genealogical account of 
citizenship will be provided, highlighting a history of transformation, reinvention, and 
rupture. This will dispel the two interlinked myths – that of citizenship’s linear 
development, and of its ‘naturalness’ – that have an implicit existence in much of the 
literature on citizenship. In addition, the chapter will map the development of 
citizenship within the two national case studies – those of Australia and Greece, the 
sites of the fieldwork for this thesis – illustrating the differential development and 
character of citizenship within diverse contexts. 
Chapter Three furthers the investigation of citizenship as it emerges from the existing 
academic literature. It highlights how problems associated with defining the term have 
led to the development of several constraining binary and ‘categorical’ theorisations, 
such as that between ‘citizen’ and ‘non-citizen’. The second part of this chapter will 
introduce the concept of ‘encounter’ as a means to investigate citizenship away from 
these rigid taxonomies, and will outline some of the existing literature in this area, 
while highlighting the novel approach to encounter that is taken by this thesis. 
Finally, as encounters engage with existing institutions and power structures, a brief 
outline of the role of the nation-state, identity, birthright bestowal and European 
citizenship will be given. 
Questions of methodology are this thesis’ next area of consideration, and Chapter 
Four will give an in-depth and reflexive account of the various methodological 
concerns and the process of carrying out the fieldwork for this research. Reflecting on 
the practical aspects of this project, this chapter will also consider how issues 
regarding choice of participants, translation, transcription, and ethics in cross cultural 
environments were addressed. It seeks to provide a more honest account of the 
experience of qualitative work that other studies may be missing and it closes with an 
examination of the value of qualitative work and provides a response to claims that it 
is in ‘crisis’. 
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The next three chapters present the substantive research of this thesis, and all draw 
heavily from the fieldwork encounters as well as the diverse literatures that relate to 
their particular themes. Chapter Five considers encounters with bureaucracy to 
illustrate the transformative capacities of these sites. In breaking with more traditional 
notions of ‘neutral’ bureaucracy simply as a ‘gate’ that one has to pass through, this 
chapter shows how the materiality of the bureaucratic encounter, its emotional force 
and the temporalities of these experiences, can have complex and ongoing 
implications for conceptions of citizenship. 
The pervasive presence of imaginaries and imaginative acts in the fieldwork 
encounters is the basis for the content of Chapter Six. Building on the literature on 
social imaginaries, this chapter criticises the key theorists’ inability to account for the 
more personal acts of imagination within these social imaginaries. It considers several 
key imaginaries in the context of citizenship: cosmopolitan imaginaries, hereditary 
imaginaries, (in)secure imaginaries, as well as the impact of inertia and of rupture 
within these considerations. In terms of understanding the role of encounter in 
relation to citizenship, this chapter shows how individual acts of imagination can 
diverge from the predominant narratives, thus highlighting the need to integrate the 
possibilities of non-determinist analyses within our understandings of citizenship. 
In the third discussion chapter – Chapter Seven – I consider the ways in which 
encounters of address make a difference, and the sizable impact that this has on the 
experiences of citizenship in lived lives. More specifically, drawing on the work of 
Judith Butler and her concept of ‘normative schemes of intelligibility’, I consider how 
the ‘logics’ and ‘vocabularies’ of neoliberalism and nationalism have come together to 
influence conceptions of citizenship. Furthermore, it will illustrate how address is 
determined not only by the accounts that we give of ourselves but by the at times 
violent address of others, highlighting the key ways in which difference is created and 
maintained in the context of citizenship within these encounters. 
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The final chapter of this thesis, Chapter Eight, will illustrate how these three key 
themes of encountering bureaucracy, imaginaries, and address come together to 
emphasise the importance of qualitative approaches to the topic of citizenship as 
status. Attending to citizenship from the position of encounter not only helps us 
conceive of its role in the everyday, but also allows an openness to fluidity and 
contingency. This chapter will also consider the contributions and limitations of this 
thesis, as well as the future possibilities of theorising the ongoing and personal 
negotiations through which citizenship emerges within lived lives. 
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2. Historicising Citizenship 
Compiling any comprehensive account of citizenship is a daunting task. The illusory 
simplicity of such a unitary term obscures citizenship’s diversity and fluidity across 
time, as well as both between and within places and populations. In addition to being 
an academic ‘buzz word’ (Kymlicka and Norman 1994, 352) and the product of a 
great deal of scholarship, citizenship as a concept has the added layers of its policy, 
political, and legal presence, not to mention its quotidian vernacular usage by diverse 
individuals. This chapter and the chapter that follows have the formidable task of 
providing a contextual account of citizenship as well as situating it within the 
academic literature. This particular chapter will provide a historical account, but 
instead of replicating the unitary history of the topic, it seeks to disrupt the dominant 
narratives and the commonly told story of a concept that stretches from Ancient 
Greece and through Rome, and eventually to the way that is used today. In doing so, 
it will apply what could be broadly labelled a ‘genealogical’ method, focusing more 
specifically on the various points of divergence and rupture. The second part of the 
chapter will give an in depth account of the development of Australian and Greek 
Citizenship – the two locations of fieldwork for this thesis – to illustrate the 
complexity of national contexts and to once again show the diverse and contingent 
ways in which citizenship has developed.
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 Introducing Genealogy 
The accounts of citizenship which trace the development of the concept back to 
antiquity often provide a conception of the subject which implies that it is ‘natural’ 
rather than the product of a particular set of historical circumstances. As such, this 
chapter will use an approach that provides a ‘genealogy’ of citizenship, highlighting 
the specific points of change and rupture that are often taken for granted in 
traditional accounts of the topic. 
The concept of a genealogical approach emerged in the first instance from the 
writings of Nietzsche ([1887] 2012), however it is the conception outlined within 
Foucault’s work which is the most widely cited. Foucault’s most explicit analysis of the 
concept of genealogy comes from his reading of Nietzsche’s work in the text Nietzsche, 
Genealogy, History, where he explains: ‘[t]he genealogist needs history to dispel the 
chimeras of origin, somewhat in the manner of the pious philosopher who needs a 
doctor to exorcise the shadow of his soul’ (Foucault 1977, 144). Yet even within this 
text there remains some ambiguity with regards to the precise form that a genealogy 
would take: ‘[Foucault] left us no extended methodological statement of this 
genealogy’ (Dean 1994, 14), and as such, there are a number of variations in the 
approaches to this method. 
Having been described as the ‘history of the present’ a genealogical method ‘is 
concerned with that which is taken-for-granted, assumed to be given, or natural within 
contemporary social existence, a givenness or naturalness questioned in the course of 
contemporary struggles’ (Dean 1994, 35). In considering the topic of citizenship, 
genealogy becomes useful by both exposing the incredible diversity of forms that it has 
taken during its historical development, but also highlighting that despite its presence 
across the globe, it is not a ‘natural’ way to conceive of or organise populations: 
‘genealogy addresses a particular kind if problem, namely, our being held captive by a 
particular picture, a way of thinking and acting, that is problematic in some respect 
such as, say, making certain exercises of power invisible’ (Owen 2005, 113). The 
elegant historical narratives that link citizenship to ancient societies give the false 
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impression that it is a ‘natural’ mode of organisation of populations, and fail to 
conceive of it as the result of a particular series of historical circumstances. 
This is not the first attempt at producing a genealogy of citizenship (Somers 2008; Isin 
2002, 1997), however the one presented here will differ somewhat to the accounts 
given by Somers and Isin. Both authors manage to articulate the importance of this 
method in this context: ‘[a]s we rethink citizenship, traditional history has nothing to 
teach us, by contrast, what genealogy can promise is to bring the present struggles into 
sharp focus and reveal the negotiations that are under way that open up new 
boundaries for citizenship’ (Isin 1997, 131). Thus the various articulations of 
citizenship consider ‘the different ways people belong to different collectivities and 
states’ (Yuval-Davis 2006, 198) and thus may illustrate divergent understandings and 
patterns of domination. In doing so ‘[g]enealogy aims to take up ‘minor’ or repressed 
knowledge’ (Somers 2008, 9), and by providing an account of citizenship that 
highlights the fact that it is historically contingent, we are also able to disrupt the ways 
in which citizenship is conceived today.  
Thus a ‘[g]enealogy, while rooted in involvement, guards against presentist effects by 
locating those positivities as the historically contingent outcome of trajectories of 
ensembles of discursive and non-discursive practices’ (Dean 1994, 36). Conceiving of 
the development of citizenship in this way also reinforces the importance of 
encounters, a concept which will be explained and developed in greater detail in the 
following chapter. As such, genealogy reminds us that ‘history is not the continuous 
line of the emergence of a people, but a series of discontinuous encounters between 
nations, cultures, others and other others’ (Ahmed 2000, 11). 
 Citizenship and its Genealogical Development 
The linear history often given of citizenship is very much a European one. This 
section will take apart this European narrative and instead of highlighting its 
historical continuity, it will point to these key periods of change and transformative 
events that caused ruptures in the development of citizenship. While there is great 
diversity in the ways in which citizenship has been enacted across the globe, this 
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particular analysis will focus largely on periods of rupture within its European 
development. This is not a claim to the universality of the arguments that follow, but 
rather an attempt to pick apart the existing dominant narrative. There is a need to 
recognise both that there have been significant differences in the emergence of 
citizenship within Europe, as well as the development of the concept outside Europe, 
illustrating that there are many alternative ways to present a genealogy of the subject.  
A majority of texts on citizenship start their historical account somewhere in Ancient 
Greece, with different proponents favouring Athens (Pocock 1995) or Sparta (Heater 
2004) as their point of departure; such an analysis would then often move to consider 
the variations present in Ancient Rome (Shafir 1998, 36), and perhaps compare the 
two. While one may contest that it was largely Aristotle’s Politics (Aristotle, Barker, 
and Stalley 1998) and Ethics (Aristotle 2014) that provided the vocabulary for 
citizenship, what terms such as ‘citizen’ have come to signify however, have changed 
so drastically, that drawing the connection between the two is misleading. The first 
indication of the failure of these linear narratives comes from the fact that these texts 
were ‘lost’ for many centuries, and not rediscovered until the thirteenth century where 
they started to appear in the works of philosophers and thinkers of the time. It was 
not until the Renaissance that these concepts were applied to populations in any 
meaningful sense (Magnette and Long 2005, 39). In this picking-up of ideas from 
previous historical periods, and applying them to new contexts, there were shifts in 
understandings: ‘[t]his re-emerging concept of citizenship was empirically built up over 
the decades. Each city defined, on a step by step basis, according to its interests and 
convictions, the rules of accession to its civic body, a panel of privileges and 
obligations for members of its elite’ (Magnette and Long 2005, 44). 
It is this vocabulary of ‘citizen’ and ‘state’ that can account for development of 
narratives that may connect these diverse and disparate forms: ‘new society operated 
not by the wholesale destruction of all that it had inherited from old society, but by 
selectively adapting the heritage of the past for its own use’ (Hobsbawm 1994, 16). 
Thus each place where citizenship began to remerge, defined the concept within its 
own terms: ‘it is very important to recognise that the status and practice of citizenship 
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emerged in specific places in response to specific struggles and conflicts. It is a 
contested and contingent field that allowed for the mediation of conflict, 
redistribution of wealth and recognition of various individual and group rights 
throughout history’ (Isin and Wood 1999, 5, emphasis original). 
Geopolitically, the treaty of Westphalia in 1648, illustrated a significant turning point 
in the organisation of the European state system, and caused the transition towards a 
model of dividing up the world within the realms of particular states (Gill 2010, 626). 
This would have increasingly significant implications later on, when the expectation 
was that not only was the world divided up into discrete partitions, but also that a 
similar logic was applied to individuals, and thus emerged a system that necessitated 
their connection with a particular state. The issues associated with this model, and 
especially for those who fall outside this framework, have been considered by Hannah 
Arendt, in her writings on the problems of post-World War II statelessness: ‘the 
trouble is that this calamity arose not from any lack of civilization, backwardness, or 
mere tyranny, but, on the contrary, that it could not be repaired, because there was no 
longer any ‘uncivilized’ spot on earth […] [o]nly with a completely organized humanity 
could the loss of home and political status become identical with expulsion from 
humanity altogether’ (Arendt [1951] 1973, 296–97).   
There were several other contributing factors which lead to the idea that required 
everyone to be a citizen of a nation-state. Eric Hobsbawm in his four part history that 
spans from the French Revolution to the mid-1990s (1987, 1988, 1994, 2006), 
highlights the role of both the French and the Industrial Revolutions as being two of 
the key sites for change globally in this period. These two revolutions – though 
considerably different in nature – resulted in transformations in society, which had 
similarly drastic consequences with regards to citizenship. The Industrial Revolution, 
essentially the emergence of modern capitalism and industrial modes of production, 
changed the nature of society profoundly. The impact of the French Revolution, by 
contrast, came from the spread of its ideas across the globe,2 thus capturing the 
																																								 																				
2 This is precisely the reason for the strategic absence of the American Revolution as an event of note in this 
analysis, and while certainly the cries of ‘no taxation without representation’ had some impact on people’s 
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‘modern’ imagination and inciting gradual reciprocal change in other parts of the 
world. In the crudest of explanations, it was the broader transformations illustrated by 
the Industrial Revolution which had caused the changes in society which necessitated 
altered forms of organisation and order, and it was the French Revolution, as an 
embodiment of the enlightenment thought, which became the catalyst for the 
development of our current understandings of citizen and state. In Turner and 
Hamilton’s Citizenship: Critical Concepts, they outline a similar standpoint: ‘[w]e should 
regard citizenship as an essentially modern institution which reflects the profound 
changes which have occurred in western societies following the democratic 
revolutions in France and America, and as a consequence of broader more general 
social changes associated with the Industrial Revolution, such as urbanisation and 
secularisation’ (1994, 4). 
The Industrial Revolution was not a singular event, but rather a gradual change in the 
means of production that is understood to have occurred in the latter half of the 
eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth century in Britain, before 
slowly spreading to other parts of the globe. While ‘gradualist’ analyses suggest these 
changes may not have been as all-encompassing as the claims presented by scholars 
such as Hobsbawm (who saw ‘the Industrial Revolution [as] the most fundamental 
transformation of human life in the history of the world recorded in written 
documents’ (Hobsbawm [1968] 1999, 13)) this ‘radical change was obvious to 
contemporaries’ of the period (Berg and Hudson 1992, 26), and is theorised by 
commentators of the time. This transition to new forms of manufacturing changed 
the fabric of society and human relations in a number of ways, and citizenship was 
slowly developing to deal with these transformations. 
Firstly, these changes offered greater possibilities of social mobility; they signalled the 
slow expansion of the middle class, and in general terms ushered in a gradual increase 
in the standards of living (though often in unequal ways). In addition, due to the 
availability of employment in urban centres, individuals were increasingly becoming 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																	
conceptions, they were nowhere near as profound in other parts of the world as the French Revolution had 
been. 
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urbanised as a result of their search for work. The industrial production of goods 
spurred on the development of new technologies and faster more reliable means of 
transport (Szostak 1991, 234). As a result of the need to circulate primary materials as 
well as people and manufactured goods, roads and railways were being constructed. 
These railway systems, especially in Britain, ensured the even faster industrial 
development of their societies. The Industrial Revolution therefore resulted in the 
‘double upheaval of the economic order and social hierarchies’ (Magnette and Long 
2005, 141). The disruptions to populations both required new ways to manage 
increasingly mobile populations and more and more diverse communities. 
Furthermore, it was in this context of industrial development as well as intensifying 
European colonialism, where ideas of nation and citizen were being spread to other 
parts of the world, and would be later taken up within post-colonial nationalisms 
(Chatterjee 1993).  
Highlighting this increasing ease of the transmission of ideas then becomes a 
convenient point from which to introduce the French Revolution. Unlike the 
Industrial Revolution, this refers to specific events, even though it is not the events 
themselves, but the ideas that emerged from them, which ensure its importance. The 
French Revolution was a period of social and political turmoil, commencing in 1789 
that marked the fall of the Monarchy, and a move towards nationalism (Furet 1981). 
It also resulted in The Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, which would 
become a further encouragement for the creation and legitimation of liberal 
democracies with a strong foundation in human rights. The events of the French 
Revolution were a catalyst for the spread of nationalism throughout the world. This is 
expressed by Theodoros Kolokotronis, one of the Revolutionary Leaders of the Greek 
War of Independence (1821-1829), where he states: ‘[a]ccording to my judgement, the 
French revolution and the doings of Napoleon opened the eyes of the world. The 
nations knew nothing before, and the people thought that kings were gods upon the 
earth and that they were bound to say whatever they did was well done. Through this 
more present change it is more difficult to rule the people’ (T. Kolokotronis, cited in 
Stavrianos and Stoianovich [1958] 2000, 212). 
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Through these emerging discourses of nationalism, citizenship became the primary 
means of the organisation of populations. Nationalism itself was an ideology that, 
using the basis of culture and politics, believed that all individuals belonged to a 
specific nation, into which the world could be divided. The French Revolution did 
not produce nationalism in any meaningful sense, it was rather the tool of its 
dispersal; the ideology itself had emerged in the works of the enlightenment thinkers 
well before the events themselves, which is clearly illustrated by Kedourie in his text 
on nationalism where he traces the origins of these ideas (1993). The French 
Revolution however became an inspiration for many popular movements towards 
independence. These ideas also played a significant role in the break-up of the multi-
ethnic empires of the period such as the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires. 
Nationalism became the vocabulary with which many of the post-colonial 
independence movements were able to articulate themselves, where through the 
pervasiveness of nationalism ‘even [their] imaginations must remain forever colonised’ 
(Chatterjee 1993, 5). 
One must not forget the role that technology played in enabling the creation of the 
modern nation state. Benedict Anderson’s account of the emergence of nationalism 
considers it as a result of ‘print capitalism’, in being able to spread ideas of the nation 
([1983] 2006). The move towards democratic regimes also required better technologies 
for determining who was and was not a national, which occurred concurrently with 
the emergence of new forms of identity documents to meet these demands (J. Torpey 
1999). The control and monitoring of the citizen has become increasingly important 
throughout history, as such ‘[t]he development of modern forms of organisation in all 
fields is nothing less than identical with the development and continual spread of 
bureaucratic administration […] [i]ts development is, to take the most striking case, at 
the root of the modern Western State […] The whole pattern of everyday life is cut to 
fit this framework’ (Weber and Roth [1925] 20, 223). The increasing ‘documentation’ 
of citizenship is both a cause and a consequences of the ‘total bureaucratisation’ 
(Graeber 2015, 18) of daily life.    
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The First and Second World Wars came to emphasise conceptions of citizenship that 
focused on the duties of the status, most notably that of conscription (Capozzola 
2008, 23). It also had several further consequences with regards to the topic: ‘while 
legislators and political theorists discussed the fairness of conscription, drafted men 
and their families […] found the state an increasing presence in their everyday lives’ 
(Capozzola 2008, 18), furthermore, ‘conscription created new categories of citizens: 
conscientious objectors, draft dodgers, veterans’ (Capozzola 2008, 22). The enormous 
disruptions caused by the Second World War in particular created populations whose 
citizenship was either contested or undetermined; many were rendered stateless. This 
resulted in the 1954 UN Convention on the Status of Stateless Persons, outlining the fact 
that all individuals had the right to a nationality (and thus citizenship, remembering 
that within international law, citizenship and nationality are synonymous), thus once 
again reinforcing both its universal application and importance (Arendt [1951] 1973, 
296).  
International events impacted on domestic understandings and policy. On both sides 
of the Iron Curtain, the Cold War had built a high level of distrust of foreign 
nationals (Lucas 1999, 13). The ‘hot’ conflicts of this period, most notably Vietnam, 
also created instances of migration and refugees that had consequences not only for 
the region, but also for the receiving countries (here an argument can certainly be 
made as to how the arrival of the Vietnamese in Australia had considerable 
consequences for conceptions for Australian nationhood and multiculturalism (Jupp 
2002, 37)). Broadly speaking, these conflicts, both hot and cold, created fear and 
suspicion, which solidified both the distrust of certain foreigners and the rejection of 
dual citizenship. However, the end of the Cold War, and the move away from 
conscription opened the doors for a broader acceptance of multiple citizenship 
statuses (Sejersen 2008, 540). 
The events of September 11, and the more general fear of terrorism has led to 
increasing securitisation and further use of technologies for monitoring citizens. This 
period has also seen more restrictive trends towards assimilation and integration (D. 
Kostakopoulou 2010, 837), and away from more multicultural policies. These events 
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were at least in part responsible for a turn away from theorisations that suggested 
trends towards more supranational forms of citizenship: ‘despite jubilant predictions 
by post-nationalists of the imminent demise of citizenship, the legal distinction 
between member and stranger is, if anything, back with a vengeance. This distinction 
has gained a renewed, and at times draconian, significance in the post 9/11 years’ 
(Shachar 2009, 2). Echoing this, others have illustrated how ‘securitization contributes 
directly to the intensification of conventional citizenship practice, as biometric 
technologies are employed to conceal and advance the heightened exclusionary and 
restrictive practices of contemporary ‘securitized citizenship’’ (Muller 2004, 291). 
The impact of migration on citizenship is nothing new, however the increasing 
‘movement of people across states revealed that citizenship is not only a set of rights, 
but also a mechanism of closure that sharply demarcates the boundaries of states’ 
(Joppke 1999, 630). Furthermore, the mixity of populations and these feelings of 
pervasive insecurity have created a paradoxical discourse around the subject whereby 
‘‘citizenship’ was the name of what was threatened by a ‘balkanising’ multiculturalism 
and conversely what possessed the moral capital to defeat it’ (Scobey 2001, 15). 
Finally, the impact of neoliberal logic on migration also created systems of mobility 
that often gave precedence to those with means (Sparke 2006), highlighting Ong’s 
claim that neoliberalism creates exceptions to citizenship (2006a), and as such moves 
away from the more traditional conceptions of the equality of citizens. 
 
There is little doubt of the impact of capitalist development with regards to 
citizenship which is seen in both Benedict Anderson’s conceptions that were outlined 
earlier as well as the transformations brought about by the Industrial Revolution more 
broadly. This impact has continued with the increasing significance of neoliberalism 
that will be developed within later chapters: ‘[w]ithin the neoliberal form of 
government, the concept of the citizen is thus transformed. The so-called ‘passive’ 
citizen of the welfare state becomes the autonomous ‘active’ citizen with rights, duties, 
obligations, and expectations – the citizen as active entrepreneur of the self; the 
citizen as morally superior. This is not simply a reactivation of liberal values of self-
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reliance, autonomy and independence as the necessary conditions for self-respect, self-
esteem, self-worth, and self-advancement but rather an emphasis on enterprise and the 
capitalization of existence itself through calculated acts and investments combined 
with the shrugging off of collective responsibility for the vulnerable and marginalized’ 
(Davies and Bansel 2007, 252). Neoliberalism is encouraging an orientation towards 
citizenship which focuses on individual advantages, rather than the more traditional 
discourses of rights and duties. 
Above all, what this genealogy of citizenship has shown, is while there may be broader 
semantic links that suggest that the origins of citizenship lie in antiquity, citizenship 
itself is the product of countless transformations. Each society has reinterpreted the 
concept in its own way and adapted it to its own ends. These changes are not 
necessarily grand or dramatic, but may rather come from gradual shifts in response to 
changing populations or technologies. As such we must realise that despite the 
longevity of the term, citizenship as we know it today is not an organic formulation, 
but rather the product of both historical accident and our specific circumstances. 
Acknowledging this also highlights the constructed nature of the various articulations 
of citizenship, but also the possibilities available to us to promote change within it. 
 Citizenship Contexts 
Having already traced the general historical developments and points of rupture 
which lead to the foundation of citizenship as the primary means of organisation of 
populations, it is necessary to note the individual variations that have occurred within 
each nation state. As the empirical elements of this thesis focus primarily on the 
Australian and Greek contexts, the next section of this chapter will establish the 
historical and cultural foundations of the respective citizenships of these two nation 
states. This however will not be the sort of account that seeks to form some sort of 
comparative approach upholding a historical institutionalist understanding (cf. 
Brubaker 1992), instead these two cases seek to be examples of the diverse ways in 
which citizenship emerges across time and in different locations. 
Historicising Citizenship 
	
46	
 Australian Citizenship  
There are two striking features in the development of Australian citizenship and its 
translation into law. The first relates to the almost glacial pace of its development: the 
official legal status of ‘Australian Citizen’ has existed for a little over 65 years, and it is 
only in the last 30 or so years that the status has not been issued concurrently with 
that of ‘British subject’. Secondly, this status is essentially ‘hollow’, the legislation that 
surrounds it clearly outlines who has it and how it can be bestowed, but any 
elaboration regarding its content is conspicuously and purposefully absent. The 
following historical analysis will trace the major legal and political developments in 
the establishing of Australian citizenship, and will draw conclusions as to its origins 
and effects. 
In light of the insights of the role of the ‘nation-state’ in our understanding of 
citizenship, the most obvious point of departure for this analysis is the Federation of 
Australia in 1901. It must not be forgotten, however, that the system that was 
instituted with the founding of the Constitution was strongly informed by the policies 
and concerns of the six self-governing British colonies3 which were to join together, 
and yet still maintain their own systems of government. The major concern of officials 
reticent towards federation was the possible loss of power at the state level, a fact 
made evident in the debates of the Australasian Federal Convention of 1897-8; this 
convention was one of several held to establish the foundations of the Australian 
Constitution. During the proceedings there was considerable debate as to the issue of 
citizenship, a term which was largely absent in British law at the time due to their 
preference for ‘subject’. Delegates argued as to the nature and definition of the 
citizenship, and its possible role, only to be faced with the inability to settle on an 
agreed upon usage. Eventually, neither the rights and responsibilities of citizenship, 
nor the status itself, became part of the Australian Constitution of 1901.  
The relative tardiness of the emergence of citizen as a term of use has its roots in the 
nature of the Australian federal system; the fact that it was not included in the 
																																								 																				
3 These were Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria, Tasmania, South Australia and Western Australia. 
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Constitution, had as much to do with state fears regarding the loss of control over 
their populations, as it did with the desire to perpetuate their strong links with 
Britain.4 The reason several states were so unwilling to codify the rights and existence 
of Australian citizenship at a Federal level was due to concerns that this would 
encroach on their abilities to legislate and thus discriminate with regards to their 
populations. It was decided reasonably early on that they would not apply the 
American model, which clearly outlined the rights of citizens within their constitution 
(the Bill of Rights); but any written constitution was still considerably different from 
the ‘unwritten’ British model.5 These decisions had significant and far-reaching 
consequences: ‘[t]he Australian founders eschewed putting any core positive notion of 
citizenship in the constitution precisely to allow the states to perpetuate their 
discriminatory regimes and to allow the new Commonwealth parliament to 
implement a national regime of discrimination’ (Chesterman 1997, 3). The power of 
the individual states with regard to the control of status continued for many years, 
and naturalisation did not become a federal power until the implementation of the 
Naturalisation Act in 1903.  
The first official codification of a citizenship-like status, came with the Nationality Act 
of 1920, which did nothing more than codify the then existing de facto regime that 
had endured largely unchanged since Federation (Dutton 2002, 16). Members of the 
Australian polity were still classed as ‘British subjects’ except that now this status was 
codified under Australian law. This tendency towards the codification of already 
existing de facto regimes is something quite common internationally with regards to 
citizenship legislation. Where gaps in legislature are evident, it is often the case that 
bureaucrats function with ‘working definitions’, which may or may not later be 
codified into law. This de facto acceptance or acknowledgement is the reality in which 
many dual citizens of various countries find themselves in today. Despite having made 
these claims regarding the absence of the term in legislative use, it must be noted that 
the idea of an Australian citizen and citizenship had been cultivated publicly by some 
																																								 																				
4 The Australian Census of 1901, the first ‘national’ census, showed that 98% of Australians had British 
ancestral origins, a figure that remained relatively stable up until the end of the Second World War. 
5 Britain has an ‘unwritten’/’uncodified’ constitution that is made up of many rulings, statutes and policies 
over a considerable period of time, and does not exist in the form of a solitary document. 
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even prior to Federation (Dutton 2002, 17); there are certainly cases where it has been 
used to encourage the emergence of an Australian identity as distinct from a British 
one. This however was not the primary catalyst for the emergence of the term within 
Australian law. 
The official legislative creation of Australian Citizenship came with the Nationality and 
Citizenship Act 1948, which was implemented on Australia Day 1949. This bill, 
introduced by Arthur Caldwell, the then Minister for Immigration, did not present a 
considerable rupture with what had come before it. On the event of the introduction 
of the bill into the House of Representatives he commented: ‘[t]he bill is not designed 
to make an Australian any less a British subject, but to help him express his pride in 
citizenship in this great country’ (Chesterman and Galligan 1999, 30). It is not a 
coincidence that a bill of this nature was introduced by a Minister for Immigration, as 
many of the changes to the formal status of Australian ‘citizenship’ have been induced 
by the needs that emerged through the successive periods of immigration. Thus the 
official introduction of the term of ‘Australian Citizen’ in 1949 was done as a means 
to clarify the status as a response to the waves of post-war immigration. In short, this 
legislation came about from ‘the need to administer an (even more) diversifying 
population during a period of mass immigration […] it was about who should belong, 
and not what their entitlements should be’ (Walter and MacLeod 2002, 7). Needless 
to say, the implementation of this status retained the aforementioned ‘hollowness’ of 
its predecessors. It was also during this period that we saw the introduction of the 
Australian citizenship ceremony, as a means to better assimilate those being 
naturalised. These ceremonies also illustrated Australia’s continued ties to Britain: up 
until 1994 ‘New Australians’, were still having to swear their oath to the queen, and at 
various times, the Union Jack and a portrait of the queen were present at these 
ceremonies.  
While ‘natural-born citizens’ were often given greater stability under the law than 
those who had naturalised, the reality of being a natural-born citizen did not 
automatically predispose that individual to the whole body of rights, which is best 
illustrated through the situation of Australia’s Indigenous peoples. As Chesterman 
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and Galligan comment: “[i]n egalitarian Australia […] subjecthood or citizenship was 
easily acquired – one simply had to be born here – and at the same time one’s formal 
status as a citizen meant very little. The crucial divide was between those citizens who 
had rights and privileges and those who were denied them’ (1997, 4). Both State and 
Commonwealth governments excluded the Aboriginal people from various 
entitlements such as welfare payments, pensions and benefits; most notably, in 1902, 
the Commonwealth Franchise Act forbade them from voting. This system was not to 
be remedied until the second half of the twentieth century with the changes to the 
Electoral Act in 1962, and the symbolic victory of the 1967 Referendum, among 
others.  
The status of British subject would exist in parallel with that of Australian citizenship 
for many years following the adoption of the 1948 Act. Its dissolution was gradual, 
and in 1969, changes to the 1948 Act meant that individuals retained only the status 
of being British subjects and ceased to be them officially. This came at a time when 
Britain herself was undergoing a shift in focus as policies were changing to reflect ‘the 
disintegration of its empire and its move towards integration of the EEC [European 
Economic Community]’ (Dutton 2002, 17). In 1973 the Act underwent further 
amendments by abolishing the distinction between individuals originating from the 
Commonwealth and individuals from other countries who aimed to naturalise; prior 
to this, those who arrived from the Commonwealth received simpler conditions and 
preferential treatment. It was not until subsequent amendments were undertaken in 
1984, over 80 years following federation, that Australians would no longer be 
regarded as British subjects, even in name. 
Issues of race long existed as part of immigration policy even prior to the Federation 
of Australia in 1901.  This is evidenced by the White Australia Policy, a collective 
name given to the various policies that limited non-European migration from the 
1880s (Jupp 2002, 9). This trend continued following Federation, with the then new 
Australian Parliament passing the Immigration Restriction Act of 1901, which, while 
not explicitly excluding people on the basis of race, included a 50 word dictation test. 
This test, which could be given in any European language of the officer’s choosing, 
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was used as a way to exclude ‘less desirable’ individuals (Palfreeman 1958, 43). The 
Immigration Restriction Act was not replaced until the Migration Act of 1958, which, 
subsequent to numerous amendments, still remains in place. It was not however until 
changes made by the Whitlam Government in the mid-1970s that one can speak of a 
definitive end to the White Australia Policy (Jupp 2002, 37). 
Following the end of the racial constraints placed on immigration, ‘restrictiveness was 
being reordered rather than erased’ (Walsh 2014, 588). While in the post-war context, 
immigration was viewed as necessary to provide a workforce for the growth of 
industry, the move to more neoliberal priorities meant, policies were aimed at 
attracting skilled migrants. Permanent Residency Visas have long been a part of the 
Australian migration landscape, but these too have been subject to a periodisation. 
Up until 2000, the vast majority of permanent visas were given to applicants who 
applied and were granted their visas offshore. Since then policies moved towards a 
two-step migration process whereby individuals first apply for a temporary visa – 
usually skilled migrant or student visas – and after a period of ‘temporary’ residence 
may then apply for permanent residency (Gregory 2014, 8). Other forms of visas such 
as Working Holiday Visas are also available, however their terms are more precarious. 
In the Australian context this has created a ‘two-tiered system in which highly-skilled 
workers and students are extended opportunities for settlement and incorporation, 
while, for other workers [on more precarious temporary visas], restrictions on 
residency and the accompaniment of dependents are intended to discourage 
integration and induce their return’ (Walsh 2014, 596). 
If further insight is needed into the fact that immigration issues were a driving force 
behind citizenship legislation, then one need look no further than the 1986 
Amendment, which effectively abolished ius soli,6 establishing that children born in 
Australia will only be considered citizens by birth if their parents are either citizens or 
permanent residents. This amendment was made to ensure that ‘[c]itizenship was not 
																																								 																				
6 Ius soli or right of the soil, effectively established that all those born within the nation-state were citizens by 
birth. This principle in the Australian context was a remnant of the British influence as it had existed there 
since 1608 with the Common Law legal decision widely known as Calvin’s Case.  
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to be abused in order to gain an immigration advantage’ (Rubenstein 1995, 507) and 
followed several court cases in which non-citizen parents were using their children’s 
citizenship in order to avoid deportation. Thus the claim that has already been made 
holds true; the ‘[o]fficial discourse on citizenship in Australia then has much less to do 
with questions of civil and political rights, democracy and popular sovereignty, than 
with problems of incorporating immigrants’ (Dutton 2002, 18). 
The most recent legislation in this area has effectively legalised dual citizenship. Since 
2002 Australians who became citizens of another country by a voluntary act, no 
longer lost their citizenship. This was just one of several changes that were to take 
place during this period. In 1999 a report was handed down by the Australian 
Citizenship Council; with its 64 recommendations, this report would form the basis 
for the changes that came into effect in 2007 when The Australian Citizenship Act 2007 
replaced the 1948 Act. The changes attempted to make the document more 
accessible, focused on a more inclusive approach to Australian citizenship and 
instituted a number of security measures to give the government greater control in 
responding to terrorist threats. Once again the legislation was largely silent on the 
issue of content, and so the claims regarding the hollowness of the legislation remain 
valid: ‘Australian citizenship […] has no coherent substance, because the 
Commonwealth government has never put it there and the Australian populace has 
not demanded it. And, crucially, very few of the ‘rights’ identified for Australian 
citizens exist as foundational or constitutional rights which the government cannot 
infringe’ (Dutton 2002, 19). 
Thus, when one speaks of Australian citizenship, it is terribly difficult to highlight a 
specific date of birth; it is certainly something that has been ‘incrementally defined’ 
(Dyrenfurth 2005, 87) and has undergone considerable changes over time. It was not 
present in the original Constitution and has not been added since.7 Thus the premise 
that is found in Hindness’ work holds true in the Australian context, that citizenship 
is primarily about establishing the boundaries of the national unit (Hindess 1998), 
																																								 																				
7 ‘…citizenship of Australia is not mentioned in the Australian Constitution, although citizenship of a 
foreign power is mentioned in s 44(i) as a disqualification for membership of the Australian parliament’ 
(Rubenstein 1995, 505). 
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which becomes increasingly obvious when one notes the fact that major changes with 
regard to citizenship have occurred as a response to questions of immigration and 
migrant incorporation. 
It is also necessary to realise the extent to which Australian citizenship – in both the 
official legal sense and the more practical substantive sense – has been influenced by 
external political, historical and ideological factors. It is no coincidence that Canada’s 
first laws regarding citizenship (1947) emerged a few short years prior to Australia’s, or 
that the subsequent changes were also informed by Britain’s slow turn towards 
Europe and away from what was once her Empire. Ongoing international trends have 
continued to inform Australian legislation and approaches. Citizenship once again 
became a topic of note in the decade that lead up to the Centenary of Federation.  
Many scholars (Dutton 2002; Dyrenfurth 2005; Chesterman and Galligan 1999), 
suggest that this came as a result of the domestic factors such as government policies 
and popular interest in the topic in the lead up to the centenary. While there is some 
validity to these claims, this is also the period in which there were broader 
international academic and political trends towards discussing the issue of citizenship; 
debates raged around the world on issues caused by increased migration and other 
perceived effects of globalisation. Internationally citizenship became a subject of 
widespread scholarly interest, and Australia as a consequence became involved in her 
own debates. 
This section, albeit brief, has attempted to sketch out the key trends and major 
changes that are associated with Australian citizenship. The following section of this 
chapter will now move on to a brief analysis of the origins and history of Greek 
citizenship, which, as will be illustrated, differs quite substantially from the Australian 
example. 
 Greek Citizenship 
 It must come as no surprise that the history and development of Greek citizenship is 
altogether different from that of the Australian case. It has however considerable 
similarities with other Balkan states that, following the fall of the Ottoman Empire, 
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had substantial difficulties staking their claim on the region’s diverse populations and 
shaping them into discrete nation states. This situation was made increasingly 
complex by the various geopolitical changes in the surrounding areas as a result of 
both regional conflicts and the two World Wars; Greece’s borders were not to take 
their current form until after the Second World War. What has remained unchanged, 
however, is the way the nation is perceived in strong ethno-cultural terms. 
The most notable and longstanding aspect of Greek Citizenship Law is their strong 
(albeit selective) adherence to the principle of ius sanguinis8, whereby citizenship is 
bestowed along ethnic hereditary lines. The basic premise of Greek Nationality law, 
found originally in the Civil Law on Nationality (1856), has been: ‘Greek is whomever 
has been born to a Greek father’ (Christopoulos 2012, 74), a principle that stood for 
almost 100 years before it was replaced in 1955 with the Greek Nationality Code 
(hereafter GNC), which adhered to similar principles. If there is any doubt as to the 
strong ethnic character of citizenship in the Greek context, one need only look 
towards the word which is its most commonly used translation, ‘ιθαγένεια’ 
(ithagenia), which etymologically retains these notions of birth and descent.9  
Many of Greece’s policy directions have been strongly influenced by its dual dilemma; 
in gaining independence from the Ottoman Empire, its internal population 
contained individuals who were not ethnically Greek, in addition to the fact that 
there were still a considerable number of ethnic Greeks living outside its borders. This 
was made all the more important by the reality that the state perceived itself 
ideologically as founded on a strong ethnic Greek character, based largely on the 
Greek Language and Orthodox Christian faith. So what constitutes someone who is 
ethnically Greek? While at different stages this definition has undergone alteration 
and amendment, according to Law 2756/1983, it is based on the existence of a 
‘Greek national consciousness […] deduced from characteristics of personality which 
refer to common descent, language, religion, national traditions and extensive 
knowledge of the historical events of the nation’ (Triandafyllidou and Veikou 2002, 
																																								 																				
8 Literally, ‘law of the blood’, further explained in Chapter Three. 
9 For a full discussion of the issues associated with translating the concept of citizenship from Greek into 
English, see Chapter Four. 
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198), a definition, like many of its other variations that is vague enough to leave the 
ultimate decision up to bureaucratic and state discretion.  
Practically the only early exception to the ius sanguinis principle came from the 
incorporation of foreign women married to Greek men, who automatically gained 
Greek citizenship upon marriage, regardless of whether they wanted to or not. In 
addition, it was only Greek men who were able to pass their citizenship on to their 
children – except in the case of children born out of wedlock – and Greek women 
who married foreign men, lost their citizenship automatically. Through the 1980s 
there were gradual changes to these policies, with the introduction of stricter criteria 
and periods of residence for the naturalisation of foreign women. Then in 1984, as 
part of a broader push for greater gender equality, Greek women no longer 
automatically lost their citizenship when they married foreign men and were now able 
to pass their citizenship onto their children (Anagnostou 2011, 7).  
At this point it is useful to outline two terms that are used in the Greek language and 
often found in legislation in this area; these are Οµογενείς (Homogeneis, of the same 
birth/descent) and Αλλογενείς (Allogeneis, of a different birth/descent). Within the 
legislature, members of the Greek nation are not necessarily the state’s citizens, but 
rather the Homogeneis, those with a Greek ethnicity. Broadly speaking, those identified 
as Homogeneis – as members of the Greek nation – have some claim to Greek 
citizenship, and thus for them, in most cases the process of obtaining citizenship can 
be relatively easy. Allogeneis, on the other hand have been faced with considerable 
hostility, and historically their chances of obtaining citizenship were almost non-
existent. Even within the country there has been strong hostility to minorities by the 
Greek State which has continued well into recent years. There have been a number of 
attempts at homogenizing the Greek population which included the exchange of 
populations with Turkey and Bulgaria following World War I, as well as policies that 
attempted to stop individuals using languages other than Greek (especially in relation 
to the Macedonian and Albanian speaking minorities). As further evidence of these 
strong ethnic considerations, Greece realised remarkably early on, the benefits that 
came from maintaining connections with their departed homogeneis and diaspora 
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groups, and a new law 120/1914 was passed in 1914 thereby allowing all individuals 
born after this date to maintain their Greek Citizenship, even after being naturalised 
abroad (Christopoulos 2013, 4). This effectively legalised Dual Citizenship for ethnic 
Greeks, and even more recent policy and rhetoric shows the continued perceived 
value of these ‘Greek foreign nationals’. 
There has certainly been a European influence in the changes made to the GNC 
(Greek Nationality Code). Greece joined the European Economic Community in 
1981, which spurred several reforms including those aforementioned relating to 
gender equality. Following the Maastricht Treaty and the foundation of European 
Citizenship (1992), having Greek citizenship bestowed the individual with European 
Citizenship granting them the right to work, reside and vote in local elections in other 
EU nation states, along with many other advantages.10 This increased the perceived 
value of Greek citizenship in the eyes of non-citizen ethnic Greeks living abroad, and 
encouraged them to pursue citizenship, often motivated by the possibilities of living 
and working in Europe, though the compulsory military service required of Greek 
males was a mitigating factor. 
Despite the strong adherence to the principle of ius sanguinis, this was not applied 
equally to all individuals who could claim to be ethnically Greek. Following the fall of 
communism in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Greece was faced with an influx of 
individuals from former communist states claiming a Greek ethnicity. The two main 
groups here were the Pontic Greeks from the former Soviet Union and the Greek 
Albanians, both of which could make substantial claims relating to their Greek 
ancestry. The legislative response that emerged shows the degree to which citizenship 
can be instrumentalised to support national interests. It was decided that citizenship 
would be offered to Pontic Greeks whose current country of citizenship allowed dual 
statuses. The decision was made not to extend this offer to the Greek Albanian 
population, as the Government desired to keep those populations where they were to 
maintain their possible claim on the southern regions of Albania. Amid increasing 
																																								 																				
10 For the full details of the rights and responsibilities associated with European Citizenship, please see 
Chapter Three, and for a discussion on the ways in which European Citizenship is imagined outside 
Europe, see Chapter Six. 
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pressure, this distinction was overturned in 2001, when they were given a ‘favourable 
legal status, short of citizenship or ‘quasi-citizenship’’ (Konsta and Lazaridis 2010, 
375), and then in 2008 the process of obtaining full citizenship was simplified 
allowing them to forgo the ten-year wait for naturalisation that is applicable in other 
cases, a change that came at least in part as a result of Albania’s new policy allowing 
dual citizenship (Konsta and Lazaridis 2010, 376–77). 
Like most of the countries of Southern Europe (Portugal, Spain and Italy), from the 
mid-1970s, Greece went from being a country of emigration to one of immigration. 
This unprecedented influx of individuals from different countries – initially from 
Egypt and Turkey, then Albania, and later from countries such as Afghanistan, Syria, 
Pakistan and parts of Africa – essentially caught Greece unawares. This meant, both 
in terms of legislation and infrastructure, Greece was ill-equipped to deal with these 
changes and as a result the policy was ‘reactive and piecemeal [in] character’ 
(Triandafyllidou 2009, 160), with the first immigration law not voted in till 2001 
(Triandafyllidou 2009, 165). As Triandafyllidou and Veikou suggest: ‘[t]he reluctance 
of the Greek Government to accept immigration as a long term feature of society was 
at first partly related to the novelty and unexpected character of the phenomenon […] 
the continuing lack of a comprehensive policy framework […] suggest[s] that there is a 
relationship between this reluctance and the ethnocultural definition of Greek 
nationality and citizenship’ (2002, 191).  
Over the past decade or more, Greece has been a key entry point for irregular 
migration into Europe (Triandafyllidou et al. 2014, 3), and ‘while irregular migration 
into the EU as a whole has dropped in recent years, entries into Greece have grown to 
constitute the large majority of detected illegal border crossings into the continent’ 
(Cheliotis 2013, 726). Furthermore, given recent conflicts in the Middle East, most 
notably that in Syria, the number of refugee arrivals have also increased, with ‘Greece 
overtaking Italy as the primary point of arrival’ (UNHCR 2015, 11). The state is once 
again ill-equipped to deal with such large flows having neither ‘the infrastructure [nor] 
services to address the basic needs of the people arriving’ (UNHCR 2015, 13). 
Furthermore, the failure of Greece to implement various European directives resulted 
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in the country being brought in front of the European Court of Justice as ‘[n]ot only 
were asylum applicants routinely placed in detention and when released given no 
assistance for housing or subsistence, but also, and most importantly, their 
applications were routinely rejected without a proper examination or interview’ 
(Triandafyllidou 2014, 420). 
Finally, regarding the nationality code, there was almost no opportunity for the 
naturalisation of non-ethnic Greeks. This changed briefly in 2010 with the passing of 
the law 3838/2010 which allowed non-ethnic Greek individuals to apply for 
citizenship, under several very strict provisions (Christopoulos 2013, 10), however 
towards the end of 2012, the State Council ruled that the law was unconstitutional, 
and was annulled in early 2013 (Triandafyllidou 2014, 418). This annulment 
coincided with increasing hostility towards migrants in Greece during the ongoing 
financial crisis which saw falling incomes and skyrocketing unemployment, as well as 
cuts to welfare and services:‘[t]he categorisation between ‘us’ Greek citizens and ‘them’ 
foreigners was compounded by the economic crisis’ (Triandafyllidou 2014, 417). The 
most discriminatory aspect of the law was that prior to 2010 the judicial and 
administrative bodies that made decisions with regards to residency and citizenship 
were not required to respond within a certain time frame (as is the case in Greece 
with other legal and judicial decisions) or provide any justification for their choices; 
without such justification, the individuals subject to these decisions had been unable 
to appeal them, so case law in this area is notably absent. This, along with several of 
the other policy decisions described above suggests once more the ‘discretionary 
character’ (Anagnostou 2011, 2) of Greek citizenship.  
 Conclusion 
There is nothing ‘natural’ about citizenship. It is a status and a mode of organisation 
that has been reinvented in countless places and historical periods. The citizenship 
that most individuals today are familiar with, that of the nation state with its regimes 
of national documents and symbols, is the product of historical accident and its global 
reach is at least in part a consequence of the spread of the idea of nationalism as well 
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as of European imperialism. The ongoing re-imagination and re-deployment of the 
vocabulary of citizenship is a reminder that it is in a constant state of development 
and transformation, but also that it may change drastically depending on its particular 
context. 
This fractured development and the influence of a particular set of historical 
circumstances can also be seen in the emergence of citizenship within the Australian 
and Greek contexts. It is possible to note, at least from a policy perspective, that 
further changes have also come as a result of responses to perceived risks, or even the 
writing into policy of the existing de facto regimes. As such, this chapter has sought to 
break apart conceptions of citizenship that see it as something that is either static or 
‘natural’. Citizenship is a tool for the management of populations, as well as 
membership in a community, that is contextually dependent and undergoes constant 
processes of change. 
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3. Encountering Citizenship  
There is no denying the importance of citizenship within the social sciences, yet it can 
be argued that its significance is at least in part a consequence of its ambiguity: ‘[t]here 
is no notion more central in politics than citizenship, and none more variable in 
history, or contested in theory’ (Shklar 1991, 1). Citizenship has become part of how 
we belong in a community, how we identify ourselves and how we come to 
understand our political participation. However the expansive use of the concept of 
citizenship has led it to be diagnosed with an ‘analytical debility that is the simple 
product of the struggle to impose intellectual order through too few ideas upon too 
vast and heterogeneous a range of experience’ (Magnette and Long 2005, 4). As such, 
this chapter will perform three key functions. Firstly, it will give a general outline of 
why the literature on the topic of citizenship is problematic in terms of scope, and 
indicate how previous attempts at organising the subject along binary and categorical 
lines have contributed to citizenship’s obfuscation as a subject of investigation. In the 
second instance, this chapter will introduce the notion of encounter as it has emerged 
largely from the discipline of human geography. This will consider the previous uses 
of the concept of encounter and illustrate the ways in which this thesis will take these 
concepts further. Finally, given that encounters ‘hesitate between the domain of the 
particular – the face-to-face encounter – and the general – the framing of the 
particular encounter by broader relationships of power and antagonism’ (Ahmed 
2000, 9), this chapter will provide a brief background to some of the existing 
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institutions and theories of citizenship, which will form the foundations with which 
we can better understand the three substantive chapters. 
 The Problems of Defining Citizenship 
As much of the content that precedes this chapter has suggested, the unitary term 
‘citizenship’ has masked considerable ambiguity and diversity. At various times it may 
be evoked as a policy or legal term, a theoretical concept, and may refer to both the 
status of belonging to a community and the practice of engaging politically within it, 
not to mention the various populist articulations of the term and its vernacular usage. 
Furthermore, the national designators, such as ‘Chinese’ or ‘French’, that come to 
define specific citizenships, provide us with a vocabulary for identity and being in the 
world. Its pervasiveness gives us the (false) impression of it being a somewhat organic 
formulation. But as the previous chapter has shown, citizenship is not ‘natural’, but 
instead, is something forged, created, articulated, theorised, and written into law and 
policy. Research on citizenship has emerged in diverse and surprising ways, suggesting 
the impossibility of giving a singular comprehensive evaluation of the literature. 
Citizenship has also been characterised by an immense proliferation of texts on the 
subject over the last three decades: ‘[s]ince being awakened from a long dormancy at 
the end of the twentieth century, studies of citizenship have been making up for lost 
time at a breathtaking pace’ (Somers 2008, 12). As early as 1994, scholars were 
speaking of the ‘return of the citizen’, the ‘explosion of interest in the concept of 
citizenship’ and the fact that citizenship had become a ‘buzz word’ (Kymlicka and 
Norman 1994). This period coincides with increasing research being undertaken into 
migration, identity, transnationalism and diaspora and these influences can be seen 
within the academic literature on the topic of citizenship more broadly. This period 
was also characterised by the expansion of the concept of citizenship into other 
domains, and also the proliferation of variations on ‘citizenship with an adjective’.  
Since the 1990s, when citizenship entered its current period of ‘semantic vogue’ 
(Magnette and Long 2005, 2), the sheer promiscuity of it as a subject has ensured that 
there are a wide variety of topics that it has been theorized in relation to. One may 
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now speak of ‘flexible citizenship’ (Ong 1999), ‘multicultural citizenship’ (Kymlicka 
1996), ‘transnational citizenship’ (Fox 2005), ‘extra-territorial citizenship’ (Fitzgerald 
2000), ‘citizenship light’ (Caglar 2004), ‘cosmopolitan citizenship’ (Linklater 1998), 
‘cultural citizenship’ (Pakulski 1997), and ‘trans-border citizenship’ (Schiller 2005), 
among others. It has also become a term that has been applied to concepts that one 
would not traditionally consider as cognate: theorists have also developed notions of 
‘digital citizenship’ (Mossberger, Tolbert, and McNeal 2007), ‘corporate citizenship’ 
(Matten and Crane 2005), ‘intimate citizenship’ (Plummer 2003), ‘biological 
citizenship’ (N. Rose and Novas 2004), ‘insurgent citizenship’ (Holston 2008), ‘sexual 
citizenship’ (Evans 2013), ‘ecological citizenship’ (Seyfang 2006), ‘health citizenship’ 
(Komporozos-Athanasiou et al. 2016), and numerous others. This sizable yet far from 
exhaustive list, is an indication of both the diversity of the subject, as well as its 
problematic ‘semantic dilution’ (Magnette and Long 2005, 3).  
These diverse applications of the concept of citizenship have also ensured that it has 
been engaged with by numerous disciplines as diverse as demography, anthropology, 
sociology, cultural and political geography, political sciences, legal studies, gender 
studies, post-colonial studies and countless others. While sociological and 
anthropological approaches dominate much of the participation literature, 
approaches that focus on status have long been associated with legal, policy or 
demographic perspectives. This also suggests the diverse methodologies that have been 
applied to citizenship’s investigation. No truly comprehensive studies have yet 
occurred in relation to the scholarship on citizenship, but drawing on the literature in 
other fields, such as that of migration, shows how this disciplinary divide can have 
significant theoretical and methodological implications (Brettell and Hollifield 2000, 
7).  
In studies of citizenship, the literature has often developed quite differently between 
the various disciplines. Some of the clearest studies in relation to the understanding 
of the topic from a more qualitative perspective have emerged, unsurprisingly, from 
the field of anthropology (e.g. Ong 1999; Siu 2001; Carruthers 2002;  as well as the 
aforementioned Hage 2000); sociological and migration studies more frequently 
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consider questions of citizenship and integration (Koopmans 2009; Soysal 1994 
among others), whereas the field of politics, as expected, tends to deal more directly 
with topics relating to citizenship policy (Howard 2010; Bauböck 2006; Escobar 
2007). While I am not suggesting that all studies remain tightly within their particular 
discipline, this ‘division of labour’, while far from being unusual, has led to a lack of 
more across-the-board studies of the topic.  
Thus citizenship is somewhat of a ‘dirty’ word; it has come to mean so much, that in 
reality the term on its own means very little. Furthermore, as the previous chapter has 
shown, these definitions are often contextual and change over time. Thus definitional 
work plays a key role in the scholarship on the subject. Citizenship is one of several 
complex terms that have received considerable attention within the social science 
literature, with other notable examples being those of ‘identity’ or ‘culture’, both of 
which can (and have) been theorised in relation to citizenship. It is, however, no 
coincidence that these terms have been some of the most widely theorised in recent 
decades, and it may well be their very ‘indefinability’ that make them so. As Abbot 
claims: this ‘explains the persistence of terms that appear to be undefinable despite 
their central importance to our disciplines. They survive because they are indexical 
terms that facilitate our discourse by their very indexicality. They give us a common if 
slippery language to establish relations between one another. They provide an 
extraordinary powerful element both for offense and defence in academic discourse’ 
(2001, 27). As Isin suggests, the question should not be ‘what is citizenship?’, but 
rather ‘what is called citizenship?’ (Isin 2009). 
 Problematic Binaries 
Due to the problem, articulated above, of the complexity of citizenship as a subject, 
much of the current literature serves to explain the concept by straight-jacketing it 
into various categories and binary understandings. As such, ‘a good deal of existing 
work recognises the complexity, and potential ambiguity of the citizenship construct. 
However extant approaches generally treat conceptual vagueness as [a] practical, 
political and analytic problem. Consequently, authors often attempt to impose 
conceptual order by forming tidy taxonomies of dimensions or models of citizenship. 
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Researchers typically contribute to these reifying tendencies’ (Condor 2011, 197). 
This section will consider some of these problematic categories and binaries, as well as 
illustrating their consequences in terms of more general understandings of the topic. 
The following section will then illustrate how approaching citizenship using the 
concept of encounter helps us overcome these ‘reifying tendencies’. 
The desire to present any concept in a clear and digestible format is a common one. 
In undertaking analysis, it helps to have ordered and unambiguous foundations on 
which to build, however, sometimes through the imposition of these categories we can 
obscure the very subjects that we attempt to define. This has been the case with many 
of the approaches to citizenship. Perhaps the clearest illustration of this has been the 
analytic distinction between ‘citizen’ and ‘non-citizen’. While the boundaries of who is 
a citizen or not, may be comparatively simple to ascertain through policy 
investigations or by requesting documents, this distinction often obscures more than 
it illuminates.  
There are a number of reasons why this binary is problematic, and these issues exist 
regardless of whether the focus is more status or practice based. Firstly, this 
citizen/non-citizen distinction obscures the fact that ‘[t]ime and again we see subjects 
that are not citizens act as citizens’ (Isin 2009, 371). Furthermore, from a more rights 
based perspective, one must remember that ‘non-resident citizens are citizen non-
residents elsewhere’ and that ‘status noncitizens are the subjects of what many call 
citizenship in a variety of contexts’ (Bosniak 2008, 8). Even those who are full citizens 
in legal terms may become subject to forms of exclusion which is the impetus behind 
Ngai’s theorisation of  ‘‘alien citizens’ – persons who are American citizens by virtue 
of their birth in the United States but who are presumed to be foreign by mainstream 
American culture, and at times, by the state’ (2014, 2). This is similar to concerns 
expressed by Somers given that the existence of ‘de jure legal citizenship and formal 
nation-state citizenship may have been necessary, but they were not sufficient to secure 
the rights of the abandoned of New Orleans [after Hurricane Katrina in 2005]. The 
treatment inflicted on those left behind teaches us that without de facto citizenship, 
possessing formal nation-state citizenship alone is an inadequate foundation for being 
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recognised as a fully rights bearing person’ (Somers 2008, 26). All of these examples 
suggest that the citizen/non-citizen binary obscures these diverse relations, and can 
thus misrepresent them. 
In highlighting the broader problematic nature of the specific terms themselves, 
Hepworth illustrates how our use of categorisations such as citizen, asylum seeker and 
illegal alien ‘imply a particular relationship to the political community, and work by 
effacing the multitude of subjectivities, migratory experiences, and historical 
contingencies of the individuals that they purport to describe’ (Hepworth 2014, 3). 
Therefore, new methods and approaches are required that are able to contend with 
these ambiguities. Even the ‘national’ distinctions of ‘French citizen’ or ‘Australian 
permanent resident’ also serve to obscure the diversities that exist between individuals 
with similar statuses. 
In terms of the subject’s existence more broadly within the literature, there is often 
the distinction made between ‘status’ and ‘practice’ that was referred to briefly in the 
introduction, or similar distinctions such as Kymlicka and Norman’s ‘citizenship-as-
legal-status’ and ‘citizenship-as-desirable-activity’ (1994, 353). While one may be able 
to ascertain whether a certain study is focused more closely on either the status or 
practice aspects of citizenship, care must be taken not to see this distinction as 
dichotomous, of which there are several examples in the literature. Another analytical 
distinction often cited is that between ‘national’, ‘supranational’ and ‘transnational’ 
conceptions of citizenship. While these distinctions may at times be useful in 
considering scales, these approaches often fail to take into account how these various 
‘levels’ reinforce one another.  
In terms of the impact of participation, citizenship has been constrained into the 
dichotomous differentiations between ‘liberal-individualist’ or ‘civic-republican’ 
conceptions (Oldfield 1990). This also has connections with ideas of ‘active’ and 
‘passive’ citizenship, of ‘whether the citizen is conceptualized as merely a subject of an 
absolute authority or as an active political agent’ (Turner 1990, 209), which lacks 
awareness of the fact that ‘activeness’ or ‘passiveness’, may come as a result of a 
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particular context or set of circumstances. Furthermore, in the political sense, 
citizenship has also been considered as either ‘domination’ or ‘empowerment’, leading 
to conclusions that ‘citizenship is Janus-faced; it can be about empowerment or about 
control and domination, depending on the specific application and context’ (Robins, 
Cornwall, and Von Lieres 2008, 1080). A final theorisation suggests that, ‘Citizenship 
can then range from thin to thick: thin where it entails few transactions, rights and 
obligations; thick where it occupies a significant share of all transactions, rights and 
obligations sustained by state agents and people living under their jurisdiction’ (Tilly 
1995, 8). 
The argument that has been made here is not suggesting that all forms of 
categorisation are unhelpful, but rather, that many approaches have used these 
distinctions unproblematically and without considerable awareness of their 
consequences on the topic as a whole. This thesis by contrast, has attempted as much 
as possible to stay away from these more rigid and static conceptions, and embrace the 
ambiguity that is required in addressing such a complex topic. 
 Citizenship through Encounters in Lived Life 
The difficulties in defining citizenship and the problems associated with constraining 
it to binary definitions has meant that new approaches to the topic are required to be 
able to address the differences in individual experiences, not only between different 
people, but also over time and in different contexts. Focusing on the ways in which 
citizenship is encountered within lived lives allows an openness to the topic of 
citizenship that can integrate both diversity and ambiguity within its conceptions as 
well as considering the impact of the material and the temporal. This section will 
briefly consider the advantages of this conception, as well as addressing the ways in 
which encounter has been used by similar approaches. 
One of the issues associated with many approaches to citizenship is that they remain 
at a level of abstraction, and fail to consider how these statuses are experienced and 
understood on the ground. Suggesting that these everyday experiences of citizenship 
exist at a distance from the more institutional considerations, also fails to understand 
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the interplay between the two: ‘[w]e would suggest that these informal understandings 
are always linked into the more institutionalised specifications about rights and 
obligations usually regarded as the terrain of citizenship […] but we would also insist 
that more informal designations of citizenship retain a dynamic of their own which 
demands more explicit consideration’ (Painter and Philo 1995, 115). It is through 
encounters that these more ‘informal designations’ may be investigated. In doing so, 
one must acknowledge the interplay between citizenship and many other aspects of 
everyday life, such as families and employment. This serves as a reminder, especially in 
considering these more lived life elements, that ‘people do not usually navigate the 
ambiguous and frequently contradictory controls and policies regulating borders and 
statuses in a bid to make general declarations about affiliation and identity as 
categorical abstractions. They are more likely to be pursuing personal projects and 
intimate relations’ (Amit 2014, 400). 
One of the limitations of the current approaches to the topic of citizenship is that 
they have been unable to theorise the ways in which citizenship emerges within the 
lives of individuals, and as such the diversity of these conceptions are largely absent 
from research on the topic. Focusing at the level of encounter however allows a 
consideration not only of individuals, but also of specific encounters within the lives 
of these individuals, thus being able to account for changes in perceptions and 
understandings over time. This approach is also able to capture some of the broader 
aspects as well, due to the impact that power structures, and existing institutions have 
on these encounters, allowing the connection between what are at times very different 
points of order: ‘the ‘encounter’ is not a discrete spatio-temporal event; whether 
explicitly or implicitly, each encounter carries with it traces of broader power 
relations. Taking the ‘encounter’ as an analytic [provides] an understanding of 
citizenship as an emergent condition that is emplaced and embodied, rather than 
simply a collection of rights to be endowed’ (Hepworth 2014, 7).  
There are several advantages to evoking notions of encounter within such 
investigations. Firstly, focusing on encounter allows a better understanding of the 
temporal that can account for change over time, but also conceives of the impact of 
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past encounters in the here and now: ‘[e]ncounters are meetings […] which are not 
simply in the present: each encounter reopens past encounters’ (Ahmed 2000, 8), and 
again ‘[e]ncounters are not free from history and thus whilst the taking place of 
encounters might be momentary, they unfold in multiple temporalities’ (Wilson 
2016, 12). As such, encounters are able to consider the ways in which past experiences 
impact on individual understandings, as well as how a current encounters may echo 
well into the future.  
One may even argue that we come to be constituted through encounters, and our 
existence in any meaningful sense emerges and reemerges through these interactions 
with objects and others: ‘[t]his encounter is mediated; it presupposes other faces, 
other encounters of facing, other bodies, other spaces, and other times […] in daily 
meetings with the other subjects are perpetually reconstituted: the work of identity 
formation is never over, but can be understood as the sliding across of subjects in 
their meetings with others’ (Ahmed 2000, 7). This point specifically will become a key 
consideration of Chapter Seven, which reflects on the importance of encounters of 
address in the context of citizenship. 
Similarly, more contextual considerations may also be grasped through encounter: 
‘citizenship is reinvented and reinterpreted through local contexts, understandings 
and experiences’ (Leuchter 2014, 786). This approach also allows us to consider the 
impacts of objects, such as the role of documents in the context of citizenship: 
‘encounters with state materials may appear relatively ‘mundane’ for many, [but] this 
unremarkable quality is precisely what normalises the subjectivity of the citizen and 
seeks to efface the instabilities behind such normative order’ (Darling 2014, 496–97). 
Furthermore, encounters are the intersections through which individuals experience 
the state, and are therefore important as to their understandings of citizenship: 
‘[b]ureaucratic encounters are part of the administration’s daily grind – a world 
apparently made up of routine and anonymity, but whose centre is unstable, and 
whose protagonists cannot always be pigeon-holed into predefined roles’ (Dubois 
2012, 2). An awareness of the diverse possible outcomes of any particular encounter 
allows a conception of citizenship that is not embedded within static understandings, 
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and it will be precisely this consideration with regards to bureaucratic encounters that 
will be addressed in Chapter Five. 
What is perhaps most important in this theorisation of encounter is that ‘encounters 
make difference’ (Wilson 2016, 5). As such, they are ‘both the site for the operation 
of power and as an occasion for the emergence of forms or ways of life that are more 
than an effect of power’ (Ben Anderson 2016, 2). In this way an encounter may act to 
reinforce existing conceptions, or even to move away from them. Repetition is also 
central to these notions (Dewsbury and Bissell 2015, 24) and it may be the case that 
‘dispossession is a matter of non-eventful and non-catastrophic disruptions that 
accumulate to reshape experience’ (Ben Anderson 2016, 5). The approach to 
encounter outlined within this thesis emphasises the importance of both mundane 
and everyday encounters, as well as the more fraught one-off ‘interruptions’ (Dawney 
2013), that is, encounters that create a rupture in one’s understanding and 
conception of the world. 
This particular approach, focusing on notions of encounter can allow us to address 
citizenship in a way that sheds much of the theoretical baggage and binary 
conceptions that exist in the literature, and focus more clearly on the ways it emerges 
within lived lives. The hugely complex concept that is citizenship may then be 
understood though the everyday actions and understandings of individuals who have 
little or no knowledge of these broader theorisations, but largely come to understand 
citizenship through these very encounters. 
 The Institutional Foundations of Citizenship 
As illustrated in the previous sections, while encounter is a consequence of these 
personal interactions and orientations that change across time and in space, these 
engage on some level with broader power structures and other considerations. 
Therfore, some understanding of the broader ‘shape’ of citizenship, the state, and 
their role in the organisation and management of society more generally, is required 
to provide greater depth to the analyses which will follow in the three substantive 
chapters. This section will outline some of the key forms and formats of citizenship as 
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we know it today, including the nation-state, European citizenship, as well as 
conceptions of birthright citizenship and identity. This brief analysis does not attempt 
to be exhaustive, but will rather provide a general introduction that will help frame 
what is to follow. 
 Citizenship and the Nation State 
The historical development of citizenship has left it intimately entangled with notions 
of the nation-state. This is evident in the academic literature, where theorisations 
regarding citizenship as status tend to follow the broader trends and projections with 
regards to the perceived future of the nation state. As such, during the early 1990s at 
the same time that several accounts where claiming the decline of the nation state (for 
example: Miyoshi 1993; Van Deth 1995; Mann 1990), so too were other approaches 
suggesting at least the diminished importance of the status of citizenship (Soysal 1994; 
Jacobson 1996; Falk 2000). When, approaches emphasising the continued 
importance of the nation state returned, so did those that highlighted the impact of 
citizenship (Shachar 2009, 2). One cannot underestimate the effect that the nation 
state has had, not only on understandings of citizenship, but on broader conceptions 
of the world in general: ‘[t]he nation-state society is the dominant societal paradigm. 
The mainstream considers that the concept of society is applicable only to the nation 
state. Accordingly, the sociological perspective or gaze […] is geared to and organised 
in terms of the nation state’ (Beck 2000, 80).  
Regardless of these academic trends, the state is the authority with the power to define 
the terms of citizenship – at least in the legal sense – as well as bestow or strip it, and 
as such, plays a considerable role in these conceptions. Given also that citizenship is 
described in ‘national’ terms and that this national vocabulary is central to our 
understandings of it, so too does this reinforce the role of the state in this conception. 
In many ways it is these nation state division, that form part of the ‘imaginative 
geography’ (Said [1978] 2003, 55) which makes up citizenship. This national 
vocabulary also has a significant impact on our individual identity in this context as 
well as the ways we are understood by others (Malkki 1992), which will be a key 
consideration taken up by the final chapter of this thesis. 
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As evoked briefly in the previous chapter, the idea that everyone should be the citizen 
of a nation-state is a right enshrined into international law, in both the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention of Nationality, among 
others: 
Article	15	–	The	Universal	Declaration	of	Human	Rights	
(1)	Everyone	has	the	right	to	a	nationality11	
(2)	No	one	shall	be	arbitrarily	deprived	of	his	nationality	nor	deprived	of	the	right	
to	change	his	nationality		
	
Article	4	–Principles,	The	European	Convention	on	Nationality	
The	 rules	 on	 nationality	 for	 each	 State	 Party	 shall	 be	 based	 on	 the	 following	
principles:	
a.	everyone	has	the	right	to	a	nationality	
b.	statelessness	shall	be	avoided;	
c.	no	one	shall	be	arbitrarily	deprived	of	his	or	her	nationality;	
d.	neither	marriage	nor	the	dissolution	of	marriage	between	a	national	of	a	State	
Party	 and	 an	 alien,	 nor	 the	 change	 in	 nationality	 by	 one	 of	 the	 spouses	 during	
marriage,	shall	automatically	affect	the	nationality	of	the	other	spouse.	
	
These various pieces of international law, including the 1954 Convention regarding the 
Status of Stateless Persons as well as the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, 
all reinforce both the right and the broader normative belief that everyone is a citizen 
of a particular state, and those that are not, need to be. This importance of being a 
citizen of somewhere is also embedded in the fact that states are the authorities which 
produce identity documents that have become crucial not only for mobility, but 
everyday necessities such as employment and access to healthcare: ‘the loss of 
citizenship deprived people not only of protection, but also of all clearly established 
officially recognised identity, a fact for which their eternal feverish efforts to obtain at 
least a birth certificate from the country that denationalised them was a very exact 
symbol’ (Arendt [1951] 1973, 287). 
At the opposite end of the spectrum to these stateless individuals are those with 
multiple citizenship statuses. Whereas once dual citizenship was seen as highly 
																																								 																				
11 The more observant readers may note that these two items of international law refer to ‘nationality’ and 
not citizenship, but as I have mentioned elsewhere, in International Law these terms are used 
interchangeably with a historical preference for the term nationality in such documents. If there is any 
doubt on the use of this term one need only consider the definitions found in these documents. For 
example, in the European Convention on Nationality, Article 2a, states ‘‘nationality’’ means the legal bond 
between a person and a State and does not indicate the person’s ethnic origin’. 
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problematic, current trends suggest that states and individuals in general see this more 
favourably, with one particular scholar asking: ‘How did dual citizenship evolve from 
traitorous to trendy?’ (Spiro 2016). The general consensus among the more politically 
and legally orientated scholars is that the instances of dual (or multiple) citizenship are 
indeed increasing (US Office of Personnel Management 2001; Boll 2007; Blatter, 
Erdmann, and Schwanke 2010; Federighi 2011); some go as far to illustrate that this 
process has emerged and continues in a pattern, much in the same way that 
nationalism did (Sejersen 2008, 523), suggesting a continuing increase in the number 
of states that accept this status (Bloemraad 2004). 
Migration is a key ongoing issue in this area and can have a significant impact on the 
nature of these ‘national’ populations, as well as introducing non-citizens into the 
nation state’s territory. States have sought to control these flows, and have often 
dictated favourable terms for certain types of migrants, depending on perceptions of 
what is desirable or necessary at that time: ‘[a]s distinctions of who is worthy and 
deserving of permanent residence are reformulated within the market’s narrow 
confines the relationship between migrants and the state is denuded of its social and 
moral qualities and converted into a contractualised relationship in which migrants 
are approached as economic inputs and are constructed as resources to be mobilised 
and controlled for market advantage (Walsh 2014, 600). These demands of the 
market however, can also create an ambiguous acceptance of non-nationals, even 
those who occupy irregular statuses: ‘[u]ndocumented migrants are at once welcome 
and unwelcome: they are woven into the economic fabric of the nation, but as labour 
that is cheap and disposable’ (Ngai 2014, 2). 
Finally, it is important to emphasise that although this section has sought to highlight 
some of these more general trends, there is a great deal of diversity among these states, 
and there are instances where these claims may not hold true. We must remember 
that ‘‘[t]he’ nation-state is a figment of the sociological imagination. What exists are 
particular nation-states, formed under particular historical circumstances bearing even 
today the stamp of these distinctive historical origins’ (Brubaker 1998, 138). 
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 European Citizenship 
When European Union Citizenship was brought into force in November 1993 by the 
Treaty on the European Union (also known as the Treaty of Maastricht, after the 
location in which it was signed), many suggested that this was a turning point in our 
understanding of citizenship. The emergence of this status had been considered for 
some time: ‘[a]lthough discussion of European citizenship began in the early 1970s, it 
was not until the 1980s’ renaissance of integrative pressure (coinciding with a 
renaissance of interest in citizenship) that serious discussion of European citizenship 
emerged’ (Hansen 1998, 752). Currently, European citizenship is enshrined in law 
through various treaties, including the Treaty of the Functioning of the European 
Union (2007): 
Article	20	of	the	Treaty	on	the	Functioning	of	the	European	Union	
Citizenship	 of	 the	 Union	 is	 hereby	 established.	 Every	 person	 holding	 the	
nationality	of	 a	Member	State	 shall	be	a	 citizen	of	 the	Union.	Citizenship	of	 the	
Union	shall	be	additional	to	and	not	replace	national	citizenship.	
As is evident in the above piece of legislation, European citizenship is conceived of as 
additional to national conceptions, and in no way intended to replace them. It has 
therefore come under criticism due to ‘the rather limited material scope of European 
citizenship, coupled with the fact that it means very little to the vast majority of 
Europe’s citizens who for whatever reason cannot or do not want to cross borders’ (T. 
Kostakopoulou 1998, 640). 
The impact of European citizenship has primarily been considered from either a 
rights (Maas 2007) or an identity based perspective (Jamieson 2002). The rights of EU 
citizenship are easier to ascertain as they are outlined within the various treaties and 
include things such as the right to free movement and residence, the freedom of 
movement to work, the right to vote in both European and Municipal elections, as 
well as the right to consular protection outside the European Union, among others. 
On the identity side however, despite initial claims to the contrary, ‘‘being European’ 
is more likely to be an abstract categorising of self and/or others rather than a strongly 
felt sense of common identity and belonging’ (Jamieson 2002, 506), which fits with 
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broader claims that ‘there is […] little to suggest that nationality has given way to a 
post-national kind of [European] citizenship’ (Delanty 2007, 63). 
Some have also considered the impact of EU citizenship and the rights that this 
entails on third-country nationals fearing that this new conception will further 
disadvantage the millions of people living in Europe without European citizenship. 
Similarly, the measures put in place for the free movement of individuals within the 
EU (with certain exceptions) have been diagnosed with creating a ‘Fortress Europe’, 
with almost absent internal boundaries, but very hard external ones: ‘[the] Schengen 
[agreement] stands as a new iron curtain, designed to protect its member countries 
from the world’s poor. At the same time, its other face, the removal of internal border 
controls, resonates powerfully with the neoliberal project of market-building and 
flexibilization’ (Walters 2002, 576). European citizenship therefore has implications 
for both those who have it and those that do not, though once again, specific impacts 
are dictated by individual circumstances. 
 Citizenship and Birthright 
Notions of heredity are central within understandings of citizenship: ‘[t]he vast 
majority of today’s global population – 97 out of every 100 people – have acquired 
their political membership by virtue of birthplace or ‘pedigree’’ (Shachar and Hirschl 
2007, 254), with the other three per cent obtaining their status via naturalisation. In 
legal terms, citizenship is seen to be bestowed through either ius soli or ius sanguinis. Ius 
soli, literally means the ‘right of soil’, and suggests that citizenship be bestowed as a 
result of one’s place of birth, irrespective of the origins of the parents. This is often 
linked with the civic conception of citizenship or nationality. Ius sanguinis, on the 
other hand, means ‘right of blood’, and considers that citizenship and nationality be 
defined as a result of ethnicity or ancestry. While historically various regimes have 
been highlighted as exemplifying either of these principles, the reality is that most 
states will use some sort of hybrid between the two.  
Both ius soli and ius sanguinis variations see citizenship as being bestowed by birth, and 
as such, there can be serious implications for those who happen to be born in more 
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disadvantaged areas. Furthermore, the intersection of these two schemes, such as 
being born in a country with an ius soli conception of citizenship, to parents from a 
country with an ius sanguinis approach, means that certain individuals will be dual 
citizens simply by virtue of the accident of their birth. If the opposite is the case, one 
may even be rendered stateless. As such, there are moral and ethical implications 
regarding the ways in which citizenship is bestowed: ‘[c]itizenship in the modern world 
is a lot like feudal status in the medieval world. It is assigned at birth; for the most part it 
is not subject to change by the individual’s will and efforts; and it has a major impact on 
the individual’s life chances’ (Carrens 1992, 26). 
It has been this particular concern which has been taken up in the writings of 
Shachar, who considers that: ‘[t]his institution provides a state-sponsored apparatus 
for handing down from generation to generation the invaluable security and 
opportunity that attach to membership in a stable, affluent, and rule-of-law society. It 
also allows members of well-off polities an enclave in which to preserve their 
accumulated wealth and power through time. If we focus on these transfer 
mechanisms, we soon realize with some surprise that today’s birthright citizenship 
laws resemble ancient property regimes that shaped rigid and tightly regulated estate-
transmission rules’ (Shachar 2009, 2). 
While there are an increasing number of long terms visa statuses that may allow 
greater flexibility in terms of residence, the inability or difficulty of naturalising leaves 
non-citizen residents in a position of both precarity, and having to undertake ongoing 
labour to ensure that their status is up to date. This having been said, just because one 
is a citizen by birth does not mean that they retain full and equal citizenship in front 
of the law. It must be remembered that ‘[t]he dominating and hierarchising modes of 
citizenship can be seen clearly in the historical exclusion of women or indigenous 
people from full citizenship’ (Hepworth 2015, 2).  
 Citizenship and Identity 
Identity considerations are incredibly complex and are by no means linked to 
citizenship alone, yet citizenship does have a considerable impact in this sphere.  As 
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Isis and Turner suggest: ‘[c]itizenship is both a legal status that confers an identity on 
persons and a social status that determines how economic and social capital are 
redistributed and recognised within societies’ (2007, 14, emphasis original), and thus 
these identity elements also require consideration. 
Part of the role of citizenship with regards to identity comes from the impact of how 
identification documents become imbricated with identity in numerous contexts: 
‘Identity implies both uniqueness and sameness. An identity card, for instance, is a 
document showing that a particular individual is this one and no other, while it also 
shows that this individual belongs to one of several groups. In addition, one identity 
cannot be defined in isolation: the only way to circumscribe an identity is by 
contrasting it with other identities’ (D. Martin 1995, 6). As such identity in terms of 
citizenship often comes through the designations of ourselves as more or less 
‘national’ than certain others: ‘this ‘dirty business of boundary maintenance’ that 
underlies the politics of belonging is all about potentially meeting other people and 
deciding whether they stand inside or outside the imaginary boundary line of the 
nation and/or other communities of belonging, whether they are ‘us’ or ‘them’’ 
(Yuval-Davis 2006, 204).  
Furthermore, considerations of identity are by no means static, and change across 
time and with regards to place: ‘[a]n individual can change his identifications in the 
course of his life: that is, he may at a time, feel more concerned by, more attracted to 
one particular identity narrative and, at another time by another. The same individual 
can, at the same time, relate to several narratives and, to a certain extent, cope with 
the contradictions between them. As a matter of fact, multiple identification is the 
rule’ (D. Martin 1995, 14). However, these multiple forms of identification may lead 
to ongoing personal negotiation over identity, and in being identified in ways we do 
not wish to be, by others: ‘[a] complex relationship, if not irresolvable conflict exists 
between citizenship and identity and demands deep intellectual engagement’ (Somers 
2008, 18). Identity is often a very personal process, and may thus reflect an 
individual’s personal orientations and changing dispositions over time. 
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Finally, in relation to identity, one must remember that ‘[t]he belief in the basic 
conflict between citizenship and identity arises from a specific conception of each: 
citizenship as universal and identity as particular’ (Isin and Wood 1999), and that 
‘citizenship codifies and institutionalises identity, anchoring it in law’ (K. Barry 2006, 
23). As such, and as will be the subject of considerable analysis in the final parts of 
this thesis, citizenship provides us often with the vocabularies of a particular identity, 
but the ways in which we position ourselves in relation to it, and the way in which we 
are identified by others in this context, has important ongoing implications. We are 
not able to define our identities in whatever way we choose. 
 Conclusion 
There is a significant breadth to the literature on the topic of citizenship. At various 
times in trying to theorise a topic so broad, attempts have been made to constrain the 
topic into binary conceptions and other forms of categorisation. The problem with 
these forms of organisation is that the allow little to no room to consider the constant 
changes that citizenship as a topic is undergoing as well as the enormous and 
increasing diversity in the ways in which citizenship plays out within lived lives. One 
possible solution to this issue is to investigate citizenship through the lens of 
‘encounter’ which allows significant diversity to be included in conceptions of 
citizenship, including the impact of the temporal and material, as well as notions of 
repetition and rupture. Given that individuals experience citizenship through these 
sites of encounter, investigating them gives greater understanding into how citizenship 
emerges and is transformed within a lived life. Finally, given that in these encounters 
there are already existing structures and institutions of power, this chapter has also 
provided a brief background into four key areas – those of the nation state, birthright 
citizenship, identity and European citizenship – as this context is both useful and 
necessary to better conceive of the encounters with bureaucracy, imaginaries, and 
address that will be theorised within the three substantive chapters of this thesis. 
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4. Methodology  
As the previous two chapters have already described, there has been a great deal of 
scholarship undertaken on the topic of citizenship, however, qualitative studies using 
in depth interviews and ethnographic data to investigate citizenship from the 
perspective of the individual and encounter are few and far between. Thus, the 
original contribution of this work comes in part from the novelty of applying these 
methodological choices to this particular subject. This of course, requires some 
qualification; just because something has not been done before, does not mean that it 
is a good idea, and the first part of this chapter will consider exactly why these 
methodological choices are fitting for the research questions. The next section will 
examine in depth the mechanics of the interview process: choice of participants, the 
nature of the interviews and issues regarding research ethics. As the fieldwork 
interviews were carried out in two different countries and in two different languages 
some consideration will then be given to questions of translation, transcription, and 
other cross-cultural concerns. This chapter will subsequently consider the way in 
which I have compiled this thesis, including reflections on researcher positionality, 
and the auto-ethnographic elements of this research, as well as the choices that were 
made in writing up. Finally, this chapter will address the nature and validity of 
qualitative work, taking into account the criticisms surrounding it. 
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 Why This Methodology? 
The complexity of the concept of citizenship has yielded many diverse approaches, as 
were highlighted in Chapter Two and Chapter Three of this thesis. Yet, citizenship as 
status, up until recently, was considered largely from legal or policy perspectives 
(Bauböck 2010), meaning that examples of qualitative research in this area are 
reasonably limited and very much required (Bauböck 2006, 31). So, what is the 
usefulness of a qualitative approach to the study of citizenship as status from the point 
of view of the individual using the concept of encounter? In the simplest terms, 
focusing on the individual allows us to step away from the broader macro frame which 
is often the starting point for research on citizenship. It reminds us that ‘[p]eople are 
individuals and need to be understood as such, but they cannot be understood only as 
individuals. They are always in relation, always in a social context.’ (Clandinin and 
Connelly 2004, 2). Using the individual as the site of the investigation of citizenship, 
we are better able to conduct empirical work which engages with a broad range of 
scales: by focusing on the micro, we see the emergence of the macro within the 
understandings of participants. Further – given that individual choice now plays a role 
and that ‘plural’ statuses are more common – there is a need to understand their 
reception and perception not solely as isolated singular citizenship statuses: a suitable 
method for this research must be able to capture the great diversity in individuals’ 
experiences of citizenship encounters which has largely gone unnoticed up until now. 
By focusing on encounter, this methodology separates itself from studies that use 
status as a point of entry reinforcing those binaries and taxonomies that this research 
has pushed so hard to evade. Further to this, it allows the consideration of a diverse 
range of encounters from dramatic events, to the more everyday repetitive processes 
that are often associated with citizenship, as well as capturing the impact of other 
factors such as the material and the temporal (Wilson 2016, 2). The focus on 
encounter allows for non-determinist outcomes and the articulation of ambiguity, 
hopes and dreams: ‘the openness and culturally constructed nature of the social 
world, peppered with contradictions and complexities, needs to be embraced and not 
dismissed’ (England 1994, 243).  
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Qualitative methods are the obvious choice for this sort of investigation; the need to 
consider complex and multiple encounters experienced by individuals, and the 
necessity of in depth description, meant that interviews were well suited to engaging 
with these concerns. The long discussions and open-ended questions allowed for the 
emergence of narratives and the interrogation of how citizenship is imagined, 
reflecting not only what is present in policy, but also the ways that it is 
(mis)understood and how this effects individuals’ thoughts and actions. This thesis 
also draws heavily on the literature of cognate disciplines weaving together arguments 
that extend well belong the literature on citizenship studies. 
The remainder of this chapter will be written in a more reflexive style outlining not 
only many of the finer details of this methodology and highlighting further its 
suitability to the investigation of these research question, but also providing a critical 
reflection of my role within the research process, as well as possible problems and 
limitations. 
 The Nature of Interviews 
It is easy to miss the underlying assumption in interviews that the individual has both 
the authority and understanding of their own conditions to be able to express them 
themselves, and not require another authority to comment in their place. There is 
also a certain irony in acknowledging this, as it is the very belief in the validity of an 
individual’s insight that both necessitates this work, and makes it possible. As 
Gubrium and Holstein comment: ‘[i]n older societies and historical periods, agency 
and responsibility have been articulated in relation to a variety of other social 
structures, such as the tribe, the clan, the lineage, the family, the community and the 
monarch. The notion of the bounded unique self, more or less integrated as the 
centre of awareness, emotion, judgement and action, is a very recent version of the 
subject’ (2002, 4).  
Prior to conducting fieldwork I had consulted a significant amount of material on 
qualitative interviewing. I considered texts on types of interviews as well as the 
methods used to conduct them (Warren 2002; Curtis and Curtis 2011). I had 
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explored the possibilities of interview protocols (Stocks, Diaz, and Halleröd 2007), 
and debated the advantages and disadvantages of different interview formats. In the 
end, I had chosen to undertake in-depth semi-structured, discussion type interviews. I 
entered each interview with a list of key topics, yet these conversations tended to have 
a life of their own, which serves as a reminder that ‘fieldwork as a dialogical process in 
which the research situation is structured by both the researcher and the person being 
researched’ (England 1994, 247). Prior to every interview I had done my best to plan 
my approach, consider case-specific topics, and reflect on previous interviews to 
develop my method, however, I never commenced an interview with a list of set 
questions. There are unknown possibilities that emerge from the encounter itself, and 
it was very clear that no amount of preparation would predict direction and content.  
What was not evident in the literature, and has since been made abundantly clear to 
me, is the messy, awkward, and at times chaotic nature of interviewing. It became 
evident that no matter how well-prepared one is, there are always going to be those 
less-than-stellar interviews, uncomfortable situations, and misunderstandings. One of 
my frustrations however, is the extent to which this is absent in the literature on 
qualitative interviewing.12 There is only one example that I am aware of, that seems 
like an honest account of this process: that of Lareau in her appendix in Unequal 
Childhoods (2011), which will be discussed later in greater detail. 
I had decided on semi-structured interviews (cf. Morris 2015) that resembled a 
discussion between researcher and participant. The interviews served a dual purpose, 
firstly providing me with the field research materials in the form of interview 
transcripts, but also acting as an opportunity for me to develop my own 
understanding in conversation with others. My first few questions generally 
established the context into both the background of the interviewee and their 
citizenship statuses. Later, more in-depth questions were asked, which involved many 
of these recounted experiences and processes, but this was often lead by the 
participant and their logical progression through their lives, understandings, and 
																																								 																				
12 Though it does exist within the literature on auto-ethnography. 
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histories. The diversity of the topics that emerged, did so as a result of the complex 
and divergent narratives and circumstances of these participants. 
There are other more practical considerations that one must address when carrying 
out interview research. My preference for face to face interviews was a logical one: a 
great deal of communication is non-verbal (93% is often the figure cited, but rarely 
explained), and I find it easier to relate and communicate in this way. This, however, 
was not always available, so several interviews were also done via skype. I much 
preferred Skype (video) interviews over phone ones, for better interactions with these 
individuals, though I was forced to do one interview by phone. Lareau also comments 
on the occasional difficulties associated with gauging responses from phone 
conversations alone (2011, 324), and I am quite adamant in the advantages of being 
able to see one’s participants. Observing participants in person was an important part 
of the fieldwork encounter and had a very different affective intensity to those 
conversations that were mediated through technology. 
There were several individuals who had mentioned that they would not be available 
for a face-to-face, phone or Skype interview but would be able to fill in a written 
survey. When this request first emerged, I had replied to these individuals that my 
research did not entail a pre-prepared list of questions, as much of the interview 
depended on their preceding responses. Out of curiosity (and perhaps naïveté), and 
due to the request popping up on more than one occasion, I did sit down over a 
period of two or three days and attempted to put the key points of interrogation from 
my research into some form of survey. It did not work. The sheer variety of questions 
and the need to interact with these individuals, meant that any form of survey could 
not capture the narrative and personal experiences I was after. It was however an 
interesting exercise; it served as a reminder of the need for congruence between the 
research question and the methods that are used, and helped to reinforce my choice 
of in-depth qualitative interviews.  
‘Where’ and ‘when’ were other considerations in the interview process. I did my very 
best to be as flexible as possible in terms of time and location of interviewing. My 
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preference was to do it at their homes or places of work, both out of a scholarly 
ethnographic interest and to ensure their convenience and comfort. If they had issues 
inviting a ‘stranger’ into their homes I was more than happy for such meetings to take 
place in a park, library, or cafe (similar considerations of place are also discussed in 
Warren’s work (2002, 90) on qualitative interviewing). One particularly memorable 
interview was conducted in a periptero, the standalone roadside kiosks that are 
common across Greece. It was carried out in the cubic metre or two of space on the 
inside, with the regular disruptions from customers demanding their brand of 
cigarettes or mobile phone recharge card through the small window. For all the 
emphasis that this thesis places on encounter, one must not forget that the interview 
itself is a site of encounter for both the interviewer and the interviewee, and as such, 
aspects such as the material and the emotional certainly play a role. 
Despite my best attempts at transparency there were several occasions where my role 
as a researcher seemed to be largely misunderstood. In trying to make clear my topic 
of research in easy to understand terms, I had settled on the explanation that I was 
working on the topic of ‘citizenship and migration’; in focusing on people with 
multiple statuses, the vast majority of participants were first or second generation 
migrants and this meant that I did not have to weigh them down with some of the 
heavier theoretical reasoning. Thus the explanation was not particularly misleading, 
and comprehensible to most. Nevertheless, many assumed that I was an expert in the 
legal aspects of citizenship and migration policy. I was often quizzed on topics relating 
to national and international laws on the subject; I had occasions where participants 
invited friends along to interviews to see if I could help them with their 
documentation or to ask advice on how to progress on all matters related to 
citizenship and residency. One particular interview that I conducted was in front of an 
audience of five other people waiting patiently on an adjacent couch to exploit what 
they perceived as my area of expertise, and so I could help them with their 
immigration documentation. I clarified my role as best as possible prior to the start of 
the interview, but nevertheless the participant wished to continue.13 It was only after 
																																								 																				
13 For further consideration of research interviews which involve additional (unwanted) audience members 
see the discussion outlined by Chavez (2008, 489–90) 
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the interview had finished that I came to understand that there may have been a 
secondary reason for the audience: there was some pride associated in the idea that a 
researcher would be interested in one’s story and experiences. Needless to say, the 
reception I received, and the way I was understood, varied greatly.  
As I did not know the vast majority of the participants prior to their taking part in my 
research, I spent the first few minutes before the start of the interview just chatting on 
general topics and getting to know the person better. I would also sometimes stay 
afterwards to continue the conversation. The time spent chatting prior to interviews 
could in some ways be considered the building of rapport; the time spent afterwards 
was more or less an act of civility. It may seem unusual, but I felt that the interview 
itself was an act of generosity on their part – I still feel this way – and it never felt right 
to simply shut off the tape recorder, to thank the person and leave. I found it 
fascinating how the tape recorder itself played a significant role in these encounters. 
Whereas others have described it as a tool of security, ‘like being in possession of a 
technological guardian’ (Back 2012, 251), and a symbol of their status as a researcher, 
in my experience, its presence on the table, and the disruption to the flow of the 
conversation, were palpable. It was a reminder of the unusualness of this specific 
encounter, and it often seemed that the interview took on a notable sense of formality 
once the tape was switched on. 
 Participants 
Choice of participants can have quite a considerable impact on the development and 
direction of any research project. My main guiding principle was the idea that these 
individuals needed to have more than one citizenship status. This does not necessarily 
mean that they needed to be dual citizens, they could have been a citizen of 
somewhere and perhaps had a long-term visa or permanent residency in another 
location, or even someone who had undertaken irregular migration and thus may not 
have had an official legal status in the country in which they were residing. This was 
important for the project as those with plural statuses have a more diverse frame of 
reference, and have also had the opportunity, due to these circumstances, to better 
reflect on their citizenship.  
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The choice to conduct interviews in both Australia and Greece was a logical one. 
From the outset, while I had no desire to present any sort of comparative work, I 
wanted diversity among my participants, which was more readily achieved by working 
in more than one location, and I was very keen to have the involvement of non-
English speakers as a great deal of the research on the topic of citizenship has been 
done within the English-speaking world. I also wanted to pick two different locations 
for this research that differed quite substantially from one another, which Australia 
and Greece most certainly do. Chapter Two of this thesis has outlined just how 
different these two countries are with regards to history, geography and the legal 
foundations of their citizenship regimes. Further to this, demographically they vary 
quite substantially with Australia being a country of immigration, and Greece’s long 
history of emigration, along with the influence if its membership of the European 
Union. There were also some other more practical concerns regarding this choice: I 
fluently speak both English and Greek; I have extensive social networks in both 
countries; I am familiar with their education systems, and having lived in both 
countries for significant periods, I considered myself both culturally aware and well 
integrated. There were certainly a whole range of cross cultural considerations to this 
decision which are discussed later on.  
The choice of fifty participants was a goal that I set myself. I wanted to get as many 
diverse stories as possible. By the end of fifty interviews, I had reached the ‘saturation 
and replication’  (Morse et al. 2008, 18) at least in general terms that are required by 
most traditional qualitative studies, yet each interview managed to produce different 
narratives and perspectives. This is at least one of the reasons why this thesis has 
pushed for a non-determinist analysis of these encounters. Participants were recruited 
in both countries using snowball sampling where I initially reached out to colleagues 
and friends, told them about the research and asked them to spread the word. I was 
incredibly fortunate to have several individuals, some of which I had never met prior 
to these interviews, circulate my information sheet and recruit others. Participants 
then got into contact with me and we started organising the details of the interview. 
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The resulting group of participants obtained for this research was incredibly diverse in 
terms of citizenship status and age. Participants for these interviews had citizenship 
statuses from 24 different countries from around the world, of which there were 28 
with an Australian citizenship status, 27 with a Greek citizenship status and 11 with a 
British citizenship status. Other countries included Bulgaria (5), Romania (5), Japan 
(4), New Zealand (3) as well as many others. In terms of age, the youngest participant 
was 21 years old and the oldest was 82, with the remaining participants spread 
relatively evenly between these two ages. There was also roughly an even spread 
between men (24) and women (26). In terms of education, those that participated 
were relatively highly educated with 28 having a tertiary degree of some description, 
and four having some form of a higher tertiary degree (in all cases a masters).14   The 
specifics of these particular statuses are included for each of the participants within 
the Appendices (p.237), which function as a reference guide. In the discussion 
chapters of this thesis I have decided to include only the information necessary, and 
therefore the appendices are available as a resource for those seeking further 
information. 
 Translation, Transcription and Other Cross-Cultural 
Considerations 
When working in more than one language, it is inevitable that translation must occur 
at some point during the research; what one must not forget is that translation itself is 
a process of ‘meaning making’ and the ‘who’, ‘how’ and ‘at what stage’ of translation 
can all affect the outcome of the work, and ‘the processes of translation should be 
part of reflexive methodology’ (Bradby 2002, 852). Some even question whether there 
is the possibility of truly comprehensive translations (Hermans 2009). The first issue 
that needed to be addressed was the translation of the topic itself; ‘citizenship’, as its 
current meaning stands in the English language, cannot be directly translated into 
Greek to produce a concept of the same meaning. There are certainly words with 
similar meanings and others that are widely used in practice, but none that are a 
comfortable direct translation. So how does one investigate a concept, which even at 
																																								 																				
14 Two of these participants were undertaking doctorates at the time, and they represent the only ones in 
the sample working as academics. 
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the most fundamental linguistic level, cannot be exactly translated? This was 
eventually done using a process of forward and backward translation (Edwards 1998, 
199), including considerations of how relevant terms are used in common parlance 
and written documentation; in this context, the two nearest options are ιθαγένεια 
(ithagenia) and υπηκοότητα (ipikootita). The term ithagenia while broadly meaning 
citizenship, etymologically alludes to the status of being a native, though there is 
uncertainty of whether this came from the old French indigenat or the ancient Greek 
ιθαγενής (ithagenis), both of which have the same etymology as the English word 
‘indigenous’. The second term ipikootita, is, at the moment, slightly out of fashion, 
and is best defined in English as ‘subject-ship’ (the status of being a subject to 
someone/something more powerful). In this way, among native speakers, ithagenia is 
the preferred term for individuals who are ethnically Greek, while ipikootita better 
suits those who are naturalised. This separation was clarified by a series of Greek 
native speakers of various educational backgrounds that I consulted. Neither of these 
terms allude to the participatory aspects that can be found in the English definitions 
of the word citizenship. In addition to the abovementioned two terms, official 
documents generally seem to show a preference for the use the Greek equivalent of 
the word nationality – εθνικότητα (ethnikotita) – which is linked to the more ethnic 
conceptions of membership to the nation state in Greece. Given the vastly different 
contexts of the development of Australian and Greek citizenship, one must also 
remember that these terms carry with them not only linguistic meaning, but also 
cultural content (Temple and Edwards 2002, 3). 
The timing of the translation of the Greek interviews was another consideration. 
Essentially, there were three possible stages where this could be done. Firstly, to 
translate and transcribe at the same time, secondly to transcribe initially into Greek, 
then to translate the written transcriptions, or finally to analyse the transcript data in 
the original Greek, and only translate the segments which would make it into the final 
written piece. For me, the last of these three options appealed the most initially, as I 
felt that it was the most likely to retain the meaning closest to the original, however, 
on considering the various search and coding functions that are present within NVivo 
(as in discussed later in this chapter), it seemed more reasonable to ensure that all the 
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uploaded transcriptions were in English, and thus I settled on the second option.  
This required extra work, but I felt that being able to focus solely on transcription, 
then solely on translation made the process worthwhile. It did however have a 
downside as certain cultural content may be lost within the process of translation 
(Smith 1996, 161). While translating, I tried to focus more on the translation of 
contextual meaning, than the translation of individual words, though this changed at 
times depending on the passage or phrase in question. Where certain words or 
phrases were problematic, a process of forwards and backwards translation was used. 
It serves as a reminder that: ‘rather than there being an exact match, word for word, 
in different languages, the translator is faced with a dazzling array of possible word 
combinations that could be used to convey meaning’ (Temple and Edwards 2002, 2). 
The process of transcription itself – even when translation was not present – 
produced several methodological considerations. The first of these is the choice of 
whether to transcribe the work myself. There are certainly advantages to this; I found 
in my own work, that listening back through the tapes in such detail allowed me to 
almost relive the encounter and reflect on the answers of the participant in an 
environment where the intensity of the interview space was muted and my mind was 
not focused on understanding and formulating the next question. But this comes at a 
cost, both emotional and temporal. Listening back to one’s own interviews is 
confronting; while many people can attest to not liking the sound of their own voice, 
what is most frustrating is reflecting on some of the questions that were asked, and 
others that were missed. It must be noted that these frustrations emerge with the 
assistance of hindsight – having the ability to reflect on a particular interview with the 
knowledge and understanding of all the interviews, research, and analysis that has 
come after it – and having the opportunity to remove oneself emotionally from the 
time and space of the interview. Regrets are inevitable. As I have already mentioned in 
this chapter, in relation to the work of Lareau (2011), I feel that researchers, especially 
those who have the opportunity to do so, need to more honestly represent the 
‘messiness’ and awkwardness of the interview process. Speaking in person to a whole 
range of researchers who have interviewed significant numbers of participants, they all 
attest to the uncomfortable situations, the misapprehensions, and their own distaste 
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at the way that certain interviews progressed. However, within the literature these 
accounts are largely sterilised. The process of doing one’s own transcribing, brings 
much of this messiness back to light and offers the researcher the opportunity to 
reflect on it. 
There are a number of ways in which to transcribe a text; in the more detailed 
versions, not only is every word transcribed, but also the pauses and hesitations, as 
well as laughter and possible background noises. The initial interviews that I had 
transcribed, had been done in a great deal of detail; it was only after completing the 
first half dozen, that I decided that including all the tiniest of details, in the way that 
someone who was completing a discourse analysis would, was far too taxing on my 
time, and was in many ways unnecessary. Instead I settled on translating the text word 
for word, but left out some of the more minor hesitations, but laughter and longer 
hesitations that may have altered the meaning of the words were included. Another 
way to have done it would simply have been not to record the interview but to make 
notes while conducting them, but I feel, both now and at the time, that this would be 
unable to capture the detail that I desired, as well as the full intensity of the 
encounter.  
 Ethics 
As this research was carried out through an Australian institution, it was necessary to 
obtain ethics clearance, which was done through the ANU Human Research Ethics 
Committee (HREC). This was obtained in late 2012, with protocol number 
550/2012. In Australia, as well as other places around the world, the need for 
research to pass through human ethics board approval is now well accepted and 
common-place, but this is not the case in all countries. While ethics is a complex issue 
involving both ‘complying with institutional ethics policy and being morally and 
ethically responsible to […] research participants’ (Halse and Honey 2005, 2142), the 
following section will focus on a key methodological dilemma, that of the 
unexpectedly hostile reception of these institutional components from some of my 
participants.  
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 While I was aware from works such as Curran (2006) that research ethics could at 
times be complicated by cross-cultural settings, I had assumed that my knowledge of 
the society and my ‘insider status’ (along with a great deal of consideration and 
preparation) should largely eliminate these difficulties. From the outset I was aware 
research ethics boards do not exist in Greece – there are a few organisations that deal 
with the ethics of medical research, but that is all – which meant that I was forced to 
explain exactly what the information sheet and consent form were, without having a 
national equivalent to reference. These official documents, though created for the 
respondents’ benefit, aroused suspicion among many of the Greek participants which 
was a direct contrast to the Australian interviews where participants either welcomed 
or were neutral regarding the paperwork. In applying for ethics, I had decided on the 
use of a written consent form translated into both languages; somewhat as an 
afterthought, and largely as a result of the possibility of Skype interviews in 
exceptional cases, I had also organised an oral consent script. When they were 
requested to sign, a notable number of my Greek participants questioned the consent 
form, and expressed an unwillingness to sign it; one participant even pulled out 
because of it, citing the well-known Greek saying «το πουλί σου και την υπογραφή 
σου, πρόσεχε πού τα βάζεις» (apologies for the crudeness, but it can be roughly 
translated to ‘your dick and your signature, be careful where you put them’).  
I made it very clear to participants that their involvement was completely voluntary; I 
never forced the signing of the document, and, in cases where they were unwilling, 
participants were told that they were under no obligation to do so, and I thanked 
them for their time. In later interviews, I gauged reactions to my explanations and 
offered them the choice of the consent form or the oral consent script. Furthermore, 
much like the tape recorder, the consent form also served to disrupt the initial 
rapport building and conversation. While my cultural and linguistic awareness of this 
environment may have been vast, I did not share the same suspicion that many of my 
participants had towards all things official and bureaucratic, and it is possible to 
suggest that the context (that of financial crisis Greece, with widespread distrust of 
both the government and the bureaucracy) may have played a role. Nonetheless it 
served as a clear reminder of both the unexpected events that are involved in research, 
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and the need not to take even the most seemingly basic ideas for granted, especially in 
cross cultural settings. 
 Putting it all Together 
Throughout the undertaking of this research project I was in a constant state of 
learning, and many aspects of this thesis came as a result of a process of trial and 
error. Undertaking this research was in many ways a transformative activity and I find 
my conceptions of the topic – and myself – changed in many ways as a result of it. The 
transformations were not only due to the face to face interactions with my 
participants, but also through the process of thinking, reading, and putting this thesis 
together. This section will seek to look at the various processes that took place after 
transcription that were the key aspects of pulling the thesis together. 
 ‘Data’ Management and Analysis 
There is a dizzying array of qualitative data15 management software available to 
researchers, and while they tend to have considerable similarities, there are also a 
number of differences. After investigating possible options including web-based 
(Dedoose), open-source (QDA lite and free versions), as well as the paid software 
versions (NVivo), I was forced to make a choice. I had been the good student, done 
courses on a couple of the varieties and was thrilled with the great diversity of 
functions that the various types of software could offer. In all honesty, I was somewhat 
in awe of the functionality of these programmes. My final decision was not based on 
the software best suited to my needs – I felt that they were all able to carry out what 
was required of them – but I settled on using NVivo as it was the most widely used in 
my field, and I saw it both as an opportunity to master an intricate piece of software 
and as a way to investigate some of its more complex search and analysis functions.  
At the time I saw this programme as a means to handle my almost two days’ worth of 
transcripts, but also as a tool to help me make sense of them; after 50 interviews I was 
left with hundreds of thousands of words of interview transcripts, much more than a 
																																								 																				
15 Here I object to the way in which the term ‘data’ serves to obscure what actually emerged from these 
fieldwork encounters, which were the in depth and personal thoughts of these individuals. 
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human brain could handle at any one time. The software allowed me to address the 
sections of multiple transcripts which dealt with certain themes all at once. I went 
through the process of inductive and deductive coding and then looked at the ways in 
which these ‘nodes’ fitted together. Yet for me this software also added a level of 
abstraction. The narrative character of some of these stories, and the parts that could 
not comfortably fit, or fitted among more than one node, tended to get lost or at least 
obscured. In the end I found that, while this was useful as a tool of organisation, 
manually going through the transcripts in paper format was the most useful in terms 
of in depth consideration and analysis. While I do not deny the functionality and 
usefulness of this software, it may at times work to highlight certain aspects while 
obscuring others. 
 Reflexivity, Positionality and Auto-Ethnographic 
Considerations 
There is a lot of me in this thesis, whether it be through the auto-ethnographic aspects 
or simply my writing style(s). I was the one who was sitting opposite the participants 
asking the questions, reading the texts and writing and rewriting chapters, 
emphasising in many ways that ‘a researcher is a co-participant’ (Chavez 2008, 474). 
For better or for worse, my smudged fingerprints are all over this thesis which is in 
part why this chapter has been written so reflexively: to acknowledge that particular ‘I’ 
who has undertaken this research, as well as the lessons learnt, and perhaps some 
consideration of my own transformation during this process. 
Through various stages of this thesis I emerge and disappear. The preface sets the 
scene using a somewhat personal account, and both the introduction and the 
conclusion commence with fragments of my own experience. This methodology 
chapter has intentionally been heavily reflexive, giving obvious voice to ‘me’ as the 
author, and in a far more conversational tone than the rest of the thesis. This serves as 
a reminder that ‘qualitative researchers […] cannot be assured that their observations, 
interpretations, and representations are not affected by their various identities and 
positionalities’ (Chavez 2008, 475), yet caution is required as any attempt to articulate 
a ‘transparent positionality’ is also problematic (G. Rose 1997).  
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Some may have noticed that in the longer excerpts in which I ask questions, I have 
chosen to include my name instead of the abstract ‘interviewer’ to subtly remind the 
reader that it was in fact me asking the questions, and that these fieldwork encounters 
were largely conversations. I do at times take issue with some of the more clinical 
accounts of similar methodologies and the ways in which they manage to obscure 
both the discomfort and the euphoria of the in-depth interview process. Traces of me 
in the last three substantive chapters are relatively rare. I have used a few auto-
ethnographic fragments of my own experiences – once again positioning myself with 
regards to this research – in the Encountering Bureaucracy chapter, simply because 
many of the affective intensities of these spaces had such an impact on my own 
narratives. Furthermore, as Ahmed reminded me, ‘these encounters were themselves 
shaped by my everyday dwelling (where I live) and travel (where I move)’ (2000, 14). In 
many ways this reinforces the idea that has been made previously of the interview 
being an encounter itself. 
Therefore my approach towards positionality and reflexivity is one which focuses on 
both making myself visible as a researcher, as well as providing honest reflections and 
criticism of the work that we undertake. This supports the belief that ‘we need to 
integrate ourselves into the research process’ (England 1994, 251), and that ‘reflexivity 
is self-critical sympathetic introspection and the self-conscious analytical scrutiny of 
the self as researcher’ (England 1994, 244) which echoes the work of Kobayashi who 
describes it as self-critique (1994). Finally this requires that we ‘inscribe into our 
research practices some absences and fallibilities while recognising that the 
significance of this does not rest entirely in our own hands’ (G. Rose 1997, 319), 
further echoing the necessity of honest accounts within qualitative research. Once 
again I feel the need to mention how my own understanding of citizenship has been 
shaped by this process, and I have no doubt, that at least for some of the participants, 
the opportunity to articulate their own narratives – to think about them and to 
present them comprehensively – may have had a transformative capacity within their 
lives. 
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 Questions of Writing and Presentation 
In trying to find an analogy for my own methods as a qualitative researcher, I came 
across many metaphors. Some make reference to the idea of a collage or a montage, 
others evoke the idea of a quilt, or use the widely circulated image of the bricoleur. 
What all these analogies have in common is that they focus on how this work is the 
result of the accumulation of varied and diverse parts that come together to create a 
text that is very much the product of the researcher. As Denzin and Lincoln explain: 
‘[t]he product of the interpretative bricoleur’s work is a complex, quilt-like bricolage, a 
reflexive collage or montage – a set of fluid, interconnected images and 
representations. The interactive structure is like a quilt, a performance text, a 
sequence of representations connecting the parts to the whole’ (2008, 8). While the 
patchwork of the quilt is an alluring metaphor, the analogy that sits most comfortably 
with the way I conceive my own practice is that of the tapestry. The ordered linear 
fashion in which it is woven, the ability of the weaver to introduce their choice of 
colours or textures to make the overall design, and the idea that the tapestry is made 
from the interconnection of thousands and thousands of threads, is something that 
sits quite nicely with me.  
So what different ‘threads’ are present in this thesis/tapestry? As has been mentioned 
previously this thesis has given considerable weight to the fieldwork encounters that 
are found in the latter half of the thesis; also previously mentioned are the auto-
ethnographic ‘data’ that are also peppered through the work, though less liberally 
than the fieldwork encounters. Furthermore, I see the contribution of this text also in 
uniting various disparate fields of scholarship, so I have also included a great deal of 
secondary sources, as well as some more theoretical texts. While the above may seem 
redundant to the experienced researcher, the point I am trying to make here is that we 
must realise that there is more to methodological considerations than simply 
outlining the process of undertaking fieldwork and analysing its ‘products’. All of 
these elements play a role in the creation of the final text and, somewhat like 
ingredients in a recipe, it is not only their presence, but their amounts and the way 
that they are combined which can colour the finished product.  
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In methodological terms, it is largely taken for granted just how much the ways in 
which we go about presenting, and compiling, research shapes the narrative that 
emerges from it. This is particularly of note in relation to the ways the fieldwork 
excerpts have been integrated within this thesis: different ways of presenting these 
encounters manage to draw out different intensities. Here, I have experimented with 
the numerous ways in which diverse aspects of the transcripts can be made to tell 
different stories. This included using vastly different lengths of excerpts, with some 
going for only a few words, others for a paragraph or several paragraphs and a couple 
for a few pages. I also used different colours (p.128) in order maintain the narrative 
account, while bringing out different concerns that emerged in an intermingled way. I 
also embedded some of these longer excepts with a brief introduction of my 
encountering them (p.188 & p.204) in order to better situate the narrative, but also to 
do away with the tendency towards the clinical representations of participants. This 
too has ethical implications. 
This thesis is also very ‘heavy’ in terms of drawing on vast bodies of work outside the 
area of citizenship studies. Through this eclectic use of interdisciplinary literature, this 
thesis draws together diverse ideas and makes connections between literatures where 
perhaps there had been none. The later chapters of this work engage heavily in these 
literatures which adds to the original contribution of this thesis. Furthermore, my 
different presences and absences as an author are an indication of the different styles 
or modes of writing that have been used within the thesis. This chapter is more 
conversational, while the three substantive chapters that follow and that make up 
more than half of the word count of the thesis have a much more traditional scholarly 
tone. This in no way suggests that a binary exists between conversational and scholarly 
forms of writing, but rather that these two forms have been used here to varying 
degrees to bring out different intensities in the writing. In this way the writing has 
been changed to deal with the demands of the particular section, and one must not 
forget that the ways in which we address the reader is also a methodological choice. 
Finally I wish to make a comment regarding the ways we assign people to specific 
categories. I am not denying that these individuals are in fact situated, though – as 
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will be explained more clearly in the latter parts of the thesis – I find the 
‘methodological nationalism’ (Wimmer and Schiller 2002a; 2002b; 2003), that is ‘the 
naturalisation of the state by the social sciences’ (Wimmer and Schiller 2003, 576) can 
obscure more than it illuminates. By including unquestioningly the nationalities of 
these individuals next to these encounters we may limit these encounters to 
something that exists within that national context instead of just focusing on the 
encounter itself. Also, I fear that judgements may be made about these individuals 
simply on the basis of their nationality. I attempt to disrupt these notions by not 
including these national designators where possible, unless their absence renders the 
extract less effective. This further reinforces the ideas outlined in the previous chapter 
of the failures of binary conceptions of citizenship. Their absence also serves 
somewhat of an ‘educational’ end, reflecting on the ways in which we seek out 
examples of ‘transparent positionality’ in order to understand the context, yet no 
attempt at positionality can be completely transparent (G. Rose 1997). I make the case 
in Chapter Seven regarding the ways in which we seek to understand the world in 
national terms. Thus, in trying to understand a specific extract that may not have a 
national (or age or sex for that matter) indicator speaks to the perceived importance of 
these categorisations in the ways we seek to understand the world. For the intensely 
curious among you, the national designators, age, sex, educational background, and 
language of interview are all outlined in the appendix. 
 Critiquing Qualitative Research Methods 
Qualitative work has often been the topic of criticism. Denzin and Lincoln (2008) 
point out that it is currently suffering from a ‘triple crisis’. The first crisis concerns the 
fact that qualitative work is a ‘social text written by the researcher’ and which suggests 
that ‘qualitative researchers can no longer capture lived experience’; the second, 
relates to the difficulties in addressing the validity and evaluating qualitative research; 
and finally, they reflect on the question of whether ‘it is possible to affect change in 
the world if society is always and only a text’ (Denzin and Lincoln 2008, 26). I feel the 
need, through the strong belief in not only the validity, but the value of qualitative 
research, to address these three considerations.  
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Regarding the first point of crisis, there is no denying the researcher’s role in the 
creation of the text as has been alluded to previously; to once again cite Denzin and 
Lincoln: ‘[a]ll research is interpretative; it is guided by the researcher’s set of beliefs 
and feelings about the world and how it should be understood and studied’ (2008, 
31). Thus, while it is less obvious, even quantitative and scientific studies interpret the 
world using particular technologies or lenses (Law 2004). The question is then, how 
do we deal with this ‘situatedness’ of the researcher? As has been made evident so far, 
I am not adverse to reflexive practice and have used it often to question and challenge 
my own position and assumptions. This too, however, is not without its criticisms 
(Salzman 2002); there is the possibility of overanalysing and indulging is what 
Bourdieu labels ‘narcissistic reflexivity’ (2003, 281). It is then, with caution that I use 
elements of auto-ethnographic work as a part of both my field research and reflexive 
practice. Its usefulness as a method comes from its ability to both to illustrate an 
individual case in-depth, while also allowing a critical reflexive understanding. As 
Leon Anderson comments: ‘[a]t a deeper level reflexivity involves an awareness of 
reciprocal influence between ethnographers and their settings and informants. It 
entails self-conscious introspection guided by a desire to better understand both self 
and others through examining one’s actions and perceptions in reference to, and 
dialogue with, those others’ (2006, 382). Thus, by at least an awareness of the position 
of the researcher, we do not completely overcome this idea of the research as a social 
text, but better understand the context in which it has emerged. 
In an earlier version of this chapter draft, the next paragraph read as follows: 
The	second	aforementioned	crisis	relates	to	the	difficulty	 in	ensuring	the	validity	
of	qualitative	research.	It	is	the	duty	of	the	researcher	to	illustrate	to	the	best	of	
their	ability	that	their	study	is	credible,	and	therefore	certain	quality	controls	(for	
want	 of	 a	 better	 word)	 must	 be	 built	 into	 the	 research	 project	 itself.	 It	 then	
follows	 that	 different	 types	 of	 research	 necessitate	 different	 methods	 of	
establishing	 validity,	 and	 the	 nature	 of	 qualitative	 inquiry	 as	 being	 constructed,	
situated,	and	interpreted	undoubtedly	make	this	difficult.	In	my	own	work	I	have	
used	 several	 methods	 of	 establishing	 validity.	 The	 first	 among	 these	 is	 the	
abovementioned	 researcher	 reflexivity,	 in	 addition	 to	 ensuring	 that	 I	 conducted	
an	 adequate	 number	 of	 interviews	 to	 ensure	 ‘saturation	 and	 replication’	 in	
sampling	 (Morse	 et	 al.	 2008,	 18).	 Readers	 have	 also	 been	 provided	 with	 a	
considerable	amount	of	detail,	a	method	labelled	by	Creswell	and	Miller	as	‘thick,	
rich	description’	(2000,	129),	which	is	common	in	ethnographic	accounts.	Even	in	
the	 presence	 of	 these	 attempts	 of	 establishing	 validity,	 it	 must	 be	 understood,	
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that	absolute	validity	in	qualitative	research	is	almost	impossible	due	to	the	very	
nature	of	the	work,	which	goes	some	way	to	explain	the	present	crisis.	
I no longer feel that these are the best methods of establishing validity in this context, 
despite having engaged in them in some form of another. It is these sorts of claims 
that encourage researchers to provide these more clinical accounts, which may reduce 
the validity of the research rather than increasing it. I am not naïve enough to think 
that if we throw the doors open on our practice that everyone will see how important 
it is and accept it with open arms, but in indicating more of these research encounters 
themselves – and their embeddedness in lived lives – I believe that it is one further 
means to assist in establishing the validity of this work. 
Due to the constructed and interpretative nature of qualitative work, the idea that all 
research is essentially a text, further undermines the ability of this type of research to 
affect change (Denzin and Lincoln 2008, 26). This is quite pertinent as anyone who 
works in the field of citizenship studies has more than likely come across the vast 
inequalities that exist within our regimes of citizenship. While questions of social 
justice have and will be considered in greater detail in other chapters, I am not 
convinced that all qualitative work is unable to affect change, or precisely whether 
that should be its purpose. But value and purpose is often a matter of perspective; the 
very act of putting pen to paper and documenting and circulating these experiences 
gives them a life that they would not have otherwise. There is also the tendency to give 
too much value to the creation of texts rather than their reception. A recent article in 
New York Magazine (Fischer 2016) outlines how Judith Butler – whose works I draw 
on quite extensively in Chapter Seven – came to become one of the key public 
intellectuals16 of our time. It explains how ideas articulated in dense scholarly texts 
written over 20 years ago are now common place in the ways in which we think about 
gender. The article implicitly suggests that it is not only the ideas themselves, but also 
the ways they are received and circulate which may account for their greater influence. 
One can never know the precise impact of one’s work. 
																																								 																				
16 There are contested definitions of the term ‘public intellectual’, however with regard to this particular 
article it defined in terms of the influence of a particular intellectual’s ideas over society. 
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 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a reflexive account of the many methodological choices 
that came about as part of this research, as well as, providing an outline of various 
issues that emerged during this process. The significance of this methodology is at 
least in part that it provides a novel approach to the investigation of citizenship as 
status: the focus on in depth qualitative accounts, and individual stories and 
experiences allows for a more nuanced approach to the subject and one that can deal 
with greater diversity and ambiguity, as well as escaping the universalising tendencies 
of other approaches. The field research for this project was undertaken in two 
different national contexts, and in two different languages. As such issues of 
translation, and cross-cultural research ethics were addressed. Furthermore due to the 
diversity, and central role the experiences of participants played in this research, this 
thesis experimented with innovative ways of presenting some of these testimonies. 
Finally, this chapter gives greater insight into the auto-ethnographic aspects of this 
research as well as some of my more personal considerations and orientations with 
regards to qualitative research. 
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5. Encountering Bureaucracy 
Perceptions of modern citizenship as status are entwined with the notions and 
functions of state bureaucracies. This imbrication is far from surprising: it is through 
bureaucratic procedures that citizenship is bestowed – or denied or stripped – and it is 
often in bureaucratic hands where these statuses may be questioned or contested. 
Regardless, there has been little attention given to the importance of the bureaucratic 
encounter in the context of citizenship, and even then, many of these existing studies 
consider these experiences simply as ‘gates’ where the outcome of the encounter is 
either successful or not. This chapter will show the diverse and transformative 
capacities of these experiences; it will consider how these, at times gruelling 
encounters between individuals, civil servants and states are reinforced, understood, 
and contested in a diversity of ways, and come to have lives beyond those bureaucratic 
spaces. It will explore the consequences of these complex, fluid and at times messy 
bureaucratic encounters in the lives of these thinking and feeling subjects. 
In the first instance, this chapter will highlight some general considerations regarding 
bureaucracy, including its historical development as an idea, and a broad examination 
of the relationships and techniques of power within these contexts. In seeing these 
encounters as sites of transformation, this chapter will examine three key elements 
that inform these experiences. Firstly, the impacts of spaces will be investigated 
through a focus on the role of the material, and more specifically, the significance of 
desks and paper. Secondly, more bodily concerns will be illustrated; this section will 
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consider both how identification and evaluation techniques dehumanise individuals, 
as well as illustrating that emotion is not only present in, but central to, these 
encounters, countering the traditional belief of emotion having no place in 
bureaucracy. Finally, times are investigated, initially in a more general sense in the 
context of bureaucracy, and later with regards to the role of waiting, where a typology 
of waiting is put forth. These three sections will draw on both fieldwork encounters 
and auto-ethnographic work to better illustrate these complexities, and how they 
unfold in lived lives. This chapter will end with a more in depth focus on a single 
participant whose experiences will be used as an illustration of the richness within 
these encounters, as well as how the bodies, spaces and times of bureaucracy weave 
together in a multiplicity of ways. It will both illustrate and build on the emerging 
content within the preceding sections of this chapter. 
 What is Bureaucracy? 
Most people are familiar with bureaucracy. We encounter it in some form on a daily 
basis: a document needs filling out, a tax or bill needs to be paid, a car registered, a 
doctor visited, a child enrolled, a permit issued, and countless others. To this we must 
also add the rarer and potentially more fraught one-off bureaucratic encounters, those 
that have the possibility of more serious consequences, and which will be the subject 
of this chapter. This propensity of the state to ‘document and monitor’ follows us 
through every stage of our life (Painter 2006, 753), and even death is accompanied by 
requisite bureaucratic documentary evidence: we drive with our licences, we travel 
with our passports, and the notion of handing over a fistful of forms, followed by a 
fistful of documents is far from unusual. Bureaucracy has developed gradually, we can 
trace its roots back to antiquity, however it is in the last 100 years or so that we have 
seen a ‘revolution identificatoire’ (Noiriel 1991 as cited in; John Torpey 1998, 242), with 
the implementation of a whole series of biopolitical practices that help governments 
to identify, catalogue, and thus control their citizens.  
Despite acknowledging the pervasiveness of bureaucracy and the bureaucratisation of 
so many diverse aspects of everyday life, this chapter will deal with the specificity of 
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the bureaucratic encounter in the important context of citizenship. Based on my 
fieldwork encounters, these include the bureaucratic sites associated with getting visas, 
obtaining permanent residency, being naturalised, as well as the spaces where our 
citizenship as status is subject to checks and controls, such as at the immigration desk 
at an airport. While I group all these locations together as sites of bureaucratic 
encounter concerning citizenship as status, the reality is that these are incredibly 
diverse assemblages of people, spaces, policies, and practices, among others. Not only 
do two offices or two airports in the same country (theoretically applying the same 
policies and laws, and performing the same functions) often vary quite substantially 
from one another, but even the way the individual traveller or applicant negotiates 
and contests this space, can differ from encounter to encounter. As Salter reminds us: 
‘the ‘experience’ of the airport varies dramatically according to who is travelling, on 
what documents, in what class, and with what sociocultural baggage’ (Salter 2007, 62). 
 Bureaucratic Encounters 
What this chapter is concerned with are these bureaucratic ‘encounters’. As has been 
outlined in earlier stages of this thesis, using the notion of encounter allows us to step 
away from the more policy or law orientated conceptions of what happens at these 
sites and come to see them as these diverse, practical assemblages of policy, people, 
materialities, and temporalities. The word ‘encounter’ itself hints at the adversarial 
qualities that are often present or at least perceived in these interactions, and as much 
of the empirical work woven through this chapter will suggest, these can be spaces of 
contestation. Each individual approaches them with their own capacities, constraints 
and understandings which are transformed by the encounter. Thus encounters are 
‘both the site for the operation of power and as an occasion for the emergence of 
forms or ways of life that are more than an effect of power’ (Ben Anderson 2016, 2). 
There is no desire here to qualitatively classify encounters, as ‘encounters are neither 
innately good or bad according to a predetermined logic’ (Bissell 2016, 397), or to see 
them as ‘gates’ or ‘stages’ through which individuals must past, but rather focus on 
their potentiality (Wilson 2016), and the ‘ongoing processes of transformation that 
take place through events and encounters’ (Bissell 2016, 395). To the external 
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onlooker, or to one who is more concerned with the processes laid out in policy, there 
may seem to be a ‘uniformity’ to such experiences, however, as the remainder of this 
chapter will contend, this is simply not the case: ‘[b]ureaucratic encounters are part of 
the administration’s daily grind – a world apparently made up of routine and 
anonymity, but whose centre is unstable, and whose protagonists cannot always be 
pigeon-holed into predefined roles’ (Dubois 2012, 2). 
By focusing on encounter, this analysis steps away from much of the classical literature 
on bureaucracy. Bureaucratic authority, as described by Weber as an ideal type, is seen 
as a means of authority which deals with individuals in rational, efficient and 
impartial ways: ‘[p]recision, speed, unambiguity, knowledge of the files, continuity, 
discretion, unity, strict subordination, reduction of friction and of material and 
personal costs – these are raised to the optimum point in the strictly bureaucratic 
administration [...] The ‘objective’ discharge of business primarily means a discharge 
of business according to calculable rules and ‘without regard for persons’ (Weber 1991, 
214–15, emphasis original). However, even Weber himself acknowledges the 
constraints and abuses inherent in such a system, which is often surmised under his 
concept of the ‘iron cage’ which first appeared in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of 
Capitalism (Weber and Parsons [1905] 2003). In many ways the foundations of 
modern states as discussed in Chapter Two are embedded in bureaucratic ways and 
means, and much of the evolution of bureaucratic processes are tied up with 
improved technologies of transport and record keeping.  
Rather ironically, it is precisely this ‘without regard for persons’ – from the passage 
from Weber previously cited – which is problematic. Several scholars, notably Hannah 
Arendt (1970) and Zygmunt Bauman (1988, 1989) in exploring the Holocaust have 
noted the role of the bureaucratic regime in these atrocities: ‘[t]he Nazi mass murder 
of the European Jewry was not only the technological achievement of an industrial 
society, but also the organisational achievement of a bureaucratic society’ (Bauman 
1989, 13). These structures, in which each individual is responsible for a small but 
repetitive part in the organisation, left them at once alienated from the ends yet, still a 
significant piece in achieving them. There is an inherent, yet largely invisible 
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propensity to violence within the bureaucratic construct: ‘[i]t must be kept in mind 
that most of the participants [of genocide] did not fire rifles at Jewish children or pour 
gas into gas chambers […] Most bureaucrats composed memoranda, drew up 
blueprints, talked on the telephone, and participated in conferences. They could destroy 
a whole people by sitting at their desk’ (Bauman 1988 citing; Hilberg 1983, 3:994, 
emphasis added). 
The myth of the neutral bureaucracy has been criticised widely and often, most 
notably through Lipsky’s Street-Level Bureaucracy (1983), that looks at the ways 
frontline civil servants and public service workers use their discretion to decide on 
and enact policy: ‘[i]n short, the reality of the work of the street level-bureaucrats 
could hardly be farther from the bureaucratic ideal of impersonal attachment in 
decision making. On the contrary, in street level bureaucracies the objects of critical 
decisions – people – actually change as a result of the decision’ (Lipsky 1983, 9, emphasis 
added).  It is precisely this street-level bureaucracy and the street-level bureaucrats 
engaged within it that will be the focus of many of the encounters that are presented 
in the remainder of this chapter, yet are absent from many other approaches to this 
topic. The following section considers the diverse sites of power in bureaucratic 
encounters including a further analysis of the role of these street-level bureaucrats. 
 Power 
‘The	greater	the	bureaucratization	of	public	life,	the	greater	will	be	the	attraction	
of	violence.	In	a	fully	developed	bureaucracy	there	is	nobody	left	with	whom	one	
could	argue,	 to	whom	one	 could	present	 grievances,	on	whom	 the	pressures	of	
power	 could	 be	 exerted.	 Bureaucracy	 is	 the	 form	 of	 government	 in	 which	
everybody	 is	 deprived	of	 political	 freedom,	 of	 the	 power	 to	 act;	 for	 the	 rule	 by	
nobody	 is	 not	 no-rule,	 and	 where	 all	 are	 equally	 powerless	 we	 have	 a	 tyranny	
without	a	tyrant.’	(Arendt	1970,	81)	 											
										 	 	 	 												-Hannah	Arendt,	On	Violence,	1970,		p.81	
As Hannah Arendt articulates above, bureaucracy is a technique of power. It is both 
an institution of the power of the state, as well as a means to reinforce it. However, 
conceiving bureaucracy as all-powerful, and all those who come against it as 
completely disempowered, is far too simplistic a view. This section will illustrate and 
explore the three key sites of power and resistance within these encounters. Initially 
this section will consider how the power of the state is enforced and illustrated by the 
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very existence of the bureaucracy itself, along with the perceived right of the state as 
sovereign to decide in these matters. This power is also reinforced by the presence of 
state symbols in these encounters. Secondly, we will look at the role of the individual 
bureaucrats and their subjectivities within this system, and finally consider the power 
of the individual or claimant in their self-presentation and contestation. These three 
sites of power and resistance are not fixed, but are fluid and unstable, and emerge in 
different ways both between encounters and within them. 
5.1.2.1 States 
In his Post-script on the Societies of Control, Deleuze recounted a story: ‘Felix Guattari has 
imagined a city where one would be able to leave one’s apartment, one’s street, one’s 
neighbourhood, thanks to one’s (dividual) electronic card that raises a given barrier; 
but the card could just as easily be rejected on a given day or between certain hours; 
what counts is not the barrier but the computer that tracks each person’s position – 
licit or illicit – and effects universal modulation’ (Deleuze 1992, 7). It seems that this 
story of the imagination may not be so far-fetched, and a reading of this fragment 
evokes in me our current regimes of identification and citizenship: we are all expected 
to carry passports to travel, that in some locations may today be accepted and 
tomorrow not. Yet the most important part of this story, or indeed our very system, is 
not the ‘barrier’, as Guattari mentions, but the system as a whole that ‘effects 
universal modulation’. This is evident in our own systems: ‘[t]he border, be it state or 
biopolitical, is precisely constituted through repeated decisions of inclusion and 
exclusion, entry and exit, and what is vital for the authority of the state is not a 
particular decision either in its correctness or its political import, but in the repetition 
of the authority to decide’ (Salter 2013, 12, emphasis added). 
It is this ‘repetition of the authority to decide’ which is the ‘[…] essence of the state’s 
sovereignty […] not as the monopoly to coerce or to rule, but as the monopoly to 
decide’ (Schmitt [1922] 2010, 13). In presenting ourselves at immigration and in 
bureaucratic offices, and allowing them to make these decisions regarding our passage 
and our status we ‘reproduce national sovereignty’ (Friedman 2010, 172). This is 
crucial in our understanding of these sites: not only are we facing the representative of 
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the state, but contesting these decisions, can be perceived as contesting the very 
authority of the state itself. As Friedman explains: ‘[t]he interview system creates this 
sovereignty effect both in its role as a concrete border practice and through the ways it 
instantiates state power. Immigration interviews conducted at the airport literally 
produce the relationship of the state to citizens and noncitizens alike […] The state is 
not an abstraction in this case; it is a lived experience of human contact between 
individuals situated very differently with respect to the privileges and power of 
citizenship status and bureaucratic entitlement’ (Friedman 2010, 179). 
These relations are echoed by various symbolic and material aspects of these 
bureaucratic interactions. Michael Billig introduces the concept of ‘banal nationalism’ 
(1995), which argues how prosaic encounters with objects and vocabularies enforce 
the primacy of nationalism and the nation state. Within these bureaucratic 
encounters, the seemingly passive presence of the flag, the seal, as well as other 
symbolic, linguistic, and material markers of the national, all enforce the primacy of 
the state. It is also possible to go further to consider how ‘encounters with state 
materials may appear relatively ‘mundane’ for many, [but] this unremarkable quality is 
precisely what normalises the subjectivity of the citizen and seeks to efface the 
instabilities behind such normative order’ (Darling 2014, 496–97). Some of these 
more material considerations will be addressed in greater detail in the next section of 
this chapter. 
This power of the state is often seen to have the capacity to make demands of 
individuals. As Salter suggests: ‘[t]he sovereign’s power to admit or exclude is manifest 
in the necessary anxiety of confession to produce the national subject’ (2007, 59). 
Through the very power to decide, these situations evoke in us the need for 
confession, which, as Foucault outlines, is inherent in our current regimes of power:  
‘[t]he confession is a ritual of discourse in which the speaking subject is also the 
subject of the statement; it is also a ritual that unfolds within a power relationship, for 
one does not confess without the presence (or virtual presence) of a partner who is 
not simply the interlocutor but the authority that requires the confession, prescribes 
and appreciates it, and intervenes in order to judge, punish, forgive, console and 
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reconcile […] the agency of domination does not reside in the one who speaks (for it is 
he who is constrained), but in the one who listens and says nothing; not in the one 
who knows and answers, but in the one who questions and is not supposed to know’  
(Foucault [1976] 2008, 61–62). This compulsion to confess and the normalisation of 
the state’s ability to demand a confession further illustrates how state power is both 
highlighted and enforced through these encounters. 
5.1.2.2  ‘Street-Level Bureaucrats’ 
In building on the passage mentioned above, we must emphasise that ‘the one who 
listens’ is not the state per se, but one of its officers. Thus these confessions are 
interpreted by subjective beings: ‘interview decisions are arbitrary and personal, 
resting on perceptions of convention, common sense and normality; gut instinct and 
experience […]’ (Friedman 2010, 178–79). However, where there is space for 
discretion and significant power differences, there is also the possibilities for control 
and violence: ‘even in the most liberal national bureaucracies the bureaucratic 
capacity for petty tyranny remains a scandal of perception if not of fact’ (Herzfeld 
1992, 6). Of this ‘petty tyranny’, the fieldwork encounters contain many examples: by 
forcing people to wait, by contesting minor issues with the quality of photos or 
documents, or by demanding documents and citing rules that may or may not exist, 
the public servant and their ‘arbitrary decisions’ (Graeber 2015, 66) can cause 
significant difficulty and distress for the individual, while reinforcing their own 
authority. In the following extract, one of my participants – Milena – recounts her 
frustrations negotiating a specific bureaucratic encounter, and the discretion that 
those particular bureaucrats had over her: 
Despite	the	fact	that	I	had	collected	all	the	necessary	paperwork	–		from	my	job,	
from	the	tax	office,	everything	 I	needed,	even	the	rental	contract	which	showed	
that	 I	 was	 renting	 and	 where	 I	 lived	 –	 I	 had	 collected	 everything	 as	 had	 been	
asked,	based	on	a	list	which	they	had	posted	on	the	wall	at	the	police	station	[…]	
when	 I	went	to	submit	 them,	after	 two	or	 three	attempts,	 I	 felt	 that	 they	didn’t	
even	want	to	give	me	the	residency	permit.	That	is	exactly	how	I	felt.	
It is this ‘substantial discretion’ which is at the heart of Lipsky’s notion of street-level 
bureaucrats (1983): he illustrates how these bureaucrats are the real arbitrators of 
these decisions. Echoing this impact as an intermediary with regards to policy, Painter 
explains how ‘passing legislation has few immediate effects in itself […] rather its 
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effects are produced in practice through the myriad of mundane actions of officials, 
clerks, police officers, inspectors, teachers, social workers, doctors and so on’ (2006, 
761). Finally, Judith Butler, echoing the same point, in her work Precarious Life 
articulates the power in the hands of these individuals, and the ease of its abuse, 
labelling these the actions of ‘petty sovereigns’ (2006, 56). 
5.1.2.3 Clients  
Despite the sheer difference in power between the state and its officers on one hand, 
and the individual on the other, it would be remiss to see all clients as completely 
‘powerless’ (Graeber 2015, 81) or as exhibiting ‘impotence’ (Ferme 2004, 105). Those 
who negotiate these bureaucratic encounters have the right to construct themselves in 
certain ways: as student, as traveller, as spouse, as refugee, and in the case of those 
with dual citizenship they can choose which documents to use, which can at times 
greatly affect the procedures that one is subject to. In returning to Foucault’s notion 
of confession evoked earlier, I argue that these confessions are constructed by the 
client, of course using the limited resources that are available to them. We must be 
careful not to overinflate the capacities of these confessors; as Salter indicates ‘a 
traveller is the author of one’s identity, but not the final arbiter of his/her mobility’ 
(2007, 53), but seeing bureaucratic interactions solely as the exercise of state 
sovereignty, fails to take into account the diverse evaluative elements present in these 
interactions and the possibilities of more subtle and emergent forms of resistance 
(Hynes 2013). 
Resistance may be present in a diversity of forms: individuals have the choice to 
pursue certain ends, or even reject them, though this is not without consequence and 
cost. They may at times question the official, phone for information, or to check the 
progress of a submission prior to the date on which they were advised, appeal to them 
as individuals, launch a legal appeal, refuse to give certain details or lie, select which 
documents to show and which to hide, and perform countless other ‘acts of 
subversion’ (Codó 2011, 734). These individuals have the ability to create their 
narratives, and present themselves in certain ways; they can become dual citizens, 
travel using different documents, or apply elsewhere or just give up on or refuse to 
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engage with the process altogether. It would be a gross oversight to suggest that all 
individuals have equal access to such tactics. They do not. It is often those who have 
the financial resources or the right ‘cultural capital’ (Bourdieu 1986) – those who 
speak the language, know the system, or know the right people or processes of appeal 
– who navigate these systems more easily. Sometimes these attempts remain 
unsuccessful, and sometimes they are resolved through the help of others. Natalia’s 
account below shows how, despite ‘emphatic and categorical’ rejection on behalf of 
those handling her case, she was able to reverse the decision using the mother of a 
friend who worked at the embassy: 
Natalia:	 I	 submitted	 my	 papers	 and	 they	 were	 rejected.	 This	 happens.	 They	
rejected	me	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 I	 had	 significant	 reasons	 to	 continue	with	my	
studies.	 So	 the	 Municipality	 of	 Athens	 advised	 me,	 completely	 incorrectly,	 to	
return	 to	 Romania	 and	 reapply	 for	my	 student	 visa.	 It	 was	 something	 that	was	
practically	 impossible.	 I	went	to	the	Greek	Embassy	 in	Bucharest	-	 I	remember	 it	
well.	It	was	snowing,	it	was	cold,	and	generally	awful	-	I	went	there	every	day,	and	
I	couldn’t	help	myself	but	cry;	there	was	no	way	that	they	would	give	me	another	
student	visa.	
Anna:	For	what	reason?	
Natalia:	 Because	 they	 were	 under	 the	 impression	 that	 I	 was	 in	 receipt	 of	 a	
scholarship	from	the	Greek	Ministry	of	Education.	They	were	saying	to	me,	‘They	
sent	you…	you	don’t	have	 it…	 the	document	 that	 they	gave	you	 is	 classified…	 it	
can’t	be	bestowed…	why	should	we	give	you	another	student	visa?’.	They	didn’t	
want	[to	give	it	to	me],	their	rejection	was	emphatic	and	categorical.	I	was	saved	
by	a	contact17.		
The power in bureaucratic encounters thus plays out differently at multiple contested 
sites and in multiple contested ways, thus indicating the importance of non-
determinist analyses of these interactions. The remainder of this chapter will deal with 
three specific aspects of bureaucratic encounters – spaces, bodies, and times – and will 
further illustrate the complexity and fluidity of these encounters. 
 Spaces: the Materialities of the Bureaucratic 
Encounter 
It would be naïve to overlook the role of spaces and materialities in these bureaucratic 
encounters; as Lefebvre outlined some 40 years ago: ‘(Social) space is a (social) product 
[…] the space thus produced also serves as a tool of thought and of action; that in 
																																								 																				
17 Natalia later comments how a friend of her mother’s was able to call on some contacts to push through 
the required visa. 
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addition to being a means of production it is also a means of control, and hence of 
domination, of power; yet that, as such, it escapes in part from those who would make 
use of it’ (1992, 26, emphasis original). Materialities are central considerations with 
regards to these encounters, because, as Pérez suggests, the ‘materiality and aesthetics 
of bureaucratic artefacts mediate discourse and action’ (2016, 216). Furthermore, one 
must also take into account the formative role materialities play, as ‘matter and 
meaning are co-constitutive and mutually emergent’ (Darling 2014, 486). The section 
that follows will investigate the materialities of bureaucratic encounters further by 
considering the two material forms that are crucial to bureaucratic spaces – those of 
desks and paper – and their transformative capacities within these encounters. 
 Desk  
The desk is present in countless different forms within bureaucratic spaces. The 
primacy of the desk is even present etymologically: the term bureaucracy comes from 
the French bureau meaning desk, and the Greek suffix –kratia originally meaning 
‘power of’ or ‘rule by’; so already in understanding this notion of a system of 
government by administrative officials, the desk takes a significant role. The image of 
desk is quite insightful: ‘[t]he desk represents the most perfect and evocative 
illustration of the nature of these authoritative and distanced relations: the applicant, 
put in the position of they who beg or demand, is dependent on the goodwill of the 
civil servant, who without hope of the capacity to cross the material barriers which 
isolates them not only physically, but also symbolically, from the public’18 (Chevallier 
1983, 21). This capacity for division and isolation is reinforced by the presence of the 
desk, yet it also reflects the dominant bureaucrat’s position of permanence and 
authority.  
This replicated context – that of the official behind the desk – helps reinforce our 
perceptions of modern administrative rule. It has even captured the artistic imaginary: 
																																								 																				
18 In the original French, this passage reads: ‘Le guichet représente l'illustration la plus parfaite et la plus 
évocatrice de ce mode de relations distancié et autoritaire: placé en position de quémandeur ou de 
solliciteur, I'administré est soumis au bon-vouloir du fonctionnaire, sans espérer pouvoir franchir la barrière 
matérielle qui isole physiquement, mais aussi symboliquement, celui-ci du public.’ Translation is author’s 
own. 
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Jan Banning recently published a book  of his endeavours to photographically capture 
bureaucracy across different regions of the world (Banning and Tinnemans 2008). Of 
his work he explains: ‘Each subject is posed behind his or her desk. The photos all 
have a square format (fitting the subject), are shot from the same height (that of the 
client), with the desk – its front or side photographed parallel to the horizontal edges 
of the frame – serving as a bulwark protecting the representative of rule and 
regulation against the individual citizen, the warm-blooded exception. They are full of 
telling details that sometimes reveal the way the state proclaims its power or the 
bureaucrat’s rank and function, sometimes of a more private character and are 
accompanied by information such as name, age, function and salary. Though there is 
a high degree of humour and absurdity in these photos, they also show compassion 
with the inhabitants of the state’s paper labyrinth’ (Banning n.d.). These photographs 
are insightful in both their similarity and their diversity: while the presence of the 
desk remains the same, the bureaucrats themselves, their stance, their expressions and 
the ‘technologies’ and other physical items which surround them are all very different, 
echoing the subjectivity evoked earlier that sees the civil servant as an evaluative 
individual. 
These bureaucratic spaces are organised to control individuals. Some desks are 
positioned higher which enforces the authority of the state and the civil servant over 
clients. There are also numerous more subtle variations, of which the following auto-
ethnographic encounter is a good example:  
The	desk	that	the	official	sat	behind	had	been	put	on	a	platform	and	elevated	in	
such	 a	 way	 that	 their	 seated	 position	 was	 taller	 than	 our	 standing	 one.	 I	
remember	looking	at	my	father	who	was	raised	on	his	toes,	in	order	to	be	able	to	
place	his	arms	comfortably	on	the	bench19.	
Here this hierarchy is evident, and the separation that the desk so clearly signifies, was 
made more acute by the strained standing positions. Some of these interactions may 
also occur through glass windows, or holes cut into walls, all of which are material 
variations in these alienating dividers, used to separate bureaucrat from client. These 
spaces therefore exhibit an unusual combination of both intimacy – in the context of 
being face to face with another individual – and alienation, in the form of these 
																																								 																				
19 This is a journal excerpt from April 2012. 
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impenetrable barriers. Bureaucratic spaces are also places of resistance as, in relation 
to one particular bureaucratic office in Barcelona, Spain, where Codó explains how 
‘employees strove hard to discipline clients not to wander about the office, to sit on 
benches until their number was called and to wait the prescribed amount of time 
before going back to the office for consultation’ (2011, 734).  
While the desk remains a key element within the bureaucratic encounter, one cannot 
help but wonder whether this will remain the case. As we move towards more online 
forms of processing, and use newly developed forms of biometric technologies for 
identification, how will these interactions be affected? Salter claims that even though 
the technology may advance, the outcome is the same: ‘[t]he simple power of the 
border guard to reject a traveller at the border has equal effect on the circulation of 
individuals, regardless of the technological or bureaucratic infrastructure that 
supports the decision’ (Salter 2013, 16). This statement is correct, if the impact we 
seek to understand is considered in terms of circulation, however, in seeing these 
spaces as ones of encounter, these new technologies act to alter the experiences of 
these spaces, something that will be evoked in the later part of this chapter, in the 
section on bodies. 
 Paper 
One cannot underestimate the symbolic role that paper, and other technologies of 
record-keeping, play in bureaucratic encounters. Not only are they the very indication 
of state power ‘by endlessly self-producing iconicity’ (Herzfeld 1992, 164), but they 
ascribe to us identities, and situate us within time and space: ‘graphic artefacts are not 
simply the instruments of already existing social organisations. Instead their specific 
discourses and material forms precipitate the formation of shifting networks and 
groups of official and nonofficial people and things’ (Hull 2012, 21). If there is any 
need to clarify the importance of paper, one need only look at the interviews which 
make up one of the empirical foundations of this thesis: ‘passport’ has become 
synonymous with citizenship as status. Furthermore, ‘[p]assports are the material 
markers of identity’ (Salter 2003, 3). This in itself is unsurprising; the passport is the 
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clearest material manifestation of citizenship, and is requested as ‘proof’ in many of 
these encounters.  
Bureaucratic encounters involve not only passports, but a whole range of 
documentary artefacts in which ‘each additional document can provide more validity 
to a person’s case’ (Villegas 2015, 2366). Long lists of documents are also often 
required; for one particular process I was required to produce my Australian birth 
certificate and passport, my parents’ marriage licence, my baptism certificate, all of my 
father’s documentation including his Greek passport and identity card, as well as our 
family status certificate from the municipality where he was born (this was required to 
have been issued within the last three months). The demand for documentary 
evidence exists extensively within our society; modern identity and identification is 
situated within these very documents, as Foucault explains: ‘[t]he examination that 
places individuals in a field of surveillance also situates them in a network of writing; 
it engages them in a whole mass of documents that capture and fix them. The 
procedures of examination were accompanied at the same time by a system of intense 
registration and of documentary accumulation’ (Foucault and Rabinow 1991, 201). 
Yet, the demand for evidence has extended beyond that of official documentation; 
personal papers too may be requested. Here Louis explains the process that he had to 
undergo as part of obtaining a spousal visa:  
For	the	first	two	years,	to	prove	that	our	relationship	was	genuine,	we	had	to	give	
photos,	we	had	 to	 keep	evidences,	 friends	had	 to	write	 letters	 to	 say	we	had	a	
true	 relationship.	 Basically,	 we	 had	 a	 pile	 of	 evidences	 that	 was	 quite	 thick	
demonstrating	that	I	was	setting	up.	That	was	a	serious	thing.		
and Suzie, undertaking a similar process evokes a variation on this story: 
…[Y]ou	have	to	provide	proof	that	you	love	each	other	and	that	you	write	to	each	
other.	 You	have	 to	 give	 examples	of	 cards	 and	 things	 that	 you've	 given	 to	 each	
other	on	birthdays	and	Christmas	and	stuff	like	that.		
The need to ‘provide proof that you love each other’ not only indicates how paper is 
central to these encounters, but also how these processes compel us to render 
tangible, things like relationships, that are not necessarily so. 
Even when paper – be it in the form of documents, photographs or Christmas and 
birthday cards – is in evidence, it may be contested. This can occur on the grounds of 
both quality, not meeting technical specifications, questions as to their authenticity, 
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or even the claim of further not previously requested documents being required. 
Once again, this is often very much up to the discretion of the individual bureaucrat. 
Here Paheer describes the difficulties that he has been facing now that his type of 
residency permit has become contested: 
Three	times	I	have	been	in	[arrested	by	the	police].	Previously,	once	they	saw	the	
sticker	[permit],	things	were	fine,	I	was	fine.	But	the	problem	is	now	there	many	
duplicate	[forged]	papers.	So	they	pick	me	up	and	we	go	there,	and	they	put	me	
in,	 and	don’t	 tell	me	anything.	 Then	one	hour	 turns	 to	 six	 and	 they	 still	 haven’t	
told	me	 anything.	 Then	 the	 big	man	 came	 in	 and	 he	 put	my	 numbers	 into	 the	
computer,	 and	 then	 they	 saw	 that	 everything	 was	 real,	 the	 numbers	 and	 the	
photo,	and	then	they	say	 ‘ok	bye’.	This	 last	 time,	when	the	police	caught	me	on	
the	road,	they	took	me	to	his	office	to	do	some	checking.	Then	they	took	me	to	
the	big	police	station	at	Petralona,	and	we	went	there,	they	didn’t	check	anything,	
they	asked	me	if	I	had	papers,	I	said	yes	and	then	they	let	me	go.		
The contestation of the material trace may thus be one of these areas where the 
bureaucrat can wield their discretionary power over the client as illustrated in the 
early parts in this chapter. In these interactions, it is not only the document that 
becomes a site of contestation, but by contesting the document, the individual too 
comes into question. As such the collection, organisation, storage, and quality of 
documents may be a trigger for anxiety. 
Returning to the significance of the passport, we must be aware of the role it plays in 
mediating interactions: ‘[w]ith the widespread use of a similar passport format, the 
examination at the border came to be centred on whether documents – rather than the 
traveller herself – were in order’ (Salter 2003, 28, emphasis original). The encounter 
then becomes as much about the documents as it does about the individual, and as 
such, documents, when lost or misplaced or even contested, can cause anxiety. Recent 
work undertaken in relation to asylum seekers has also enforced the affective 
capacities of paper: ‘letters took on a role as possessions critical to an individuals’ 
sense of self’ and ‘losing a letter was an issue of disorientation, of losing track of one’s 
own position, of the one thing that tied one to the state’ (Darling 2014, 491). 
Furthermore, Cabot in his study of the Greek asylum regime explains how ‘material 
techniques and tools of regulation persistently enter into new relationships and uses, 
open to various contradictory and collaborative ends’ (Cabot 2012, 24). The role of 
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paper within these encounters can have considerable ongoing transformative 
capacities. 
Bureaucratic acts, and the need to render individual identity into restrictive paper 
formats, have a normalising effect. ‘Immigration controls are not neutral but 
productive: they produce and reinforce relationships of dependency and power’ 
(Bridget Anderson, Sharma, and Wright 2009, 8, emphasis original), they fit people, 
process them and understand them based on pre-existing static categories. ‘[P]eople 
are not easily classified’ (Papastergiadis 2010, 349), and yet a passport, like so many 
other documents of identity limit them to a name, a nationality, a sex and a date of 
birth. Needless to say, these designations have a way of affirming identity. As one of 
my participants, Susan, explains in reference to her own experiences:  
I	think	it	is	reinforced	when	you	actually	pass	through	gates	at	the	airport	and	you	
go	 through	whichever	queue	and	you	 think	 ‘which	passport	will	 I	 use?’	or	 ‘am	 I	
going	through	the	Australian	queue	or	the	EU	queue?’,	that	certainly	reinforces	it.	
But	I	think	you	are	always	going	to	have	the	sense	of	the	belonging,	the	passport	
is	 just	more	of	a	visual	object	 that	you	can	see.	You	pull	 it	out	and	 it	 is	 like	 ‘Oh	
yeah’…		
The denial of these forms of identification can also be instrumental; in a study of the 
Indigenous Argentinian Chaco, Gordillo shows how these material forms of 
identification that had once been denied, then became fetishized as items of great 
reverence (Gordillo 2006). These documents have a value so far beyond the materials 
that they are constructed from, as markers of identity and recognition, but also as 
productive tools of control and categorisation. 
 Bodies in Bureaucratic Encounters 
As some of the latter parts of the last section have illustrated, identity and paper find 
themselves intertwined with more bodily concerns, as bureaucracy tries to capture and 
control the body.  Building on some of the ideas that have already emerged in this 
chapter, the following section will first explore how the body is captured and 
evaluated within bureaucratic encounters, and the consequences of these processes. It 
will also bring questions of emotion and bureaucracy back into the discussion, to 
illustrate, that despite indications to the contrary, emotion plays a central role within 
bureaucratic encounters.  
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 Confessions of the Body 
The increasing use of biometric forms of identification in these encounters are 
altering our perceptions of the body. Biometric practices are those where ‘particular 
use is made of individual bodily characteristics for identification purposes’ (van der 
Ploeg 1999, 295), and as such ‘the body [becomes] broken down precisely so that it 
can be correlated with the specificities of individual identity’ (Cho 2013, 342). While 
those in favour of these new technologies have pointed to their speed and accuracy, 
they have also been widely criticised for having an ‘objectifying and dehumanising 
effect’ (Villegas 2015, 2364). In these cases ‘the person’s body is used against him, or 
her, in this case as evidence of identity’ (John Torpey 1998, 249, emphasis original). 
As such, we lose the capacity to assert our own identities, and if we situate this with 
regards to Foucault’s idea of the broader confessionary complex, as outlined 
previously, this time, instead of the individual speaking for themselves, parts of the 
body are made to ‘speak’ on their behalf. 
I remember recently, in one of my own bureaucratic encounters, the shock that I felt 
when a border guard put significant pressure on my fingers as they were being 
scanned by a fingerprint scanner, while passing through immigration entering the 
United States. The thought of having my fingerprints scanned and registered gave me 
a sense of anxiety in itself – as many bureaucratic encounters do – but this was 
heightened when I no longer controlled my digits, which were now subject to the 
border guard’s capture. Adey explains that ‘[t]he unity of the whole body is undone by 
focusing on the pieces of it’ (Adey 2009, 277) and the guard’s emphatic pressing on 
my fingers exemplified this. While some may argue that the introduction of these 
technologies are relatively minor changes to our regimes of bureaucratic encounter, 
one must remember that over time their capacities for transformation may build-up; 
as Ben Anderson suggests, ‘dispossession is a matter of non-eventful and not 
catastrophic disruptions that accumulate’ (2016, 5). 
For many, obtaining a visa or permanent residency involves being made subject to a 
health check, which produces a very different encounter to those that we may be 
familiar with, with our regular health care professionals. Here the results are for the 
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state that we are applying to, and are very rarely communicated to those being 
examined. Returning to the notion of confession, in this case the body is made to 
confess, but even the person whose body it is, is not made privy to that conversation.  
It is therefore not surprising that these encounters can have dehumanising effects, 
which was mentioned explicitly in several of these fieldwork encounters. The most 
vocal in her distress was Emma who recounts her experience: 
Emma:	It's	in	this	building	in	Surry	Hills.	You	go	into	this	dark,	dimly	lit	lift	and	you	
come	out,	and	it's	just	this	nasty	place	with	plastic	chairs	and	people	everywhere	
and	no	particular	explanation	of	what	 to	do	and	everyone	 looks	a	bit	 confused.	
Then	you	go	and	you	obviously	have	to	move	around	to	the	different	sections.	 I	
remember	the	doctor	being	quite	creepy	and	there	was	a	lady	who	did	the	basic	
things	like,	"Can	you	see?"	and,	"Can	you	speak	English?"	And	the	"Can	you	speak	
English?"	I	come	from	England,	so	even	that–	
Anna:	So,	you	had	to	read	out	a	text	or...?	
Emma:	You	have	to	read	out	a	paragraph,	which	is	fine.	We	thought	it	was	mildly	
amusing,	but	it	was	very	much	that	I	have	to	tick	the	box	that	we'd	done	it,	which	
was	quite	bizarre.	Largely,	there	are	a	lot	of	people	who	don't	speak	English	and	
they're	all	 in	 this	place	being	shuffled	around	from	one	post	 to	another.	There's	
no	real	system	and	it's	just	gruesome.	
Anna:	Is	it	clear?	
Emma:	Not	clear	at	all.	Obviously	a	 lot	of	people	have	got	their	families.	There's	
no	 place	where	 you	 could	 send	 people	 to	 sit	 and	wait	 if	 there's	 one	 of	 you	 go	
through	 the	 process	 or	 whatever.	 Oh,	 it's	 gruesome	 and	 you're	 there	 for	 ages.	
Everyone's	got	to	wait	for	their	different	things.	Someone	could	look	at	it	from	a	
time	 and	motion	 point	 of	 view.	 It's	 truly	 horrible.	 I	 spoke	 English,	 so	 at	 least	 I	
could	find	out	what	was	going	on.	If	I	was	an	immigrant	who	didn't	speak	English,	
it	 would	 be	 quite	 the	 most	 frightening	 experience	 you	 could	 imagine…	
Interestingly,	 I	 have	 other	 colleagues	 at	work	who've	 done	 the	 same	 thing	 and	
they	all	thought	the	same	thing	from	their	perspective,	too.20		
The aforementioned dehumanisation is clear in the encounter above, illustrated by 
the lack of explanation and direction as these people are being ‘shuffled around’. As 
her verb choice attests to, there is a diminished agency of individuals within this 
process, as applicants become subject to the demand of whichever body part or system 
requires testing next. This may create all sorts of responses from fear to feelings of 
alienation and lack of control.  
Finally the outcomes of these processes need also be highlighted as a source of anxiety, 
and a reminder that ‘political and policy decisions are often experienced in a personal 
																																								 																				
20 Notice how, in this fragment, she makes specific reference to the material environment and the impact 
that it has had on her, which further emphasises the arguments made in the preceding section of this 
chapter. 
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and emotional way’ (Ho 2009, 790). Questions of health were a huge preoccupation 
for Suzie as she applied for Australian citizenship: 
I	have	to	admit,	 in	the	process	of	applying	for	Australian	citizenship,	 it	did	make	
me	 wonder,	 what	 happens	 here	 if	 Australia	 doesn't	 let	 me	 in	 because	 of	 my	
health	issues?	I	did	feel	very–	I	understand	the	reasoning	behind	it–	but	I	just	felt	
like	it	was	a	bit	prejudicial,	and	it	made	me	understand	a	little	bit	more	about	how	
other	people	might	feel.	I	was	very	angry,	and	very	hurt	by	it,	because	thing	is	this,	
my	 illness	 -	as	 it	 stands	 right	now	 -	 it's	not	 in	 remission,	but	 I've	only	ever	been	
hospitalised	twice,	and	that	was	when	I	was	very	first	was	being	diagnosed	with	it.	
But	I	think,	of	course,	the	concern	is	way	down	the	track,	that	something's	wrong.	
But	I	felt	like	we	gave	a	good	body	of	evidence	about	how	I	haven't	cost	anybody	
huge	amounts	of	money	at	this	stage	in	my	life	and	so	it	made	me	sit	back	and	go,	
‘Well,	 what's	 going	 to	 happen	 to	me	 and	my	 husband?’	 Because	 at	 that	 stage,	
could	we	then	say,	forget	this	and	move	back	to	America,	and	then	we	follow	that	
track	about	going	through	American	citizenship,	what	if	I	have	similar	issues	in	the	
US?	So	then	I’m	forced	to	go	back	to	England.	So,	it	did	make	me	think,	‘Oh,	wow.’	
I've	always	thought	myself	as	an	 international	child,	and	maybe	 I'm	not.	What	 if	
no	 one	 wants	 me	 [laughter]?	 And	 it	 made	 me	 wonder	 too,	 privately	 without	
discussing	 with	 my	 husband,	 will	 our	 relationship	 survive	 this?	 If	 they	 say,	 ‘no	
sorry’,	 is	 he	 going	 to	 say	 ‘no	 sorry’.	 Because	when	he	proposed	 to	me,	 he	 said,	
‘Don't	say	yes	unless	at	some	point	plan	on	living	in	Australia	for	the	rest	of	your	
life.’		
Here the process she underwent in applying for citizenship had significant emotional 
complications; her body, with her less-than-perfect health, stood as a potential 
barrier,21 not only to the status of citizenship, but possibly to her life as she knew it 
and to her relationship with her husband. It is evident here how bureaucratic 
encounters can have significant impacts well beyond the bureaucratic space, they do 
not happen in parallel to lived life, but as a complexly interconnected part of it. This 
example leads us into the next section of this chapter which looks at the role of 
emotion within these encounters.  
 Emotion 
Earlier in this chapter, in drawing on Weber’s ideal type, we noted how the perceived 
absence of emotion in the bureaucratic context has been a key component in 
																																								 																				
21 While there is simply not the space to enter into this in greater detail, the possibility of her being rejected 
as a permanent resident, is due to a clause in the Migration Act of 1958 (DIBP [1958] 2016). Part of this 
piece of legislation includes a ‘significant cost threshold’ whereby entry is denied if the ongoing cost of the 
individual’s illness exceeds AUD$40,000. This has meant that there have been some very public cases 
whereby individuals have been denied permanent residency due to the belief that their (or their children’s) 
future medical care will come at too great an expense. Australia is by no means alone in this legislation, and 
there have been several other cases discussed in the media, most notably in Canada (McQuigge 2016) and 
New Zealand (Roy 2016).  
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rationalising the value of this mode of authority: ‘‘sine ira et studio’ without hatred or 
passion, and hence without affection or enthusiasm’ (Weber and Roth [1925] 20, 
225, vol 1.) is described as the bureaucratic ideal. However, the experiences of clients 
and bureaucrats show that this could not be further from the truth. Emotions and 
affects are present in all bureaucratic encounters, and are sensed and evaluated 
differently by both the client and the public servant, and two people undertaking the 
same bureaucratic process with the same official may have very different emotions 
evoked as a result of it. For some, these encounters may even cause heightened 
emotions. In fact emotion is required to evaluate the client and the truthfulness of 
their ‘confessions’: ‘[w]ithout sufficient emotional response, civil servants found it 
difficult to interpret how people were thinking […] a certain level of emotional display 
and exchange was considered necessary to enable civil servants to perform their duties 
[…] [however] if personnel are of the opinion that ‘too much’ emotion is displayed by 
the client, they may view it as a device to coerce the civil servant’ (M. Graham 2002, 
211–12).  
So not only is emotion necessary in these encounters, but as the above citation 
suggests, there are reasonable and expected levels of emotion. Even in the bureaucrats’ 
understanding of the situation, emotion and sensation are once again central: ‘gut 
instinct’ (Friedman 2010, 179) we are told is one of the foundations on which these 
decisions are made, thus highlighting the emotional intensities present on both sides 
of the desk. Needless to say, these situations are emotionally draining: ‘[i]n many 
circumstances bureaucratic indifference may be more likely to be the result of 
emotional exhaustion […] or even the anticipation of emotional exhaustion’ (M. 
Graham 2002, 211). Furthermore, we need to acknowledge that high status and high 
income individuals are often able to better insulate against this: ‘for the powerful, 
doormen and secretaries for instance, may provide a human barrier against exposure to 
hostility that powerless people less often enjoy’ (Hochschild 1975, 295–96, emphasis 
original). By getting their paperwork processed by companies, and paying extra for 
faster service, these individuals experience bureaucracy very differently. This all attests 
to the limitations of our previous approaches to this subject where ‘the emotional 
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force of the experience – the one thing that matters the most to people themselves – 
was edited out’ (Sayer 2011, 3).  
It is not only emotions at play at the exact time of these encounters, but also how 
these can have ongoing implications for action. These emotional responses have the 
ability to affect the capacities of these individuals and cause them to feel differently: 
‘emotions have consequences for agency […] [e]motions help propel people into 
alternate courses of action’ (M. Graham 2002, 220). These are what Ho describes as 
‘[t]he microlevel emotional dynamics to social and political structures’ (Ho 2009, 
792), all of which can change individual behaviours within them. Furthermore, the 
anxiety of the encounter may not even be embedded in the event itself, but rather 
what the encounter signifies: the transition from one’s own country, a large change or 
a very difficult anxiety causing decision. In the context of the encounter it is often easy 
to forget that this may have been the culmination of a long process or that this 
emotive influence may come of a result of other affective influences, thus emphasising 
the need for non-determinist analyses.  
Finally, the processes of recordkeeping and identity documentation go some way in 
which to regulate emotional expression. This is clearly illustrated by one of my own 
encounters where I accompanied my sister to get our passports renewed. Here the 
official found my sister’s photo problematic, she picked it up and said to her ‘You’re 
smiling in this photo, the police won’t accept this!’. I picked up one of the copies of 
my sister’s photo and looked at her dead-pan expression in it, trying to figure out how 
she could even consider this a smile; her lips formed a perfectly straight line. My sister 
didn’t say anything, so I replied for her, ‘No, she isn’t smiling, that’s just her face’, 
feeling how the absurdity of the comment reflected the absurdity of the moment. 
Here, we see the capacity of the photograph to capture the body, but also how the 
requirements offer possibilities to control and dictate forms of reasonable expression: 
‘[passport photographs] are not natural at all. They expose the citizen-subject caught 
and composed for identification purposes […] it is doubtful that, in that fraught 
moment of encounter with the border patrol officer, that anyone looks as neutral or 
as natural as our passport photos make us out to be’ (Cho 2009, 276). Emotion, 
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which has been theorised as absent in bureaucratic processes, is central to them, as 
illustrated in the diverse examples presented above. 
 Times: Waiting in Bureaucratic Encounters 
Through every interview that contained a description of a bureaucratic encounter – 
and the vast majority of them did – issues relating to time and waiting were 
permanent fixtures. We do a lot of waiting within these interactions: for documents, 
for appointments, in queues. So much of our regimes of documentation are littered 
with and controlled by the temporal: our passports and identity cards have expiry 
dates, visas are issued for distinct periods of time, and we are subject to regimes of 
‘temporal eligibility’ (Robertson 2014, 1917) where our treatment is determined by 
our age. Just as Ferme contends: ‘the state’s control over territory and populations is 
often experienced as control over space-time – the duration of passports, visas, 
scholarships, residence and work permits, and so forth’ (2004, 110). Yet, despite all 
this, bureaucracy retains a distinct ‘atemporality’ (Herzfeld 1992, 164) due to its 
perceived permanence of the institution, and by invoking symbols of the nation, are 
often represented as timeless. 
To return to the previously discussed techniques of power, time and waiting are of 
some consequence to them; studies have shown that the lower an individual is within 
a power hierarchy, the longer they are likely to be made to wait (Schwartz 1974; 
Bishop 2013). Perhaps the clearest indication of this in the context of bureaucratic 
encounters can be found at airports where ‘[n]ew technologies are being adopted to 
allow favoured, rich and highly mobile travellers to pass seamlessly and quickly 
through […] while other passengers face traditional, and in many cases intensifying 
scrutiny’ (S. Graham and Marvin 2001, 3). As Hage reminds us ‘there is a political 
economy of waiting, not least because ‘time is money’ and waiting can be a waste of 
time’ (2009, 3). Furthermore, income and status becomes tools through which waiting 
may be avoided, thus exhibiting the greater ‘time sovereignty’ (Elchardus 1994, 466), 
or control of time of some individuals. 
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Time is not only an indication of the relative power of the individual, but can be used 
as a technique of power within bureaucratic encounters: ‘[i]n fact, time is a tangible 
presence in bureaucratic interactions. What bureaucrats do is to background their 
own management of this contestable commodity. The timing of their ploys – what 
Bourdieu calls tempo – is a domain over which bureaucrat and client may tussle for 
control […] [this] carries implications for unequal power that can be further 
accentuated by skilled temporal manipulation’ (Herzfeld 1992, 163). As such, so many 
of the aforementioned ‘tyrannical’ acts of street-level bureaucrats are often based in 
the temporal, and the ability to make wait, becomes a tool of violence: ‘[t]ime is a 
crucial component in concepts of the person. By brusquely delaying action, a 
bureaucrat can deny the client’s humanity’ (Herzfeld 1992, 165). And as such, 
insisting people come again or at another time is an indication of this very power. 
One participant, Lucia, was subject to one of these demands which she managed to 
contest: 
They	said	 I	had	 to	come	at	six	 in	 the	morning.	Then	 I	 said,	 ‘I	 cannot	come	then,	
because	 the	 doors	 [to	 the	 convent]	 are	 closed’.	 They	 said,	 ‘Okay.	 Then	we	will	
make	 them	 now.’	 It	 took	 five	 or	 ten	 minutes	 to	 make	 them,	 it	 was	 only	 bad	
intentions.		
These cases are present in the literature as well: ‘his feeling of powerlessness in front 
of the agents of the state was always expressed as a conflict of ‘spatiotemporalities’, as 
an excessive amount of time spent in a particular (other) state or space, rooted in 
immobility for a long time, his mobility disrupted because of yet another problem 
arising from his passport’ (Ferme 2004, 107). 
It is often the case that ‘foreigners’ or people occupying certain specific categories are 
forced to wait in very different ways to the rest of the population, of which in my own 
experience, I have had a very clear and material illustration:  
In	our	first	visit	to	this	particular	building	we	arrived	mid-morning,	and	studied	the	
machine	 at	 the	 entry	 which	 prints	 out	 numbered	 tickets.	 There	 were	 several	
options,	 however	 the	 option	 for	 ‘foreigners’	 had	 the	 blue	 lid	 of	 a	 water	 bottle	
sticky	taped	over	the	top	of	the	button.	Uncertain	as	to	whether	this	was	a	fault	of	
some	kind	or	done	on	purpose,	we	asked	the	receptionist	behind	the	glass	at	the	
desk	by	the	entry.	She	said	very	rudely	that	all	the	tickets	for	foreigners	are	gone,	
and	that	in	order	to	be	seen	on	a	given	day	we	had	to	arrive	before	8am.		
Here, on the machine that provides tickets to join the virtual queue, the ‘blue lid of a 
water bottle sticky taped over the top of the button’ provides a very clear both physical 
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and symbolic illustration of some of the barriers that certain individuals face in 
gaining access. In this case, those who were at these offices for other functions could 
obtain their numbered ticket at a time of their choosing, and be served not long after. 
Time in this context ‘is a social weapon’ (Herzfeld 1992, 165).  
The specific length of time and the circumstances under which one is forced to wait 
are the result of the interplay of complex considerations, one of which are the regimes 
of priority applied to the categories that we inhabit. Natalia’s own observations of her 
experiences applying for visas in Athens reflect this: 
They	 asked	me	 to	 go	 to	 Petrou	 Ralli,	 where	 there	 is	 a	 special	 police	 office,	 the	
General	 I	 think	 it	 is	 called,	 where	 they	 refer	 all	 of	 the	 foreigners.	 There	 are	
massive	queues,	even	from	early	in	the	morning	it	is	absolute	chaos.	You	have	to	
get	there	at	6am	at	the	latest.	Of	course,	those	who	come	from	European	Union	
countries	–	 	once	again	 this	 is	 in	our	 interests	–	are	allowed	 to	enter	 first.	 They	
open	the	gates	and	you	enter.	Whereas	those	unfortunate	people	that	come	from	
Asia	 and	 the	 like,	wait	 for	 hours	with	 their	 families,	 pushing	 strollers	 and	 often	
surrounded	by	kids.	It	is	disgusting	isn’t	it?		
This highlights Fuller’s point that ‘[t]he queue is not just a symptom of mass 
distribution, it is also a diagram of how bodies and bits, peoples and structures move 
relationally’ (2013, 209). Countless factors can influence our waiting, it can differ 
between times of the year and the time of the day. It may depend on the queue that 
you join, and often, as indicated above, it can depend on which category you fall into. 
Status and wealth can be used in order to insulate the individual from the 
bureaucratic encounter – an idea that was developed earlier in this chapter with 
regards to emotion – and as such there are also possibilities temporal insulation: ‘if 
one has money, one pays for a lawyer’s time – carefully clocked to the minute at 
hourly rates – to follow through the case. Otherwise, one invests enormous amounts 
of one’s own time and knowledge’ (Ferme 2004, 111).  
The banality of waiting is such that it often makes us overlook its significance by 
considering it as completely normal and expected practice. At times, however, the 
durations spent waiting can render some of the processes not only questionable, but 
absurd, as Lana explains here in relation to her own experiences: 
When	you	have	a	scholarship,	and	you	are	a	student	here,	sometimes,	well,	quite	
a	few	times,	you	go	to	submit	your	papers	and	you	get	your	permit	about	a	month	
after	the	other	one	expired.	It	 is	something	which	is	completely	bizarre.	 In	other	
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words,	you	obtain	your	residency	permit,	but	you	had	to	wait	so	 long	for	 it	 that	
the	one	 that	you	already	had	had	expired.	One	month,	 sometimes	 two	or	 three	
months.	 So	 you	have	 to	 submit	 everything,	 and	 even	 if	 you	do,	 you	will	 still	 be	
there	illegally	for	a	period	as	it	will	have	expired.		
Tied up with this absurdity, is the uncertainty that goes with it, and it is often this 
idea of waiting, without a clear or defined end, that can be the most difficult to cope 
with, and it creates anxiety and worry: ‘dead time […] is also marked by insecurity, 
particularly because those waiting do not know the type of work that may go on 
behind closed doors to facilitate their deportation. Thus waiting produces an affective 
response […] [it] enhances the worry, fear and uncertainty that are part and parcel of 
the border encounter’ (Villegas 2015, 2368). And in this way, bureaucratic waiting 
can often be vastly different from waiting elsewhere due to what is at stake; for some 
of these decisions may have enormous implications for the way that they live their 
lives and the opportunities that they perceive in their future. As Conlon suggests: ‘[…] 
waiting is socially produced, imbued with geopolitics, and also actively encountered, 
incorporated and resisted amidst everyday spaces’ (2011, 353)  thus enforcing the 
problematic nature and ‘inadequacy of a single conception of time’ (Brown 1998, 94). 
 A Typology of Waiting 
As the previous section has illustrated, waiting in bureaucracy is not singular, it’s 
plural. It is in trying to understand this plurality, the following section outlines a three 
part typology of waiting. Each will start with a description of an encounter which 
involved this type of waiting, before analysing the form in greater detail. The first type 
is queueing, that is the waiting in a line which is either physical or virtual. Secondly 
we will consider ‘appointed’ waiting where there has been a specific point in linear 
clock time where an anticipated event or outcome will occur. The final type to be 
considered is ‘ambient’ waiting, which is the waiting that happens when there is 
uncertainty regarding the timing of the desired outcome or even its eventuality. 
Whereas the first two examples use various technologies – the number of people that 
must be served before you are, or the amount of time that needs to pass before you 
will be seen – as indicators of eventuality, this one offers no such clarification. While 
there are certainly other forms of waiting and enormous diversity within these types, 
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this triptych gives us a starting point to better understand how and why we wait and 
the implications of these types.  
5.4.1.1 Queueing 
We	had	arrived	at	the	offices	around	7.45	am.	We	were	shocked	to	find	a	queue	
that	wrapped	all	 the	way	down	 the	disabled	access	 ramp,	 the	whole	way	down	
the	side	of	the	building	before	snaking	back	on	itself	and	tailing	off	down	the	road.	
We	could	not	believe	it.	We	asked	at	the	end	of	the	queue	if	this	was	the	queue	
for	the	foreigners	and	the	lady	nodded.	It	was	a	really	cold	morning,	and	she	and	
her	son	who	was	in	a	pram	were	rugged	up.	Our	breath	was	foggy	in	the	cool	air.	
At	about	8.15am	an	official	arrived	with	a	pile	of	numbered	 tickets	and	a	police	
officer.	He	started	to	hand	them	out	and	it	was	another	half	hour	or	so	before	we	
got	 our	 turn.	We	were	 each	 handed	 a	 number	 and	 told	 to	 leave	 and	 not	 come	
back	till	after	2pm,	as	there	was	no	way	our	number	would	be	called	before	then.	
[…]	
We	 arrived	 a	 week	 later	 just	 after	 6am	 to	 find	 the	 line	 already	 had	 some	 20	
people	in	it,	so	we	joined	it	in	the	dark	and	freezing	cold	and	waited	the	two	or	so	
hours	for	the	official	and	the	police	officer	to	come	and	hand	out	the	numbered	
tickets.	Once	we	obtained	out	numbers,	we	still	had	to	wait	quite	a	while	before	
those	who	were	before	us	were	 seen.	When	we	 finally	made	 it	 in	over	an	hour	
later	we	were	called	in	separately.	It	was	quite	daunting	as	you	could	not	see	into	
this	room	from	the	outside,	and	you	weren’t	allowed	to	enter	it	until	your	number	
had	been	called.	
Bureaucratic offices and airports are often notorious for the lengths of their queues, 
and, for many, the difficulty of the task may lie less in the ‘confession’ itself, and more 
in the difficulty of reaching someone to hear it. As the auto-ethnographic fragment 
above illustrates, queueing may take hours or occur in less than ideal circumstances. 
This example also illustrates two types of queueing – the physical sort where people 
line up one after another, and ticketed queueing where one waits for one’s number to 
be called. Queueing gives this encounter a sense of order, that despite the length of 
the line or the numbers that are in front of you, you will eventually be seen to: ‘[i]t 
seems so simple and fair. A neat, linear structure that seems to transparently echo a 
tidy discursive line that says something like ‘good things come to those who wait’’ 
(Gillian Fuller 2013, 206). No matter how slow, when the queue is moving, an end is 
being reached. Issues may arise when the momentum of the queue is interrupted such 
as with queue-jumpers: ‘where ‘to jump the queue’ is indexical with impoverished 
moral values and antisocial civil disobedience’ (Gillian Fuller 2013, 206–7), and 
complaints may be made over the length of the time spent waiting, as long queues 
may reflect a lack of efficiency.  
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Especially long queues may become problematic, as queueing requires a waiting in a 
certain space which can render individuals unable to engage with things outside the 
line or the waiting room (in the case of ticketed waiting). Often long queueing 
experiences may force individuals to take ‘time out’ of their usual routines, which will 
in itself have an impact on the intensities of the encounter; these waiting experiences 
are diverse, not just in terms of the length of the wait, or the expectation and 
anticipation that surrounds it, but also through the diverse personal, spatial, and 
temporal contexts in which it occurs and our responses to them. As Bissell reminds us 
‘waiting as an event should be conceptualised not solely as an active achievement or a 
passive acquiescence, but as a variegated affective complex where experience folds 
through and emerges from a multitude of different planes’ (2007, 277), something 
that one needs to be mindful of across all three of these types of waiting. 
The physicality of the queue also has an impact on the individual, especially in the 
cases where there is more than one queue, as Louis explains here in relation to his 
own experiences at the airport: 
[I	got	my	citizenship	b]ecause,	when	[my	son]	was	six	months	old	we	went	back	to	
France.	He	was	born	in	2003.	And	I	remember	that	[my	wife]	and	[my	son]	were	in	
the	Australian	queue	and	I	was	in	the	foreigners	queue.	And	I	thought,	‘I	need	to	
get	my	passport.’	And	that's	why	I	ended	up	getting	this	passport.		
To clarify this idea, several further points need to be made. Firstly queueing 
encounters like this one, become tools of categorisation that are incredibly impactful. 
They provide a clear and material evocation of the different categories individuals 
occupy, especially when the styles of waiting – by either waiting longer or waiting 
differently – reinforce that categorisation. As the above example illustrates, and as the 
following one will also, airports are notorious for these category-enforced forms of 
queueing: ‘[t]here is very little in international air travel quite so unpleasant as the 
moment you realize that a) you don't carry an EU passport; and b) the bureaucrats at 
EU airports don't particularly care about people who don't carry EU passports […] I 
just landed in Brussels after an overnight flight from […] Dulles and found myself, 
along with hundreds of others – mainly Americans – on the non-EU passport line. It 
was one of those tightly coiled lines that provides the appearance, though not the 
reality, of movement’ (Goldberg 2015). In evoking the European Union we must also 
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mention the corollary; while waiting may produce an affective response, the ability to 
not wait, or even to wait less has an impact as well. The Schengen Agreement, which 
eliminated the borders between many of the EU states, has created the absence of a 
border, a regime of ‘not waiting’, eliminating the feeling of passing from one space to 
another thus minimising the awareness of difference.22 
5.4.1.2 Appointed Waiting 
On	the	day	that	our	appointments	rolled	around	we	arrived	back	at	the	prefecture	
15	minutes	early	 and	 climbed	 the	 stairs	 to	 the	next	 floor.	 I	 remember	watching	
the	girl	in	front	of	us	walk	up	the	stairs	with	a	folding	stool	thinking	gratefully	that	
now	 that	we	had	 appointments,	 our	wait	 shouldn’t	 be	 all	 that	 long.	 I	was	 once	
again	mistaken.	Following	the	girl	to	the	office	that	we	had	our	appointments	at	
upstairs,	we	were	shocked	to	find	the	waiting	room	overflowing.	There	was	barely	
any	 standing	 room,	 and	 the	 room	 was	 uncomfortably	 warm	 despite	 the	 chill	
outside.	The	girl	that	had	arrived	before	us	found	a	space,	unfolded	her	stool	and	
took	a	book	and	a	thermos	from	her	bag.		
As the above encounter of suggests, having an appointment sets the expectation for a 
specific event to happen at a specific time; appointed waiting gives us the capacity to 
leave the space of waiting while still being confident that our turn will come. It allows 
us to do the waiting elsewhere. We need to be aware of these presences and absences 
and the atmospheres of waiting. Whereas ambient waiting – as discussed below – is a 
form of waiting in absence, appointed waiting requires both absence (until the time of 
the appointment) and presence (waiting in the waiting room on the day of the 
appointment). 
Here there may be several points of contestation. The first of these is in relation to 
how long one must wait for an appointment, and just how much power that 
individual has to dictate the details of this appointment. This reflects back on 
questions of power and waiting that were addressed earlier: often those with the least 
power wait the longest for their appointments and have the least ability to contest 
when they will be seen to. Furthermore, wealthy and high status individuals can hire 
services that do the waiting for them, or may receive priority or expedited treatment. 
Having an appointment for a specific date and time does not necessarily mean that 
																																								 																				
22 It is beyond the scope of this chapter to further investigate how the EU changed these waiting regimes for 
European citizens, and thus this has been addressed only in passing. For further discussion relating to the 
other aspects of the European context, please see Chapter Three, and Chapter Six which looks at how this 
regime has become embedded in imaginaries. 
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the individual will be seen to at that particular time. Being forced to wait beyond the 
time of the appointment can create a sense of anxiety and injustice: the wrongdoing is 
acutely felt because it can be measured in minutes, hours and sometimes days. The 
time of the appointment sets an expectation of an end point – or at least a time at 
which the individual will be served. When the appointment passes and one has not 
been served – many bureaucracies are notorious for their delays – there is the sense of 
having been misled, and as time progresses past the time of the appointment, 
aggravation often ensues. 
5.4.1.3 Ambient Waiting 
Anna:	Was	[your	residency	permit]	hard	to	get?		
Mayumi:	Difficult	in	what	sense?	To	be	honest,	it	needed	a	great	amount	of	time.	
It	took	more	that	one	and	a	half	years.		
Anna:	Did	it	need	a	lot	of	running	around?		
Mayumi:	No,	not	so	much	running	around,	but	it	took	a	very	long	time	and	I	just	
didn’t	know	when	I	would	get	it.	Then	after,	it	was	very	inhumane.	They	didn’t	tell	
you	when	it	was	ready,	you	had	to	go	to	the	police	and	see	if	your	name	is	on	a	list	
outside.	There	are	so	many	people,	 I	mean	there	is	a	 list	of	say	1000	names	and	
you	have	to	go	through	it	all	to	see	if	yours	is	on	it.		
Anna:	 So	 they	don’t	give	you	a	date?	So	 it’s	 just	pass	by	whenever	you	can	and	
check	it?		
Mayumi:	Yup,	come	by	and	check	the	list.	That	is	all	they	tell	you.		
Anna:	Did	you	go	often?		
Mayumi:	Once	 every	 two	or	 three	months.	 I	wasn’t	worried,	 because	 I	 had	 the	
blue	papers,	but	I	was	concerned…	Look	I	didn’t	really	have	a	problem,	but	it	was	
stressful.	 I	 would	 go	 every	 two	 or	 three	 months	 and	 there	 were	 names	
everywhere,	and	I	mean	everywhere.		
	
The final type of waiting, is ‘ambient’ waiting, which described a period of indefinite 
waiting: one that has uncertain timelines and sometimes uncertain ends as Mayumi, 
one of my participants illustrates so clearly in her encounter above. These extended 
periods of uncertain waiting leaves individuals ‘feeling outside the ‘normal’ time of 
mainstream society’ (Griffiths 2014, 1992), and highlights the suffering that time can 
engender (Medlicott 1999). There is a certain irony to the use of the word ‘ambient’, 
as it suggests something that exists in the ‘surrounds’, which it may be for some, but 
for others the anxiety and uncertainty is very much fore-grounded, like the case 
exhibited in the ‘interruption’ that follows where the respondent ‘was living in that 
student security check stage for five months’. His choice of words shows how pervasive 
this waiting is: he is living in it. As Conlon explains: ‘waiting is not something that 
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takes place in suspended time or outside of ‘doing’ things, but instead [is] an active 
intentional process, integral to constructions of subjectivity and ‘significantly shaping 
the lived life’’ (2011, 357). 
Finally, we once again need to acknowledge that the diversity in encounters and 
people’s responses to them, as Hage explains: ‘differences between the various actors, 
not just in what kind of waiting they engage in, but also in the intensity with which 
they do their waiting’ (2009, 8). ‘Ambient’ waiting can be done in both an active and 
a passive way: one may ring up and enquire, they may look for other options, or may 
engage in many of the acts of resistance that were outlined much earlier in this 
chapter. Or they may just wait, and even then this may be seen in more active terms as 
a ‘celebration of one’s capacity to stick it out’ (Hage 2009, 97). Thus we begin to see 
the diversity of ways in which these waiting styles are encountered. The Interruption 
(Interlude) below will illustrate one such case in greater detail. 
 Interruption (Interlude): Amir’s Story 
After discussing the topic of time, I now wish to interrupt it, or rather interrupt the 
flow for this chapter to highlight how many of the ideas that we have outlined in the 
earlier stages of this chapter, emerge within a single narrative. Our narratives of 
citizenship and bureaucratic encounters are intricate experiences that involve the 
interplay of countless variables which are all reflected on and responded to by the 
individual. But by breaking up these elements, by considering them one by one, we 
are obscuring the seen, heard and felt narratives in all their complexity. The following 
interlude is taken from my interview with Amir and shows just one of countless 
permutations of these experiences. It evokes several ideas that are central to this 
chapter, and in order to maintain the intensity and richness of the narrative, I have 
highlighted three of these central ideas in different colours. The sections in red 
highlight his emphasis on the temporal and the role that time and timing play in his 
account. The green segments expose his repeated mentions of the lack of 
information, and of being kept in the dark, as well as his attempts to make sense of 
these delays. Finally the blue sections highlight his emotive responses to this situation. 
His story will be followed by a brief analysis of these three points. 
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Amir:	Now,	what	 I	 say	 is	my	own	conditions.	 I	don't	generalize	 that	 into	all	 [my	
national]	community	or	anything…	So	if	I	compare	with	my	friends,	many	of	them	
-	 like,	 80%	 of	 them	 -	 have	 not	 been	 this	 bad,	 unfortunate.	 But	 this	 is	 what	
happened	to	me	now.	 I	 lodged	my	student	visa	application	to	Australia.	 I	had	all	
the	 documentations	 that	 they	 need,	 and	 I'm	 very	 organizing,	 making	 all	 of	 the	
documentations	very,	very	clear.	I	lodged	that	and	I	waited	–	it's	normally	to	take	
less	 than	 three	 months,	 is	 the	 average	 that	 the	 website	 also	 says	 about	 the	
student	visas.	I	waited	six	months	and	there	were	no	response	sort	of	thing	from	
the	DIAC.	Now,	 I	got	very	anxious	back	then...from	my	own,	 let's	say,	education	
goals	and	this	sort	of	things,	 I	was	losing	opportunities…	And	at	the	same	time,	
my	 own	 peers	 were	 getting	 into	 best	 US	 universities,	 so	 I	 felt	 very,	 very	
frustrated.	DIAC	was	 not	 replying	 anything.	 They	 were	 just	 saying	 –	 after	 one	
month	of	lodgement,	the	case	officer	told	me	to	do	the	medical	examination	and	
everything,	which	essentially	means	that	she's	okay	with	my	documents	as	for	the	
immigration	perspective,	not	the	security	check.	But	after	that,	I	went	through	the	
security	 check,	 which–	 they	 don't	 mention	 the	 word	 security	 check.	 They	 said	
additional	 checks	 or	 these	 sorts	 of	 things.	 I	 was	 living	 in	 that	 student	 security	
check	 stage	 for	 five	 months	 or	 –	 I	 don't	 know,	 whatever,	 until	 I	 got	 really	
frustrated.	Now,	after	six	months,	 I	started	to	think	about	applying	to	the	other	
countries	and	other	universities.	I	tried	for	another	TOFL	exam	for	some	of	these	
very	 top	 universities,	 much	 higher	 –	 higher	 marks.	 I	 was	 writing	 to	 all	 the	
professors,	 ‘Do	 you	want	 a	PhD	 student?’	 and	 this	 sort	 of	 thing…	But	 anyway,	 I	
still	wasn't	get	any	answers.	I	randomly	applied	to	these	universities	and	I	was	–	
at	the	same	time	I	was	calling	to	the	Embassy	of	Australia,	asking	about	–	
Anna:	‘What	are	you	doing?!’	
Amir:	No	 clear	 answer.	 Now,	 longer	 story	 short,	after	 eight	months	 of	my	 visa	
lodgement	 to	 Australia,	 my	 case	 officer	 wrote	 to	 me	 saying	 that	 your	 security	
check	is	passed,	give	me	a	new	ECOE	-	Electronic	Confirmation	Of	Enrolment	-	to	
issue	your	visa.	It	took	me	21	days	to	get	that	issued	again	from	–	
Anna:	Why?	Just	to	get	the	[?]	–	
Amir:	 It	was	 just	 laziness	of	 the	admin.	Because	 I	did	everything.	 I	 had	 the	new	
scholarship	 issued	 before	 that.	 I	 had	 the	 new	 admission	 before	 that,	 but	 just	
printing	one	 thing	 and	 sending	 that	 to	me	–	 but	 it	 took	 so	 long	 for	 them	 to	do	
that.	The	craziest	thing	is	that	when	I	sent	that	confirmation	of	enrolment	back	to	
the	case	officer,	I	got	this	automatic	reply	email	which	says	that	I'm	on	leave	and	
contact	this	other	case	officer.	I	did	that	-	didn't	get	any	reply.	Waited	one	week	-	
no	reply.	Called	the	Embassy,	and	there	were	one	speaker	 [of	my	 language]	on	
the	phone	which	didn't	give	any	sort	of	information.	He	just	was	saying	that	it's	
okay,	wait	a	 little	bit,	we	will	 come	back	 to	you.	And	nothing	happened.	 It	was	
very,	very	frustrating.	Now,	after	calling	them	several	times,	that	speaker	[of	my	
language]	 told	 me	 that	 the	 case	 officer	 sent	 your	 profile	 back	 to	 the	 security	
agency	again	[chuckles].	
Anna:	Why?	
Amir:	 I	 said,	 ‘Why?!’	 So	 I	 contacted	 the	 case	officer	 and	 she	 said	 that,	 ‘Because	
you	have	renewed	your	passport	while	you	were	[inaudible]	security	check,	I	had	
to	 send	 you	 back	 for	 security	 check	 again	 with	 your	 new	 passport.’	 Now,	 the	
interesting	thing	is	that	before	I	renew	–	because	it	was	close	to	expiry	date	when	
I	was	waiting	for	visa.	Before	 I	renew	 that,	 I	contacted	the	previous	case	officer	
and	said	that,	‘Look,	this	is	the	expiry	date.	I	have	been	waiting	for	this	visa.	Do	I	
renew	my	passport	or	do	I	not?’	and	I	exactly	said	that.	Does	it	change	the	process	
of	my	 visa	 or	 not?	 And	 she	 said	 that	 it	 doesn't	 change	 at	 all	 your	 process,	 and	
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renew	it	and	send	to	me	–	send	me	the	copy	of	the	new	passport	as	soon	as	you	
get	 it,	which	 I	 did.	 I	 forwarded	 the	 same	 thing	 to	 this	 new	 case	officer	 and	 she	
never	 replied.	Anyway,	 it	 was	 passing	 eight	 months.	 I	 applied	 to	 15	 other	
universities	 and	 it	was	 in	 different	 countries,	 because	 I	 had	 this	 very,	 very	 bad	
experience	with	Australia	and	I	put	all	of	my	eggs	in	the	basket	of	Australia,	so	I	
didn't	want	to	do	that	again.	I	said	okay,	I	will	get	three	admissions	from	different	
countries	and	 I	will	 apply	 to	all	of	 them,	 for	visa.	Now,	 it	was	about	eight,	nine	
months	through	my	visa	to	Australia	that	I	got	–	I	started	to	get	admissions	from	
different	universities,	and	it	was	all	the	universities	that	I	didn't	think	that	I	would	
get	admitted	there	with	a	scholarship.		
Amir:	 So	 anyway,	after	 11	months,	 they	 eventually	 randomly	 sent	me	 an	 email	
saying	 that	your	visa	has	been	 issued,	go	and	get	 it.	 I	didn't	book	a	 flight	until	 I	
went	 to	 the	 Embassy	 and	 they	 stamp	 that	 [chuckles]	 visa	 into	 my	 passport.	 I	
didn't	 trust	 the	email.	 I	waited	 five	days	 to	 go	 to	 the	 Embassy	 and	 stamp	 that	
thing.	The	worst	 thing	 is	 that	 they	do	not	 give	you	any	 feedback.	 They	didn't–	
during	this	whole	process	of	the	security	check,	eight	months	or	so	since	they	first	
came	back	and	said	that	your	security's	passed,	they	never	ask	me	that	we	want	
such	and	such	document,	or	this	part	of	your	life	is	not	clear	to	us	-	explain	that	
to	us.	Or	we	have	problem	with	that	thing	or	this	thing.	If	they	were	giving	me	
feedback,	 I	 could've	 provided	 them	with	 information.	 I	 have	 no	 idea	 what's–	
why	 this	 process	 is	 so	 lengthy,	 and	 why	 they	 do	 not	 contact	 me	 to	 ask	
information	 if	 they	 want.	 Either	 they	 are	 trying	 to	 figure	 out	 the	 information	
themselves,	or	not.	In	both	cases	they	can	contact	me	and	ask	me.	
Amir:	One	thing	that	I	forgot,	back	then	for	my	student	visa	application,	I	told	you	
that	after	eight	months	they	came	back	to	me	and	wanted	new	ECOE.	Then	I	got	
them	and	they	didn't	say	anything,	and	they	sent	my	profile	back	to	the	security	
agency.	After	ten	months,	they	got	back	to	me	and	they	wanted	my	updated	CV.	
That	is	the	only	thing	that	they	want	for	me	after	ten	months	–	
Anna:	That	was	different.	
Amir:	Just	said,	updated	CV.	And	I	sat,	okay,	updated	CV	–	
Anna:	Had	you	done	anything	in	those	ten	months?	
Amir:	No!	So	I	–	only	–	
Anna:	Sat	at	home	[chuckles].	
Amir:	Only	 I	 guess	one	or	 two	of	my	papers	which	was	under	 review	back	 then	
were	accepted,	 so	 I	 just	 included	those	 two	papers	and	 I	 submitted	my	CV	back	
again.	I	immediately	got	a	phone	call	from	the	speaker	[of	my	language]	who	said	
that	 from	 specific	 date	 to	 another	 specific	 date,	what	were	 you	 doing?	 And	 it	
was	from	the	day	I	lodge	my	visa	application	to	that	current	day	[chuckles].	
Anna:	And	what	had	you	been	doing?	
Amir:	 I	 said	okay,	 I	was	 sitting	at	home.	He	didn't	 say	what	were	 you	doing,	he	
said,	‘Where	were	you	working?’	I	said	I	didn't	work	anywhere.	He	said,	‘So	what	
were	you	studying?’	I	said	I	didn't	study	[?].	‘So	what	were	you	doing?’	I	said	I	did	
blah-blah-blah.	He	said	okay,	write	all	of	that	and	immediately	email	that	to	me.	
He	 said	 several	 times,	 immediately.	 I	 don't	 know,	 they	were	 sitting	 ten	months	
there	and	now	they	say	 immediately.	So	 I	 sat	and	wrote	about	one	page	and	a	
half,	 and	 I–	 in	 detail	 I	 said	what	 I	 was	 doing	 in	 this	 ten	months	 -	 sitting	 TOFL	
exam,	 getting	 admission,	 getting	 something,	 blah-blah-blah,	 reviewing	 that	
journal	paper,	revising	that	journal	paper,	helping	other	student,	and	all	of	that,	in	
one-and-a-half	page,	and	I	sent	that	to	them.	I	don't	know.		
[…]	
Amir:	 Even	 the	 stuff	 that	 I'm	 telling	 you	 is	 just	 guesses,	 because	 there's	 no	
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information	about	what	is	this	system	that	does	the	security	checks,	and	what	are	
the	basis	of	 that?	DIAC	doesn't	give	any	answer	or	 information,	 so	 it's	 just–	and	
everybody	has	 their	own	 limited	number	of	people	around	 them,	and	 it's	 just	 a	
limited	number	of	different	experiences	and	they	want	to	put–	And	assumptions	
too,	 because	 I	 suppose	 you	 sit	 down	 and	 go,	 ‘What	 is	 it	 about	me	 that	 people	
might	find	problematic?’.	
[…]		
Amir:	....	now	with	the	PR	application	here.	I	applied	for	permanent	residency	11	
months	ago.	 I	had	all	 the	documents	and	everything,	and	again	the	same	as	the	
student	 visa	 application	 -	 the	 immigration	 part	 went	 very	 smooth,	 I	 did	 all	 the	
medical	checks	and	everything,	and	now	I	have	been	in	this	security	check	stage	
for	more	 than	nine	months.	No,	 less	 than	nine.	About	 nine	months	 now.	And	
again,	the	immigration	doesn't–	like,	exactly	same	story,	exactly	same	scenario.	
They	don't	tell	me	if	they	want	more	information	and	what	is	it	that	the	results	
are	 not	 coming.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 they	 don't	 accept	 or	 reject	 that.	 It's	 very	
annoying	because	you	cannot	plan	for	your	life.	
[…]	
Amir:	I	carry	this	feeling	of	insecurity	with	me	around	all	the	time.	Part	of	that	is	
because	before,	during	that	very–	a	few	months	that	I	was	in	[my	country]	and	it	
was–	my	visa	application	was	not	coming	through,	and	 I	didn't	start	 to	 look	 into	
other	 university.	 I	 was	 losing	 my	 opportunities.	 I	 had	 a	 very,	 very	 bad	 time,	
feeling	 of	 insecurity,	 feeling	 of	 losing	 the	 future.	 I	 was	 very,	 very	 hardworking	
during	 all	 my	 education.	 I	 couldn't	 just	 imagine	 that	 I	 cannot–	 I	 am	 losing	 my	
goals.	 Now,	 that	 feeling	 has	 yet	 remained	 with	 me	 and	 here,	 I	 know	 that	
compared	to	my	home	country,	for	example,	it	is	a	safer	country,	it	is–	everything	
is	more–	what	you	say?	There	 is	regulations	for	everything,	so	 I	should	naturally	
feel	safer	here.	But	that	is	not	what	is	happening.	Inside	I	don't	feel	safe	because	
I'm	 asking	myself	why	 have	 I	 been	 treated	 differently?	What	 is	 it?	 I	 don't	 get	
answers,	and	it's–	this	feeling	of	insecurity,	it's	a	very	bad	feeling	for	me.	
	
Throughout this text we see many references – as highlighted in red – to the counting 
and measurement of time. These are not only linear calendar time, as he counts down 
months and days, but also notions of the future (his ‘education goals’), his 
expectations surrounding the time of the process (‘less than three months’) and the 
relative time in considering his peers (‘my friends were getting into the best US 
universities’). His words also show just how much this waiting affects him, and in 
returning to our typology of waiting, most of this narrative expands on his experience 
of ‘ambient’ waiting. He speaks of ‘living in that security check stage’, suggesting 
precisely how pervasive the waiting is. The different expectations of time between 
bureaucrat and client are also evoked, especially in relation to demands over time: 
‘they were sitting ten months and now they say immediately’. Here it also shows the 
changing rhythms; where waiting abruptly ends and rapid action is required – 
something Griffiths describes as a ‘temporal rupture’ (2014). It also shows the 
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importance to the bureaucracy of how one spends one’s time, as indicated by their 
need to account for the eleven or so months between the start of the process and their 
request for that document. One might also notice that the words ‘renew’ and ‘expire’ 
have been highlighted to emphasise that even documents have time frames within 
these encounters and the role that they have played in this narrative. This example 
shows how his waiting is both active and passive; initially he allows time to pass, but 
when the experience prolongs, and he is still confronted with a lack of information, 
he starts being more assertive, and looking for other options: he applies to other 
universities, he calls and sends emails to the embassy, and in one much longer part of 
his interview that has not been included here due to space limitations, he even 
recounts his attempts to speak to the ambassador in order to progress his case. All of 
these reflections on the temporalities of this encounter, reinforce the previous 
mentions of the multiple conceptions of time. 
The number of the green sections speak to the frustrations that Amir had in trying to 
understand this process.  They are reflective of the fact that while the ‘confessionary 
complex’ requires clients to confess, the information does not flow both ways: ‘agency 
of domination does not reside in the one who speaks (for it is he who is constrained), 
but in the one who listens and says nothing’ (Foucault [1976] 2008, 62). Here Amir 
tries on many occasions to find out about his application, and yet the bureaucrats are 
particularly closed lipped: ‘the worst thing is that they do not give you any feedback’. 
He tries to understand the delays in this process on his own, and relies on his own 
‘assumptions’ to make sense of it, but the fact that there are no clear answers, and no 
explanation for these delays means that he has come to conclude that there is 
something about him that may be of issue: ‘I suppose you sit down and go, ‘What is it 
about me that people might find problematic?’’. His prolonged waiting and the lack of 
response from the authorities has become a source of interrogation and uncertainty 
that he applies to himself. This is a personal response that is not only triggered by the 
circumstances, but also by the individual. 
Finally, the blue sections suggest his emotive responses to these situations, not only at 
the time at which they occurred, but also how the uncertainty and insecurity evoked 
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in that period extends so far beyond it. He describes being ‘frustrated’, ‘annoyed’ and 
‘insecure’, and yet these feelings were so pervasive during that particular experience 
that they have endured: ‘I carry this feeling of insecurity around with me all the time 
[…] I had a very, very bad time, feeling of insecurity, feeling of losing the future […] 
that feeling has yet remained with me’. This shows how the experience of the 
encounter can echo far beyond it.  
There is so much more within this short extract than the three themes which have 
been highlighted above. He comments on the importance of documentation and the 
care that he puts in to having everything organised – ‘I had all the documentations 
that they need, and I'm very organizing, making all of the documentations very, very 
clear’ – and the fact that he did not believe that he had the visa until it was adhered to 
his passport, showing the value assigned to the materiality of paper within these 
encounters. He also speaks in his account of the different people that he spoke to, 
and the role they played, as individuals, highlighting the impact of specific 
bureaucrats. This ‘interruption’ shows exactly how several of the complex factors that 
have been outlined previously within this chapter emerge within the encounters of 
one particular individual.  
 Conclusion 
Citizenship as status, and the countless and inherently complex and diverse 
bureaucratic encounters that bestow it, test it, question it, deny it, illuminate and strip 
it are inseparable from the identities of individuals, their emotions and perceptions, 
and how these interactions fit into the understanding of themselves within their own 
personal narratives. What this chapter has illustrated is the way in which these 
bureaucratic encounters are felt, sensed, rationalised and understood and the impact 
that they may have on our complex, fluid, and contested personal narratives. One can 
draw some broad global understandings from these interactions, such as the huge 
power differences between civil servants and their clients, how waiting can cause 
anxiety or be used as a tool of violence, even how the material objects of bureaucracy 
bestow identity. However, what this chapter most clearly illustrates is the considerable 
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fluidity within these processes and how the experience of a bureaucratic encounter 
can differ so drastically, reinforcing the need to look past the policy approaches that 
see these processes simply as either successful or failed applications. Here we have 
focused on three specific areas, the spaces of bureaucracy, as exemplified by the role of 
desks and paper; the centrality of the body in bureaucratic processes regardless of 
more traditional claims to the contrary; and finally how time and waiting are present 
in bureaucratic encounters. From my fieldwork encounters the ongoing effects of 
these experiences are evident, as exemplified by Amir’s pervasive feelings of insecurity, 
and thus greater attention needs to be given to the transformative capacities of these 
interactions rather than viewing them simply as ends in themselves.  
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6. Encountering Imaginaries: 
Citizenship through Acts of 
Imagination 
Every day, usually unknowingly, we take part in countless acts of evaluation, 
calculation, and action based on social imaginaries. As such, ‘imagination permeates 
our decision-making, routinely enters our thoughts, is a domain in which individuals 
immerse themselves regularly, and in the form of collective imaginings, can inspire 
social change’ (Adams 2004, 277). Yet, acts of imagination and imaginings take up a 
relatively marginal place within the social sciences, and there are considerable 
advantages in developing these concepts further. This chapter will build on the 
existing literature on social imaginaries by providing a new approach to the subject 
that better integrates individual acts of imagination and considers the ways in which 
the concept can be used to highlight the diversity within conceptions of citizenship, 
and help us to theorise how citizenship is understood and acted upon in lived lives. 
One of the most cited texts of the social sciences in the past three decades is that of 
Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities ([1983] 2006). Perhaps part of the allure of 
this theorisation is that imagination is a useful tool for explaining things – in his case 
the national community – that cannot be conceived of solely through the usual forms 
of interpersonal connections or objective material reality. This approach also allows 
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the illustration of how these imaginaries are mediated by material technologies, which 
help both construct this imaginary and maintain it. Citizenship – like the nation – is 
imagined. It is embedded within collective social imaginaries, but also comes to be 
articulated through individual acts of imagination, and is informed by assemblages of 
paperwork, policy, bureaucracy, as well as stories, conversations, and practices. 
Furthermore, citizenship is constantly being reimagined: ‘through the stories told, the 
imaginaries circulated, the rules naturalised, and the practices repeated over and over 
again’ (Amin 2012, 96).  
The idea of imaginaries being informed by both collective and personal acts of 
imagination is missing from the academic literature on the subject: ‘[m]ost authors 
who write about imagination are, in fact, writing about collective imaginings’ (Adams 
2004, 278). As such they fail to take into account the influence of individual acts of 
imagination. This focus on the personal is made all the more prominent by the ‘twin 
processes of autonomization and responsibilisation’ (N. Rose [1989] 1999, xxiii), and 
the more general turn towards the focus on individual choice which will be explained 
in greater depth later in this chapter. Furthermore, this approach to imaginaries 
provides us with a means to grasp how citizenship emerges initially through the 
imagination: ‘it is in this realm of assumptions, fears, and prejudices that citizenship 
in both its de jure and de facto guises is invented prior to its installation in actual 
practices ‘on the ground’’ (Painter and Philo 1995, 108). There is a pressing need to 
better understand how citizenship is imagined. 
Citizenship also intersects with other related imaginaries. To better illustrate this, 
consider the example of the ‘American dream’, which extols ideals of opportunity and 
social mobility. This imaginary, found in countless forms through speech, literature, 
policy, films, and even on the Declaration of Independence, becomes a catalyst for the 
imagination of one’s own future circumstances.  Take this quotation from Strauss’ 
book Emergency where he recounts the comments of a friend given over dinner: ‘‘I 
wanted to become a citizen for the opportunities’ he finally continued. ‘In the Czech 
Republic I had no future. In America anything is possible. Anyone can become 
whatever he wants. It’s all happening here. There are a million different paths and 
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choices and careers open to everyone who lives in America. And no matter what 
happens politically, they can't take that away’’ (Strauss 2009, 156). This trope has 
come to colour general understandings, yet specific acts of imagination in this context 
take on a personal flavour: the ‘dream’ emerges not in an abstract form but through 
imagining the possibilities of a quality education of their children, or their personal 
business success. The American dream has also had an influence on migration 
narratives more generally (Barsky 1995; Pileggi et al. 2000), and its endurance speaks 
to its force in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary. Finally, despite the 
pervasiveness of this imaginary, one cannot assume that it emerges in the same way 
within personal conceptions, or even that there are not individuals that reject it 
entirely. 
As this chapter will illustrate, while the collective focus of imaginaries is useful in 
understanding more general orientations, there is also insight to be garnered through 
individual imaginations, which serve as a reminder of the individualism that is 
inherent in citizenship itself (Yeatman 2007). Furthermore, notions of imagination 
and imaginaries are useful especially when we consider that citizenship is an ‘ongoing 
process of private negotiation’ (Leuchter 2014, 783). Thus, this approach will fill the 
gap left by many of the existing theorisations of imaginaries and imaginations that 
have failed to grasp these more specific personal orientations: in the academic 
literature there is no ‘mention of how individuals react to, think about, discuss, and 
act on their imaginings’ (Adams 2004, 280). All of these aspects will be considered 
within this chapter in relation to citizenship. 
More specifically, this chapter will address this issue in five sections. Firstly it will 
provide context by looking at the ways in which we understand and imagine both 
futures and the present, and the diverse ways in which the concept of imaginaries has 
been theorised within the social sciences. Secondly, this chapter will address the role 
of cosmopolitan mobile imaginaries and the way they become embedded within 
individual orientations towards citizenship, but also how individual perceptions and 
circumstances may enforce very different orientations. It also considers the ways in 
which material artefacts come to inform these imaginaries. The third section deals 
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with inheritance imaginaries, starting with the notions of how birth and birthright 
have long been associated with citizenship and how this has informed parental desires 
for multiple statuses for their children, as well as the ways in which European 
Citizenship has become attractive to those dual citizens living outside Europe. The 
following section focuses on (in)secure imaginaries and explains how in the context of 
insecurity, citizenship comes to be imagined as both an opportunity and a risk, as well 
as how having a ‘passport in a drawer’ is seen as a tool of security. Finally, inertia and 
ruptured imaginaries are considered by looking at the ways in which individuals act, 
do not act, or react, in relation to these imaginaries. The broader narrative arc of this 
chapter will consider both citizenship and imaginaries, and look at how the points of 
intersection between these two concepts provide illumination for both. 
 A History of Imagination(s) and Imaginaries  
Imaginaries and imagination are socially and historically situated, as such, before 
considering citizenship imaginaries, one must first have a general understanding of 
the context in which these imaginaries emerge, as this has an impact on both their 
form and their substance. Acts of imagination do not exist in isolation, rather they are 
embedded within ideas regarding the present and expectations of the future. As with 
the approach to citizenship outlined in the previous section, this chapter makes the 
novel intervention of seeing how individual acts of imagination come to inform 
imaginaries, and will illustrate some of these specific imaginaries in the context of 
citizenship. The second part of this section will consider the few examples that we 
have of how social imaginaries have been theorised within the social sciences.  
 Imaginaries and a History of the Future 
Imagination and imaginaries are historically contingent, not simply in the sense that 
imaginaries are inherently contextual – which they are – but that the orientation to 
the future and the feeling of possibility that individuals and groups have over their 
lives shape the way in which they are imagined, and thus the imaginaries that emerge. 
Individuals may still have the capacity for imagination outside these contexts, but in 
understanding the orientations towards the future, the considerations of possibility, 
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and who may be involved in these acts of imagination, gives a more general 
understanding of the form. This section will provide a brief history of conceptions of 
‘the future’; it is however important to note that the narrative outlined here builds 
very much on the development of concepts of the future within western thought, and 
may not be applicable in all contexts. 
Notions of futurity are by no means static. At our current historical juncture, we are 
incredibly future-focused: we plan, calculate, and project into the future as well as 
perceive a rapid pace of technological advancement and change. As such ‘the future is 
thought of as resonant with possibilities’ (Giddens 1991, 77), yet we are also subject to 
a pervasive feeling of uncertainty and indeterminacy: the rapidity of change has led to 
feelings of instability. As Adam explains, ‘contemporary daily life […] is conducted in 
the temporal domain of open and fluid pasts and futures, mindful of the lived past 
and projectively orientated towards the ‘not yet’’ (2010, 361–62). Thus imaginaries 
are important not just in understanding the here and now, but also in the conception 
of the possibilities for future action. 
Historically we have progressed through some very different orientations to the future. 
These orientations, which Ben Anderson23 describes as ‘styles’ (2010), not only dictate 
the ways in which we understand the future, but have implications for how we act 
upon it. As Adam and Groves (2007) demonstrate in several broad strokes: in ancient 
times, myths and legends highlighted the role of fate; tragic heroes fighting and not 
succeeding in escaping their destiny. Religions as well had their own variations on 
what the future was and how best to function with regards to it. With the scientific 
revolution came the notion of a form of future that was replicable: combining the 
same ingredients under the same conditions should create the same outcome. Then, 
with the rapidity of technological development and notions of progress, the future was 
seen as a void; to be ‘colonised’ by the individual (Giddens 1991, 112). Recently 
however, this model is starting to fall away in favour of another: ‘the fiction of the 
empty future […] is starting to disintegrate […] [w]e are beginning to recognise that our 
																																								 																				
23 Not to be confused with Benedict Anderson who appeared previously. Unfortunately the work of three 
B. Anderson’s, and an L. Anderson have been used in this thesis so first names have been included. 
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own present is our predecessor’s empty and open future: their dreams, desires and 
discoveries, their imaginations, innovations and impositions, their creations’ (Adam 
and Groves 2007, 13), and as such we are coming to terms not only with the fact that 
our future actions are limited, but more generally, there is greater awareness of the 
possible ongoing consequences of our actions. 
Due to these current articulations of pervasive uncertainty, our visions of the future 
will be inherently unknown, and thus our imaginations may concurrently contain 
both utopic and dystopic visions: ‘disclosing the future as surprise means that one 
cannot then predetermine the form of the future by offering a deterministic 
prediction. Instead, the future as surprise can only be rendered actionable by knowing 
a range of possible futures that may happen, including those that are improbable’ 
(Ben Anderson 2010, 782). In these dystopic futures, one cannot know the shape of 
possible disastrous events, and so we consider the many possibilities. Massumi 
explains ‘threat in today’s world is not objective. It is potential’ (2007, 5), thus, our 
generic uncertainty and our openness to the future result in certain inclinations 
regarding ways to act in order to protect against various futures. Furthermore, ‘the 
politics of the turbulent unknown’ (Amin 2012, 148) – a consequence of the 
perceived threats such as terrorism and climate change – have meant that both states 
and individuals are increasingly likely to be involved in preparation against future 
threats, something that will be discussed more explicitly in the section on (in)secure 
imaginaries. 
Whereas imagination was once the domain of the elite, whose rank gave them the 
authority for deciding on the futures of the masses, our present period emphasises the 
role of the individual creating and sustaining their own futures: ‘the imagination […] 
has become part of the quotidian mental work of ordinary people […] it is no longer a 
matter of specially endowed (charismatic) individuals, injecting imagination where it 
does not belong. Ordinary people have begun to deploy their imaginations in the 
practice of their everyday lives’ (Appadurai 1996, 5).24 On the subject of immigration 
																																								 																				
24 This makes a similar point to the one that has been made in the methodology chapter with regards to the 
largely overlooked premise of the use and importance of the interview. It is the same broader changes that 
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we have also come to better recognise the agency of the ‘entrepreneurial’ migrant 
(Portes, Guarnizo, and Haller 2002).  These notions of individuals as able to pursue 
their own futures has meant that ‘ordinary lives today are more often powered not by 
the givenness of things but by the possibilities that the media (either directly or 
indirectly) suggest are available’ (Appadurai 1996, 55). While the notions of ‘the good 
life’ that circulate through forms of media may indicate these more collective ideals, 
these imaginaries have become democratised, and individuals are seen and see 
themselves as having greater freedom to decide and strive for certain ends. 
The value assigned to individualism and choice also arose through the pervasiveness 
of neoliberalism;25 Aihwa Ong, in her widely cited text Flexible Citizenship highlights 
the ways in which mobile individuals are subject to neoliberal influences and thus 
openly extol both the value and the need for flexibility (1999). This, coupled with the 
focus on capacity-maximising and entrepreneurship (Bröckling 2015), ensures that 
value is assigned to imaginative individuals. The realms of finance have instilled in us 
concepts of futures as being something that we are able to insure against or invest in. 
Furthermore, the anticipatory action that is inherent in neoliberalism, encourages 
individuals and organisations to labour to stay ahead of the markets, an orientation 
that encourages planning for the future, even if those plans do not eventuate. Thus, 
the ‘ordinary experience of pre-occupation and immersion in the forthcoming’ 
(Bourdieu 2000, 207; in Adkins 2009), is a common habit for those living in the 
developed world today.   
The individual nature of imaginative acts is further reinforced by the ways that people 
are governed on the basis of greater individualism than had existed in the past: ‘[…] an 
enabling state [...] will govern without governing ‘society’ – governing by acting on the 
choices and self-steering properties of individuals, families, communities, 
organisations. This entails a twin process of autonomization plus responsibilisation – 
opening free space for the choices of individual actors whilst enwrapping these 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																	
gave the authority to individuals (rather than those in power), to both think for themselves (in terms of 
imaginaries and acts of imagination) and speak for themselves (in the context of the value of an interview). 
Furthermore, this should come as no surprise, as thinking and speaking are entangled acts. 
25 I deal with neoliberalism only in passing here given its in depth treatment in the next chapter. 
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autonomized actors within new forms of control’ (N. Rose [1989] 1999, xxiii). These 
‘twin processes of autonomization and responsibilisation’ further place the 
possibilities of not only imagination, but acting upon it, in the hands of individuals 
and validates not just their individual choice, but their capacity to choose. This 
particular claim must be made with caution, as this capacity for choice is not available 
equally to all parts of a given society. 
Jessamyn West is quoted as having once said that ‘the past is really almost as much a 
work of the imagination as the future’, and our imaginaries are as likely to shape our 
narratives of the past as they are to help us construct the possibilities of our future. To 
this however we must add the idea of circulation: these narratives are not only 
constructed and reconstructed, but they are shared; we often judge our own capacities 
and experiences through those of others. This can in part explain our increasingly 
global orientations: ‘few persons in the world today do not have a friend, relative, or 
co-worker who is not on the road to somewhere else or already coming back home, 
bearing stories and possibilities’ (Appadurai 1996, 4). Thus, the past experiences of 
another become our imagined future, and these encounters unfold through time and 
space. The past of others as well as our own becomes one of the key materials for 
imagining the future, as well as making sense of the present: ‘the future is known, not 
through the guesswork of the mind, but through social efforts, more or less conscious, 
to cast ‘jetties’ out from an established order and into the uncertainty ahead. The 
network of reciprocal commitments traps the future and moderates mobility’ 
(Jouvenel 1967, 45 in Adam and Groves 2007, 8). It is this concept of imaginaries 
which gives us the possibility of conceptualising how past, present, and future become 
enmeshed in the ways in which we understand the world in general, and, citizenship 
in particular. 
Some consideration needs to be given to the circulation of these imaginaries. While 
more traditional means such as storytelling and hearsay continue to circulate, new 
technologies of communication can contribute to their diversity and range: ‘for the 
new power of the imagination in the fabrication of social lives is inescapably tied up 
with images, ideas, and opportunities that come from elsewhere, often moved around 
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by the vehicles of mass media’ (Appadurai 1996, 54). To this list of media, storytelling 
and hearsay; we must add stories, movies, books, news articles, and social media 
which has further given scope to the circulation of these imaginaries, as well as who is 
able to be involved in their production. Whereas once content was under the control 
of organisations, these new technologies have created opportunities for information 
to be circulated to a broader audience. 
 Imagination in the Social Sciences 
The notions of imagination and imaginaries appear with regularity within the social 
sciences, yet concerted efforts at specific theorisations are relatively few in number: 
‘the literature on imagination is incipient, leaving many areas unexplored and 
containing few works even on those areas that have been covered’ (Adams 2004, 280). 
This section will outline some of the key texts and approaches in this area, while 
considering how these texts fit with the concept of imaginaries that has been outlined 
in this thesis. Finally, it serves to mention that this section does not attempt to be 
exhaustive on the subject of imaginaries beyond social scientific formulations. As 
such, other theorisations of imaginaries, such as in the psychoanalytic theories of 
Lacan (Mellard 2006), as well as Sartre’s less social and more psychological account 
([1936] 2012), have not been included. 
Arguably the first systematic theorisation of the notion of imaginary comes from 
Cornelius Castoriadis’ text The Imaginary Institution of Society ([1975] 1997). In 
understanding both how the social world is understood and structured, he explains 
the extensive scope of what may be included within an imaginary: ‘[t]his element – 
which gives a specific orientation to every institutional system, which overdetermines 
the choice and the connections of symbolic networks, which is the creation of each 
historical period, its singular manner of living, of seeing and of conducting its own 
existence, its world, and its relations with this world, this originary structuring 
component, this central signifying-signified, the source of that which presents itself in 
every instance as an indisputable and undisputed meaning, the basis for articulating 
what does matter and what does not, the origin of the surplus of being of the objects 
of practical, affective and intellectual investment, whether individual or collective – is 
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nothing other than the imaginary of the society of the period considered’ (Castoriadis 
[1975] 1997, 145, emphasis original). However, while his account provided a novel 
theoretical contribution, it is marred by several weaknesses. Firstly, this theorisation 
sees social imaginaries as abstracted and largely unchanging within historical periods. 
Secondly, his account is dichotomous, making the common distinction between what 
are broadly traditional and modern societies, but giving a bare bones analysis of the 
diversities within these two forms, or how change is effected in this system. Thus 
Castoriadis’ account is based on more abstract considerations of ontology, which are 
difficult to engage with in non-theoretical terms. 
The next text is Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities ([1983] 2006) which 
explores how the nation is imagined. His use of the term ‘imagined’ emerges from the 
idea, that since all the members of any given national community will never meet, the 
cohesiveness of this community comes from the fact that they are imagined as 
belonging together. While Anderson’s main thesis saw the importance of ‘print 
capitalism’ to this process of the spread of ideas of the nation and the national 
community, we can expand this concept to consider that citizenship and all the 
structures and documentation that surround it, are also in some way imagined; to his 
discussion of the census, the map, and the museum – technologies of imagining the 
nation – we may add the passport, the visa, and the identity card – technologies for 
imagining the citizen. Citizenship is itself an abstract concept that has emerged out of 
theorisations of nation states, which are themselves ideologically based, and thus will 
always be in some way imagined. This imagination is mobilised and materialised 
through countless technologies of the state, from passports to borders and 
government offices, and numerous things in between. And certainly, as Benedict 
Anderson clearly evokes in his work, just because it is imagined, or at least in part a 
product of the imagination, does not make it any less real: ‘it’s real because it can kill 
you’ (Graeber 2015). Many things in our daily lives exist, not due to their ‘givenness’ 
as highlighted by Appadurai (1996, 55), but rather by the countless acts of 
imagination from which they are constructed. 
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To our short list of theorisations we must also add Mill’s Sociological Imagination 
([1959] 2000), in which ‘imagination’ in this sense is an outlook that has ‘the capacity 
to range from the most impersonal and remote transformations to the most intimate 
features of the human self and to see the relations between the two’ (Mills [1959] 
2000, 7). Consequently, this is a different formulation to those of the aforementioned 
Castoriadis and Anderson, as it theorises imagination as a lens – a way of thinking – 
disciplined and disciplinary. Nevertheless, this conception has captured the 
imagination of other genres and disciplines who speak of Ethnographic (Atkinson 
2014) or Criminological Imaginations (Young 2011). Thus within the social sciences 
there are several examples of the word being used in this sense. 
The idea of a social imaginary has also been developed by Charles Taylor. In his 
conception, a social imaginary is ‘the way our contemporaries imagine the societies 
that they inhabit and sustain’ (Taylor 2004, 6), which can be applied to citizenship as 
a tool of social organisation. In considering the concept, he states that it is ‘the ways 
people imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go 
on between them and their fellows, the expectations that are normally met, and the 
deeper normative notions and images that underlie these expectations’ (Taylor 2004, 
23). The usefulness of his account is that it also indicates the pervasiveness of these 
imaginaries: ‘[this new conception of modern social order] has now become so self-
evident to us that we have trouble seeing it as one possible conception among others’ 
(Taylor 2004, 2), which is also applicable to the concept at hand. Furthermore, he 
provides an analysis of how these imaginaries can become the basis for action: ‘[social 
imaginaries are] a common understanding that makes possible common practices and 
a widely shared sense of legitimacy’ (Taylor 2004, 23). 
In addition, in building on these existing notions we have more recent work emerging 
in the discipline of Science and Technology Studies. Here, drawing on Actor-Network 
Theory, and other sources, Jasanoff and Kim among others, have developed the 
concept of sociotechnical imaginaries, which is the ‘collectively held and performed 
visions of desirable futures animated by shared understandings of forms of social life 
and social order attainable through, and supportive of, advances in science and 
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technology’ (2015, 4). It is this particular theorisation that will be drawn on more 
heavily within this chapter. In this conception, imaginaries have both empirical and 
epistemological implications, but in the context of this thesis it provides the grounds 
for a better understanding of the role of the material within these imaginaries and the 
impact that it has more broadly, in understanding how they are conceived of and 
circulated.  
The deployment of imagination within this chapter, and this thesis at large, builds on 
various aspects of the above conceptions, but also diverges somewhat from them. As 
with all of the theorisations mentioned above, this approach accepts the situatedness  
of these particular imaginaries: ‘imagination is reflective of particular cultural and 
historical contexts’ (Benson 2012, 1684). However, greater emphasis will be given to 
our roles as agents of imagination, and the realisation that our lives themselves are 
‘partly imagined’ (Appadurai 1996, 54), while still conceiving of the impact of sociality 
on these imaginations. Furthermore, imaginaries never exist in isolation; they 
intersect with other imaginaries, of family, of friendships, of what the ‘good’ life looks 
like. And thus imagination is concurrently social, in the sense that it exists in 
common among groups of people, and individuals: ‘the work of the imagination […] is 
neither purely emancipatory nor entirely disciplined but is a space of contestation in 
which individuals and groups seek to annex the global into their own practices of the 
modern’ (Appadurai 1996, 4). Furthermore, it is important to reinforce that 
imagination is both the tool for the maintenance of certain imaginaries, but also 
something that causes their change –  both ‘glue and solvent’ (Jasanoff and Kim 2015, 
39) – something that in the domain of Sociotechnical imaginaries is known as co-
production.  
 Cosmopolitan Mobile Imaginaries  
The longing for a cosmopolitan lifestyle is not an uncommon one. Many of us may 
have the desire to travel to diverse parts of the world and to live in exotic places. 
Regardless of our personal incentives for change, be it for warmer climes or for more 
employment related reasons, the possibility of ‘[m]igration in itself comes to function 
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as a technology of the imagination in which envisioned migratory trajectories open up 
imagined worlds and possibilities’ (Vigh 2009, 105). The desire for a more 
cosmopolitan lifestyle produces an openness and the imagination of the possibilities 
of lives that could be lived elsewhere. Cosmopolitan orientations too are themselves 
imagined as ‘cosmopolitanism [is] a perspective, a state of mind’ (Hannerz 1990, 238). 
This section will illustrate how these more global imaginaries become articulated as 
‘folk expressions of metanarratives’ (Skrbis and Woodward 2007, 745) and in doing 
so will help us consider how  ‘[i]maginaries […] encode not only visions of what is 
attainable […] but also how life ought, or ought not, to be lived’ (Jasanoff and Kim 
2015, 6). Furthermore, it will illustrate the ‘ambivalent and largely self-centred 
relationship to cosmopolitan experience that rest[s] upon an individual’s embracing of 
cosmopolitan experience in some realms and a fear or rejection of cosmopolitan ideals 
in others’ (Skrbis and Woodward 2007, 745). This section will address this issue in 
two parts, firstly looking at the ways in which these cosmopolitan imaginaries emerged 
in the fieldwork encounters, and how they came to circulate. The second half will 
provide a counter argument, showing how the stratified nature of citizenship and 
divergent individual perceptions and orientations suggest that we cannot assume that 
all individuals ascribe to these ‘shared’ visions. 
 ‘The World is Open to Me’: Status and the Possibilities of 
Work and Travel. 
Discussions of the concept of cosmopolitanism often evoke the notion of ‘openness’ 
(Skrbis and Woodward 2007, 734), yet, the sense in which it is used articulates the 
individual’s openness towards the world. The fieldwork encounters, especially with 
participants who had multiple citizenships, or were aspiring to, often expressed that 
these statuses opened the world to them, the clearest case of which is Louis, a French, 
British and Australian Citizen. He comments: 
Having	several	passports	it	has	always	given	me	the	sense	that	I'm	a	kind	of–	the	
world's	open	to	me.	That	gives	me	the	right	potentially	to	go	and	live	anywhere	I	
want.		
For many, like Louis above, having more than one citizenship has changed the way 
that they see themselves and their possibilities for the future. This is not to say that 
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having multiple statuses will mean that he will take up this opportunity to ‘live 
anywhere [he] wants’, but that his awareness of this multiple citizenship, leads him to 
imagine these possibilities, in this or other lives. 
The advantages of multiple citizenship are often imagined using the language of 
cosmopolitan mobility: as a means of obtaining access to the world. These statuses are 
seen in terms of the possibilities for individuals to live and travel elsewhere. In 
conceiving of cosmopolitan experience as desirable, these additional citizenships 
become tools to facilitating these possibilities. Grant mentions this in relation to a 
friend, where his comment belies some envy of this ‘trifecta’: 
I	think	having	the	ability	to	have	a	European	passport	is	massive,	really.	I've	got	a	
friend	 of	 mine,	 who's	 also	 English,	 and	 he	 lives	 in	 Bondi.	 He	 also	 married	 an	
Australian	 girl	 and	 he's	 got	 the	 trifecta.	 His	 dad	 was	 American,	 so	 he's	 got	 an	
American	 passport,	 obviously	 he's	 got	 his	 British	 passport,	 and	 he	 will	 soon	
become	 a	 citizen	 of	 Australia	 so	 he'll	 have–	 you've	 kind	 of	 covered	 the	 world	
there26.		
While this expresses a cosmopolitan orientation, what is also noticeable is the absence 
of any indication of the traditional content that one may associate with citizenship; it 
is articulated not as being part of any specific community, but rather in terms of the 
spaces that these ‘passports’ give him access to. Furthermore, his vision is a telling one 
in the way that the world is ‘covered’ by just three citizenships, which speaks either to 
the ease of movement that these passports provide, or even a reflection of his view of 
the primacy of these three destinations. These notions of the usefulness of multiple 
citizenships will be further developed in the next section of this chapter on 
inheritance imaginaries. 
While the circulation of these imaginaries has already briefly been mentioned, it is 
often surprising the specific images or stories that they make reference to. One of the 
most unanticipated aspects of this research was the frequency with which James Bond 
was evoked within interviews. As Louis comments: 
You	look	at	all	those	James	Bond	movies	and	things	that	are…	it	is	just	that	having	
several	passports	[chuckle],	it's	like,	‘Which	one	will	I	use	today?’	There's	probably	
a	 little	of	 a	 cool	 factor	 I	 suppose,	 not	 that	 it	 should	be	 the	 reason	why	 you	are	
doing	it.		
In a similar vein is a comment made by Grant: 
																																								 																				
26 In case it is not clear, the trifecta he refers to here is having US, British, and Australian Citizenship. 
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I've	always	wanted	a	second	passport	 [laughter].	 I	mean,	who	doesn't?	You	kind	
of	 feel	 this	 slightly	 international	man	of	mystery	 thing	by	having	more	 than	one	
passport.		
Finally, Natalie, comes to a similar conclusion: 
Someone	 told	 me	 that	 when	 you're	 going	 to	 any	 other	 country,	 you	 can	
completely	choose	and	that	they	choose	based	on	whatever's,	like	-	if	they	don't	
need	 a	 visa	 for	 a	 while.	 But,	 I	 just	 find	 it	 a	 bit	 weird.	 I	 feel	 like	 James	 Bond	
[laughter].		
What these comments suggest is that in having multiple passports, they either evoke 
Bond’s image or ‘feel’ like him. Despite the seemingly tangential link between 007 
and citizenship, it is perhaps not surprising that the image of James Bond emerges 
within these discussions. He is par excellence an example of the unfettered individual 
who navigates the world without barrier; paradoxically, while being an agent of a 
government, he seems to be beyond the control of other states (and occasionally his 
own). As such, Bond seems to be a fitting allegory for the desires of current mobile 
individuals. Further to this, it was a diplomatic passport that became the backdrop for 
one of the first advertisements for Ian Flemming’s Bond books. The advertisement 
was headlined with ‘Diplomatic Passport 0094567 – Bond J.’, and reads: ‘Where 
would you find James Bond? He’s the man being hustled through US customs 
minutes after the plane has touched down…’ (Brittany 2014, 195). It is difficult to 
suggest why this particular image emerged more frequently than any other: whether 
there are class (all three come from higher income brackets) or national (all three are 
British citizens) aspects that relate to why Bond has been mentioned, or whether it 
springs, as Louis suggests, from the desire to feel a little ‘cooler’ than we really are, or 
even the appeal of subterfuge in presenting one document over another.  
It may also be a result of the passport as being the material evocation of this 
cosmopolitan mobile imaginary. Not only do passports, as was discussed in the 
previous chapter, play a key role within concepts of citizenship, but they are also a 
continuing presence within the Bond franchise and similar genres of spy films.27 Thus 
it may be the role that the passport plays in these films – or even the visible presence 
																																								 																				
27 In a curious aside, the recent exhibition (opened in October 2015) of ‘Bond in Motion’ at the London 
Film Museum – advertised as being ‘the largest official collection of original James Bond vehicles’ – also 
included a cabinet containing a considerable number of the prop passports – some of which were used for 
their ‘real’ identities and others in the names of aliases – that had been used in the films, by Bond and 
other characters, thus further suggesting the impact of these documents in the franchise. 
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of having more than one passport, in both the films, and in the dual citizen’s hand 
luggage – that triggers this feeling of being James Bond. The passport becomes what 
Sherry Turkle describes as an ‘evocative object’ (2007),  and more generally, this 
supports Jasanoff and Kim’s ideas regarding the material foundations of these 
imaginaries (2015). It is the imaginary of what the passport constitutes and the 
repeated acts of that passport facilitating (or not facilitating, as the next section will 
illustrate) travel between countries, which also evokes these imaginaries of 
cosmopolitan mobility outside of the image of James Bond. The passport itself  is 
considered more generally as a symbol of mobility and opportunity: ‘[the passport] was 
imagined to embody other life possibilities’ (Leuchter 2014, 787). Thus ‘the ability, or 
at least the imagined ability, to choose between different life opportunities and 
scenarios becomes increasingly coveted’ (Leuchter 2014, 784). The possibilities for 
imagination emerge across bodies through the various images and technologies in 
different environments, as such, the image of James Bond, and the materiality of the 
passport, suggest that notions of cosmopolitan mobility have come to infuse 
citizenship in general, and dual citizenship in particular. 
 Tempering Cosmopolitanism: Hierarchies and Individual 
Difference 
A common criticism of notions of cosmopolitanism is the claim that they represent 
elite orientations and class dynamics (Calhoun 2002) and that the cosmopolitan 
‘openness’ referenced above fails to consider those who lack the capital, social or 
otherwise, to live these lifestyles. So the desires for, and possibilities of, ‘actually 
existing cosmopolitanism’ (Calhoun 2002, 869) need to be contextualised. This is also 
a reminder that many of these acts of imagination, and social imaginaries depend, 
more generally, on the context of the individual, yet cannot completely be determined 
by it. Part of the novelty of this approach, in comparison to some of the existing 
conceptions, is precisely its ability to step away from theorisations that see imaginaries 
as applicable to all. This section will illustrate how the presence of these cosmopolitan 
mobile imaginaries are not equally applicable to all individuals, either as consequence 
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of their status and how they imagine their place in the world, but also as a result of 
individual experiences and dispositions.  
While the previous section highlighted how the passport is conceived of as a tool of 
mobility, this depends largely on where the particular passport is from. As will be 
discussed in greater detail in parts of the following chapter, there are companies that 
offer citizenship planning, and in doing so, they produce various metrics for ranking 
citizenships. Arton Capital produces a Passport Index which lists the number of 
countries that a particular passport can gain visa free entry to. According to the 2016 
Passport Index, Germany is the country with the highest rating, with visa free entry 
into 158 states, followed by Sweden on 157, while at the other end of the scale is 
Afghanistan (24), Pakistan (27) and Iraq (29) (Arton Capital 2016). While these 
ranking systems are in themselves a crude measure, they provide a useful indication 
not as an objective comparison, but as a signifier of the immense inequalities between 
statuses.  
Thus the notion of a passport as a tool of cosmopolitan mobility is predicated on the 
fact that it is a ‘good’ passport. This is evidenced by Kapllani in his own experiences, 
and the experiences of others, that he outlines in the Short Border Handbook: ‘[b]orders 
and walls live for the most parts inside our pockets. I become aware of this each time I 
stand at passport control, because at these checks, there are two categories of people: 
bearers of ‘cool passports’ and everyone else – people holding ‘bad passports’. If 
you’ve got a ‘cool passport’, you’ve got nothing to worry about. Borders are nothing 
more than invisible lines, a trick of the imagination, geographical lines as translucent 
as the light of the Mediterranean. Having a ‘bad passport’ on the other hand, changes 
everything. It means you have border syndrome, and every crossing you make becomes 
an unforgettable incident, an event in your existential calendar’ (Kapllani 2009, 155). 
This highlights that the conception of the passport as a tool of mobility – one that 
renders the world ‘open’ or ‘covered’ as described in the previous section – depends 
on what passport you are carrying.  
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Whether through indices or these more vernacular hierarchies, there are a number of 
ways in which the inequalities between citizenships come to be circulated. These too 
are linked with preconceptions of what particular nations or nationals are like, 
reminding us that ‘the national people is a paradigmatic case of [a] modern social 
imaginary’ (Gaonkar 2002, 5). These ‘nations’ exist as the result of vast networks of 
history and power, which are themselves represented in these conceptions. It is why 
people perceive a hierarchy of citizenships (Castles 2005), and it is why we speak of 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ passports. In some parts of the world, individuals covert their 
national identification as exemplified by their passport(s): they collect them and 
fetishize them (Gordillo 2006). In others they, burn them.28 This reflects on the vast 
differences in the ‘opportunity structures to which individuals are entitled [as citizens 
which] is a blind spot, if not the ‘black hole’, of citizenship theory’ (Shachar and 
Hirschl 2007, 274).  
Whereas so far migration has been imagined as a tool of opportunity, this too needs 
to be reconsidered. In focusing on the advantages of cosmopolitan movement, the 
assumption is that the individual will be able to improve their life. This may not 
necessarily be the case, and the perception of the advantages of openness and 
movement are not imagined in the same way among all individuals. Here Diana 
explains this in relation to her own experiences: 
Firstly,	given	the	fact	that	I	don’t	know	how	to	speak	English	means	that	the	very	
thought	 of	 travelling	 to	 another	 country	 for	 work	 verges	 on	 science	 fiction.	
Secondly,	I	have	lived	here	in	Greece	for	so	many	years,	and	because	I	have	lived	
through	experiences	of	racism	[….]	I	don’t	want	to	go	to	another	country	and	live	
through	that	all	over	again.	For	that	reason	I	am	not	even	going	to	consider	it	and	
I	believe	that	if	I	have	to	go	to	another	country,	it	will	be	incredibly	hard.	It	is	only	
for	 certain	 young	 people	 like	 you	 who	 know	 another	 language,	 that	 have	 a	
Master’s	Degree	or	a	Doctorate,	in	other	words	you	would	be	quite	able	to	work	
somewhere	 else	 with	 what	 you	 have	 already	 done.	 I	 don’t	 believe	 that	 I	 could	
ever	go	to	a	place	like	Germany,	even	if	I	could	speak	the	language	and	easily	find	
work	 there	 and	 be	 on	 par	 with	 the	 average	 German,	 especially	 since	 I	 have	
regretted	 being	 part	 of	 all	 of	 this	 [migration	 to	 Greece].	 There	 is	 a	 common	
proverb	in	Bulgarian	and	I	consider	it	to	be	completely	correct.	The	saying	is	that	
‘every	stone	has	its	own	resting	place‘,	and	it	is	so	true.	I	don’t	know.	I	don’t	think	
																																								 																				
28 This is an oblique reference to the Harrag, those individuals who burn their documents prior to 
undertaking clandestine migration, which will be discussed in the following chapter, see also (Omoniyi and 
Omoniyi 2016). 
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it	 is	 even	 that	 good.	 I	 honestly	 believe	 that	 if	 people	 were	 able	 to	 find	 decent	
work	in	their	own	countries	they	wouldn’t	do	it.	
There are several points that need to be made here. Firstly, given the primacy of the 
English language as the closest thing that we have to an international lingua franca, the 
possibilities for mobility and the types of mobility one has access to, are influenced by 
it. In addition, it may be those who are unable to speak the language that may imagine 
it an insurmountable constraint. Here we also see the importance of including diverse 
narratives within our approaches to the subject of citizenship, including those from 
non-English speakers. As she says herself, given the fact that she does not speak 
English limits the possibilities for her. Furthermore, her reference to ‘science fiction’ 
is also telling, in suggesting that while she has imagined the possibility of migration, 
she has rejected it as being beyond the realms of possibility. Her narrative also shows 
how desires for mobility come against the harsh realities of experience, something that 
will be discussed further in the ruptured imaginaries section of this chapter. Diana’s 
comments also remind us that: ‘[i]t may therefore be that highly educated immigrants 
are better able to envisage certain applications to which dual citizenship could be put’ 
(Amit 2014, 398). The final comment that needs to be made regarding Diana’s 
insights considers the role that sayings and proverbs have in informing our own 
thinking. Here she mentions the Bulgarian proverb ‘every stone has its own resting 
place’, and one can see just how informing this is to her own understandings of this 
topic. Proverbs may also be a means by which imaginaries circulate. 
One of the risks associated with the concept of social imaginaries, as it is theorised in 
the academic literature, is that it may obscure the way that personal desires and values 
come to shape individual imagination. For those who are lucky to have it, a (good) 
passport is a document of potentiality, and a possible object that we can bring into 
our ‘colonisation’ of the future. However, even having two ‘good’ citizenships does 
not dictate that the individual in question will have any desire to live a more 
cosmopolitan lifestyle. Here Heidi discusses her two sons, both of which are dual 
citizens. Within her comments the individual preferences and personal dispositions of 
the two young men are evoked, and the differences between the two, despite having 
grown up under similar circumstances are telling: 
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It	is,	sometimes	you	return	to	a	specific	place	and	you	say	to	yourself	‘Ah,	the	light	
of	the	sun,	the	very	smell	of	the	land,	and	you	think:	this	is	home’	and	it	even	goes	
so	far	as	what	your	parents	taught	you,	how	much	of	a	patriot	you	are,	what	sort	
of	 personality	 you	 have.	 To	 my	 sons	 I	 have	 never	 said	 anything	 bad	 about	
Germany	 [where	 they	 are	 also	 citizens],	 or	 even	 anything	 bad	 about	 any	 other	
country	-	nothing,	nothing	at	all.	But	my	youngest	is	so	connected,	so	tied	to	this	
topos,	 for	 him	 it	 is	 the	 only	 place	 that	 matters	 […]	 and	 that	 is	 a	 question	 of	
individual	 character.	He	 says	 that	he	wouldn’t	be	able	 to	 live	 in	 [a	neighbouring	
town]	or	anywhere	else	for	that	matter.	While	the	other	one,	he	wants	to	leave,	
he	wants	 to	 discover	 the	world.	 It	 is	 a	 story	which	 is	 incredibly	 complex,	 and	 I	
honestly	believe	that	every	individual	is	different.	It	is	obviously	something	which	
is	very	personal,	but	often	these	differences	aren’t	given	enough	attention.		
At the very heart of our decisions made regarding citizenship, are the ways in which 
we perceive our life trajectories. Just because one has the option to pursue a more 
cosmopolitan lifestyle does not mean that it is desired and often it is these more 
personal orientations that are missing from theorisations of cosmopolitanism and 
dual citizenship. This works as a reminder that just because a particular imaginary 
exists does not mean that people will not think and feel differently to the circulated 
conventional logic. As Amit reminds us: ‘if the motivations, identifications and 
viewpoints of people actively choosing to immigrate and to naturalise in their adopted 
country are neither simple nor obvious, the orientations and viewpoints of their 
children who may have inherited their status are even less predictable’ (Amit 2014, 
397).  
Given the ‘elite’ basis of some of the cosmopolitan conceptions, it is perhaps not 
surprising that counter imaginaries exist in other contexts. Vigh discusses one such 
example in his research into urban youth from Bissau: ‘this social imaginary is related 
to a global awareness from below: an understanding of a world order consisting of 
societies with different technological capacities as well as levels of masteries over 
physical and social environment [sic.], as well as the spaces and social options which are 
open or closed to persons of different social categories within it’ (Vigh 2009, 93, emphasis 
added). So imaginaries can also function as a tool of restraint, where a given 
individual’s position may cause them to feel like they are constrained, or that they are 
in a situation which they are unable to overcome. 
While there may be no denying the allure of the cosmopolitan imaginary for some, 
not all individuals ascribe to it, or imagine it in the same way: ‘[cosmopolitanism] is an 
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increasingly prominent, available cultural discourse – and ideal – but one that 
conflicts with an array of other social and personal imperatives, and thus does not 
always find full flowering’ (Skrbis and Woodward 2007, 735). The restrictions faced 
by some, as well as the role of individual dispositions and acts of imagination are all 
mediating factors in this context, reminding us that just because there is evidence of a 
circulating imaginary does not ensure that all individuals ascribe to it in equal 
measure, if at all.  
 Inheritance Imaginaries 
As has been outlined in Chapter Three, historically conceptions of citizenship have 
had a great deal to do with birth and birthright. Whether the particular national 
conception be based on the principle of ius sanguinis – ethnic conceptions of 
citizenship based on blood – or ius soli – citizenship by virtue of being born in a 
particular place – both engage with the idea of citizenship being bestowed at birth. 
This is the standard practice for ‘97 percent of the world’s population’ (Joppke 2010, 
9).29 Heredity has been central to notions of citizenship, and this section will look at 
the ways in which birthright citizenship comes to intersect with parental desires for 
‘good’ lives for their children. In the first instance, it will consider just how these 
hereditary notions are embedded in citizenship, and how the perceived advantages of 
multiple citizenship have engaged the parental imaginary. Finally, the idea of 
European citizenship will be considered in particular to show how its perceived value 
for hereditary Europeans and their offspring, has created a divergent citizenship 
imaginary that circulates outside of Europe. 
 Inherited Multiple Citizenships and the Parental 
Imagination 
It is perhaps a truism to suggest that the vast majority of parents want to give their 
children all they can to succeed in life, and it is part of this imaginary of the ‘good life’ 
that inherited multiple citizenships have come to play a role. Yet, the imaginative 
possibilities that a parent applies to the future of their child differs to the way in 
																																								 																				
29 I am surprised by the very small amount of research which takes this into consideration. 
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which they imagine their own futures. This too is embedded in the contextual 
concerns as outlined in the beginning of this chapter: ‘[m]ore people than ever before 
seem to imagine routinely the possibility that their children will live and work in 
places other than where they were born: this is the wellspring of increased rates of 
migration at every level of social, national, and global life’ (Appadurai 1996, 6). These 
concerns will be addressed in the section that follows, however, as was highlighted in 
the preceding section, this desire for hereditary dual citizenship may be mediated by 
the perceived value of that particular citizenship. 
We live in societies where choice is highly valued. Opportunities are seen as good 
things that we wish to give to our children. Briefly consider this excerpt of a 
conversation between Mark and Amanda on the reasons why they pursued dual 
citizenship for their children:  
Amanda:	[Dual	citizenship]	is	giving	[our	children]	choices.	
Mark:	Yeah.	Opportunities.	
Amanda:	Yeah.	That's	the	majority	of	the	issue,	is	having	options	to	be	able	to	do	
more	things.	And	certainly	for	them	to	be	able	to	travel	to	Britain	freely,	and	then	
to	 be	 able	 to	 travel	 freely	 throughout	 Europe,	 was	 the	 main	 reason	 why	 we	
wanted	to	give	them	British	passports.		
As has been mentioned previously, future possibilities are strongly culturally 
inscribed: this particular discussion evokes imaginings based on the ‘cosmopolitan 
scripts’ (Appadurai 1996, 63) that were addressed in the previous section. This 
invoking of the notions of ‘options’ and ‘opportunity’ also acts as a tool with which 
they can justify their actions, and, as Benson mentions, these more commonly held 
assumptions also go some way to reinforcing the imaginary: ‘action on the basis of a 
social imaginary both confers legitimacy on the individual and reproduces the moral 
order’ (2012, 1684). Given that the image of ‘the multiple-passport holder [displays] 
an élan for thriving in the conditions of insecurity, as well as the turbulence of global 
trade’ (Ong 1999, 1), it is quite natural for parents to want this for their children. 
However, given the enormous differences in the conditions within states and the 
different levels of access and treatment of individuals, there are also moral and ethical 
implications: ‘scholars of citizenship have to date failed to turn their gaze to the largely 
analogous form of strict intergenerational transfer that still persists in the realm of 
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birthright transmission of membership entitlement’ (Shachar and Hirschl 2007, 274). 
These considerations are made all the more pertinent as hereditary citizenship can 
even continue beyond the second generation. Consider Grant’s comment below: 
I'm	 very	 keen	 to	 pass	 on	 both	 my	 British	 and	 Australian	 citizenships	 to	 my	
children,	 and	 also	 their	 children,	 because	 I	 think	 some	 of	 it	 goes	 back	 to	
grandparents	as	well.		
So, in this instance, not only is Grant considering the ways in which hereditary dual 
citizenship rights will bestow great benefits on his children (which he has not, and 
reinforcing the notion of the uncertain future, may not ever have), but he is also 
commenting on the fact that he wishes to pass on his citizenship status to potential 
grandchildren. While this is telling, both regarding his conceptions of the value of the 
status and the modes of hereditary transmission, it also says something about his 
projections into the future: he is planning on passing on his citizenship to his 
grandchildren, that is the children of the children that he is yet to conceive. But 
perhaps this is the point: the fact that he (currently) has neither children nor 
grandchildren, allows him the possibilities of imagination that may not have been 
available if they were already existing; their non-existence gives him the blank slate to 
consider them in any way he wishes. However in eventually obtaining these 
citizenships for his children, or even simply discussing his intentions to, he reinforces 
this possibility for others: ‘[i]f the understanding makes the practice possible, it is also 
true that it is the practice that largely carries the understanding’ (Taylor 2004, 25). 
These projections into the future on behalf of one’s offspring raises the question of 
what it is specifically about ones’ children – or in this case one’s children’s citizenship 
– that not only allows, but encourages such leaps of futurity. Parent participants had 
the contrary perception when they spoke of their own citizenship and its possibilities. 
Here James considers the reasons behind obtaining Danish citizenship for his 
children: 
Obviously,	if	they	ever	wanted	to	go	and	live	in	Europe	for	a	period	of	time,	they	
can	do	it	without	having	to	go	through	all	the	hassles	of	paperwork	and	visas	and	
all	that	stuff.	That's	the	only	reason.	But	I	have	no	intention	of	going	back	myself.	
It's	only	for	the	kids.		
Here his use of the word ‘obviously’ is telling. As he sees it, the advantages of Danish 
citizenship are obvious, not just to go and live in Denmark specifically, but also in 
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Europe at large, which is what will be addressed in the section that follows. This 
desire for multiple statuses would seem ridiculous to those who may have been living 
in previous historical periods, where dual citizenship was seen as morally 
reprehensible and likened to bigamy (Spiro 2010, 114). While the parents among my 
participants were open to the possibilities for their children, there was a closing of the 
imagination with regards to the possibilities of their own lives. Thus, this suggests that 
depending on the situation, we may have different capacities to imagine futures. 
 European Citizenship Imaginaries 
Ever since the implementation of European citizenship in 1992 under the Maastricht 
Treaty, it has been a topic of considerable scholarship. Some works have considered 
the changes that it has made to our conceptions of citizenship and rights more 
broadly (for example Maas 2007; Delanty 2007) and, others have focused on the ways 
in which European citizenship develops a broader European identity (Delanty 1997; 
Lehning 2001). While, as one would expect, much has been written regarding 
European citizenship and its impact within Europe, the literature rarely, if ever, 
mentions the impact it has had among hereditary Europeans who have migrated 
abroad.30 The possibilities of travel and work in the European Union have changed 
the conceptions of the respective national citizenships, highlighting the opportunities 
they engender. As Louis explains: 
I	look	at	all	the	Australian	friends	that	I	have	and	all	of	them	will	have	actually	one	
of	the	European	citizenships,	they	really	value	that,	because	for	them	when	they	
go	backpacking	or	when	they	go	to	Europe,	it's	easier	for	them	to	be	able	to	work	
and	that's	an	advantage	that	you	can	gain.		
Given the high numbers of migrants who arrived in Australia from Europe following 
the Second World War, along with the various hereditary conceptions that the 
particular national citizenships may have, there are a considerable number of 
Australians with European citizenship. While precise figures are very difficult to come 
by, this idea of a useful ‘European Passport’, either in regards to themselves or their 
children, was articulated by all participants who had both an Australian and a 
‘European passport’. The frequency of these claims, and their discussions of them 
with friends – as seen in Louis comments above, and on Grant’s comments earlier in 
																																								 																				
30 A notable exception to this is (Leuchter 2014). 
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this chapter where he mentions the ‘trifecta’ – illustrates a broader social imaginary in 
this context. This also links to the popularity of a European ‘gap year’ among young 
Australians. 
Once, again, we must not underestimate the importance of personal orientations. 
Here Omar, a Greek-Australian who obtained Greek citizenship through hereditary 
means, explains how it was his father, that pushed him to apply for the status: 
The	first	reason,	and	probably	the	most	predominant	reason,	 is	that	my	father	–	
who	is	Greek	–	told	me	I	should	get	one.	I	think	he's	under	the	impression	that	he	
wants	us	to	–	so	we	can	go	on	holiday	in	Europe,	and	can	stay	as	long	as	we	like.	
Not	that	I	ever	really	see	myself	living	there.		
While the value of European citizenship is highlighted for work and travel – like with 
the case of Omar above – several of my participants who fell into this category 
indicated that they had little intention of moving there or moving back as the case 
may be. Instead, this ‘European citizenship’ was conceived more in terms of its 
mobility aspects and temporary access to the labour markets. What was interesting 
however, is that in asking participants who had a ‘European citizenship’ and had lived 
in Europe for extended periods to discuss their thoughts on the topic, the same 
discourse of ‘access’ and ‘opportunity’ was missing. While the methodology used for 
this thesis can make no judgement for the applicability of this further than the 
participants involved in this research, this observation opens up the possibility that 
the imaginary of the advantages of European citizenship with regards to labour market 
access and opportunities for mobility, circulates more freely within the Australian 
context.  
When Milena describes her joy in ‘having the burgundy’ with the accession of 
Romania into the EU (in reference to the colour that is used on all European 
passports) she reinforces that her particular citizenship is of greater value as a 
‘European citizenship’ rather than simply a national one. This has been also 
understood by policy makers, and the ‘appeal’ of European citizenship has been used 
for geopolitical ends. Some European Union states with more ethnic conceptions of 
nationhood have mobilised the carrot of European citizenship to attempt to lure ‘lost’ 
populations living in neighbouring countries, such as in the case of Hungary with 
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regards to their populations in Romania prior to Romania’s own accession (Kovács 
2006) and in Bulgaria in relation to their populations in Macedonia (Neofotistos 
2009). This suggests the ways in which European citizenship has been imagined 
differently by different populations. 
However, returning to the case of European citizenship in Australia, the promise with 
which these antipodean ‘Europeans’ hold their citizenship, has often not had the 
opportunity to be tested: ‘[t]he imagining of the privileges associated with these 
[European] citizenships does not necessarily correspond to the ability to realise them. 
In fact, their implementation requires, by and large, residence and command of the 
local language, which makes them irrelevant for most’ (Leuchter 2014, 783). The 
impact of coming up against a situation where one’s imaginary is questioned in the 
contest of citizenship will be considered within last section of this chapter on 
ruptured imaginaries. 
 Imaginaries of (In)Security 
At the time that the New York Times and other American news outlets were 
announcing Trump’s win in the 2016 US Presidential Election, they were also 
broadcasting the story of the Canadian Immigration website crashing due to the 
enormous number of visitors (Kassam 2016). Other stories explained how individuals 
were seeking either to renounce their American citizenship or to obtain citizenship to 
another country in response to the election results (Bromwich 2016). Similarly, in 
both the lead up and wake of Brexit, the Guardian ran stories about the increasing 
number of individuals applying for citizenship in other – mostly European – locations  
(O’Carroll, Marsh, and readers 2016), with many applying for Irish citizenship in 
particular (Addley 2016). While the precise numbers of people obtaining dual 
citizenship and their reasons are hard to determine, what is perhaps the most telling 
and of the greatest interest to this thesis is the obvious articulations of an imaginary of 
citizenship offering security (in getting another one) and another offering insecurity 
(in the need to renounce it).  
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The reactions to the election and the referendum fit within the context of general 
feelings of pervasive insecurity: there is a ‘new apocalyptic imagination coursing 
through Anglo-American public culture. This is an imaginary that, by design or 
default, draws a parallel between diverse threats such as global warming, health 
pandemics, natural catastrophes, technological risks, and international crime and 
terrorism, seeing them as perturbations of a world system on the edge of breakdown 
or, at least, one so complex and interconnected that it continuously generates new 
and escalating risks.’ (Amin 2012, 138). Thus, as Giddens explains, in seeking to act 
or conceive of the future: the ‘[a]ssessment of risk – or the balance of risk and 
opportunity – becomes the core element of the personal colonising of future domains’ 
(Giddens 1991, 129). There is often an interplay between these utopic and dystopic 
visions: ‘imaginations of desirable and desired futures correlate, tacitly or explicitly, 
with the obverse – shared fears of harms’ (Jasanoff and Kim 2015, 6), and as such – as 
hinted at by the notion of (in)security – they will be dealt with together rather than 
separately. 
While there are numerous examples of these broader imaginaries of crisis that 
circulate within society, the role that citizenship has to play in this is less obvious. 
Questions of (in)security also offer us the context with which to see how imaginaries 
intersect. One such example is how the perception of insecurity evokes the belief that 
we will be safer elsewhere (imaginaries of mobility), and thus the possibilities of the 
passport as a tool of security enter into this equation. Whether or not these 
individuals ‘use’ their citizenship as a response to the perceived threat – in this 
context at least – is less relevant, but rather what this section is interested in is the way 
in which citizenship is imagined in light of these risks. This section will consider the 
ways in which citizenship has become part of these social imaginaries of (in)security. 
 Neurotic Imaginaries 
In theorising the importance of individual encounters within the context of 
citizenship, there is an underlying assumption that these are active individuals rather 
than simply governed passive subjects, which is further emphasised by the approach in 
addressing individual acts of imagination in addition to social imaginaries. It is within 
Encountering Imaginaries 
	
162	
this same acknowledgement that Engin Isin evokes the idea of the ‘neurotic citizen’ 
that acts on neuroses and fears: ‘[t]he neurotic citizen is not a passive, cynical subject 
but an active subject whose libidinal energies are channelled towards managing its 
anxieties and insecurities. The neurotic citizen actively mobilises affects and emotions 
and governs itself through them’ (Isin 2004, 232). In evoking this image of the 
neurotic, he highlights the fact ‘that people not only conduct their lives with affects 
and emotions but also in the absence of capacities for evaluating full and transparent 
information’ (Isin 2004, 220). Thus in seeking to consider how notions of (in)security 
come into being, we need to acknowledge these acts of interpretation: ‘the viewer after 
all construes what she sees; in turn the viewer’s capacity for observation is socially 
trained in ways that delimit what she can perceive’ (Jasanoff and Kim 2015, 19).  
In theorising imaginaries as both individual and collective – as is being done in this 
chapter – we open up a reflection of how some of these circulating images and stories 
re-emerge applied to personal circumstances. What was perhaps the most telling was 
the role in which these narratives played in people’s minds, even when, sometimes 
from their own attestations, these futures were highly improbable. Take Suzie’s 
explanation for her reasons for naturalising: 
I	would	 say	 the	biggest	 incentive	was	 -	because	we	have	 children,	we	have	 two	
kids	[…]	not	that	that's	really	an	issue,	but	my	parents	have	horror	stories.	One	of	
my	 mom's	 friends	 was	 American	 and	 had	 come	 over	 to	 Australia	 with	 her	
husband,	 was	 unhappy,	 met	 another	 Australian,	 and	 decided	 to	 stay.	 Married	
him–	no,	she's	Australian,	met	an	American,	married	him,	they	had	a	child	when	
they	 were	 physically	 in	 Australia.	 Because	 they	 weren't	 married	 yet,	 their	
marriage	wasn't	 legal,	 because	 she	was	 still	waiting	 for	 a	 divorce	 from	her	 first	
husband.	Her	American	husband,	because	he	was	American,	they	had	real	issues	
declaring	citizenship	for	her	child	that	was	born	in	Australia	[...]	not	that	anything	
like	that	is	going	to	happen	but	things	like	that	have	been	in	the	back	of	my	head.	
(Emphasis	added)	
While Suzie here attests to the fact that ‘not that anything like that is going to 
happen’ we can see from the way in which she has absorbed the narrative that she has 
taken it on within her own imagination of possible futures: someone else’s past 
circulated through storytelling, functions as trigger for the imagination of her own 
future. Still the narrative that left its mark is quite telling, because a brief investigation 
into the policies related to these concerns would have indicated that this event (as she 
illustrated herself) is, if not impossible, then highly improbable. This disjoint 
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reinforces the image of the neurotic citizen ‘whose conduct is based not merely on 
calculating rationalities but also arises from, and responds to, fears, anxieties and 
insecurities’ (Isin 2004, 217). It is wrong however to completely reject her anxiety for 
two reasons. The first is that we can never completely rule out the possibility, only 
comment on its likelihood. Secondly, this imagined situation is real in its impact on 
her: ‘[fear] acts just as palpably whether the threat is determinate or not. It weakens 
your resolve, creates stress, lowers consumer confidence, and may eventually lead to 
individual and/or economic paralysis’ (Massumi 2007, 6). While the situation itself 
may not eventuate, her emotional responses, and its role as a catalyst are both very 
real. 
Here is another example, where David, in his early thirties, is motivated towards 
citizenship due to political events: 
Living	in	Australia,	the	Afghan	War	had	just	started,	and	the	parents	had	advised	
that	 I	 do	 [obtain	 dual	 citizenship],	 on	 the	 grounds	 that	 John	 Howard	 [the	 then	
Australian	 Prime	Minister]	was	 very	much	 pro-conscription.	 The	 idea	was	 that	 I	
should	have	a	second	passport,	should	it	come	to	pass	that	mine	was	confiscated,	
and	I	was	asked	to	get	drafted.	That	way	I	would	have	a	way	to	not	have	to	go	to	
war.		
In David’s conception, and in this version of the narrative at least, citizenship is a 
means by which to overcome the (unlikely, and with regard to the intervention in 
question, un-eventuating) possibility of conscription. It is useful to consider this for a 
moment: he is reacting to the possibility of a policy that did not even exist yet. Rigid 
notions of policy as either in force or not, fail to consider the ways in which 
individuals come to take on these legal considerations: ‘[l]aws came to be remembered 
even if they were never enacted, with many migrants […] citing retracted legislations – 
those that were proposed, debated, but never passed – as a source of their increased 
insecurity or as a reason for their changed habits in navigating the city or interacting 
with […] citizens’ (Hepworth 2015, 8–9). Therefore, the legal framework while not 
unimportant, still functions to illuminate only the law itself, and fails to consider how 
these policies are taken on in either pre-emptive or reactionary capacities, or even how 
they come to present a different shape through misunderstandings.  What individuals 
respond to more than anything is the sense of the law or their own understanding of 
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its probability and consequences; they rarely have a global conception of its 
implications. Thus, laws and policies exist at least in part through acts of imagination. 
While the section that follows will consider how an additional citizenship is seen as a 
tool for security, Svetlana below reminds us once again that individual conceptions 
can create different outlooks. In this case, citizenship is not seen as an advantage, a 
secure status, or being part of something, instead it is seen as a risk. Svetlana 
comments: 
It	doesn’t	give	me	any	form	of	security.	So	what	can	it	give	me	anyway?	Only	the	
right	 to	 come	 and	 go	 as	 I	 please	 in	 Europe.	 I	 don’t	 care,	 I	 will	 go	 get	 a	 visa.	
Anyway,	I	travel	fairly	freely	in	Europe	without	it.	To	head	to	the	US,	I	will	go	and	
get	a	visa.	I	prefer	to	waste	my	time	on	these	sorts	of	things	rather	than	having	an	
identity	 card	 that	 will	 never	 give	 me	 the	 feeling	 of	 security	 […]	 There	 are	 no	
benefits	 at	 this	 point	 in	 time	 to	 have	 a	 Greek	 identity	 card	 […]	 I	 much	 prefer	
having	 a	 Russian	 passport	 and	 that	 is	 never	 going	 to	 change	 […] I	 feel	 that	 [in	
getting	it]	you	will	be	even	more	indebted	for	things	that	you	haven’t	even	heard	
of.	Somehow	it	will	tie	you	down,	and	it	will	demand	things	from	you.	 
Her comment that ‘there are no benefits at this point in time to have a Greek identity 
card’ stands in direct contrast to the perceptions of this status as outlined by others in 
earlier sections of this chapter. While her context of economic crisis Greece, with the 
political uncertainty and the harsh new tax measures (Malkoutzis 2016), will likely 
have played a role, there is something that she finds troubling about the status. Her 
statement of ‘it will demand things from you’ also evokes more traditional ideas about 
the responsibilities of citizenship, which have been largely absent in other individual’s 
comments, apart from a few references to taxation. This is also an interesting case as it 
provides an almost opposite account to some of the others who saw having Greek 
citizenship as great personal advantage. This shows that there are subjective elements 
to notions of ‘good’ or ‘bad’ passports, or even how individual dispositions as well as 
circumstances come to shape how citizenship is imagined. While this is Greek, and 
thus European citizenship, the same narratives of advantage are not there. In 
addition, Svetlana currently lives in Greece and professes to be there for the 
foreseeable future. She has been married to a Greek man for many years but she has 
no desire to naturalise, even despite mentioning her husband’s wish for her to do so. 
In her imagination, Greek citizenship ‘doesn’t give [her] any form of security’, which 
is the complete opposite of the perceptions of many others. 
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 ‘Passport in a Drawer’: Citizenship as contingency 
In contrast to Svetlana, several participants saw a second citizenship as a tool of 
security. But in doing so, they tended to make a distinction between their two (or 
more) citizenship statuses: one was seen as primary to everyday life, and the other was 
usually imagined in other terms, such as in the context of mobility or security. In a 
number of cases, the passport for this ‘second’ citizenship was not renewed and others 
described it as simply ‘a passport in [a] drawer’. As such, this section will consider 
three points, firstly, how citizenship is imagined as a tool for security. Secondly, what 
the idea of having a ‘passport in a drawer’ says about citizenship more broadly, and 
finally, it will illustrate an example of what happens when this idea of a ‘backup’ 
citizenship comes up against the more traditional concepts of the duties of a citizen.  
In the context of the insecurity of financial crisis Greece, Heidi mentions how her 
German citizenship fills her with ‘a sense of security’: 
I	would	never	want	to	lose	my	German	citizenship,	not	because	I	have	some	sort	
of	nostalgia	for	it,	but	for	me,	it	has	always	seemed	to	give	me	a	strong	sense	of	
security.	 If,	 for	 some	 reason	here	 things	happen	and	everything	goes	 to	hell,	 or	
even	something	else,	or	even	something	of	a	more	personal	nature	 -	 I	have	 the	
right	to	return	to	Germany	and	say	‘Look,	here	I	am,	do	you	want	me?	Don’t	you	
want	me?	Well,	you	have	to	at	least	give	me	the	basic	welfare	amount’	-	Basically,	
my	thinking	follows	along	those	lines.		
Here she explains how her German citizenship gives her a feeling of security, 
especially in what she perceives as an increasingly uncertain context. Yet, the 
citizenship that she relies on for her security ‘if everything goes to hell’ comes from 
the country of her birth where she has not lived in for almost thirty years. While 
traditionally, citizenship is often articulated in terms of rights and responsibilities, this 
particular perception focuses on the rights (‘well, you have to at least give me the basic 
welfare amount’) with little regard to contributions, or the fact that she has not lived 
there for many years. Furthermore, she indicates the unquestioning certainty that she 
has of her German citizenship in the claim that Germany has ‘to give [her] the basic 
welfare amount’. Despite these perceptions, citizenship is not necessarily stable. This 
instability may be foretold by changing policies which strip people of their citizenship, 
and of this there are countless examples. Recently in the Australian context, 
individuals where stripped of their citizenship if they were believed to be part of a 
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terrorist organisation (Safi 2016), or in Germany, changes were implemented to their 
dual citizenship laws, to close a loophole that was being ‘exploited’ (Caglar 2004). 
The idea of citizenship as a tool of security is also articulated by Natalie: 
At	the	end	of	the	day	if	I	split	up	with	[my	partner]	and	I	move	back	to	the	UK,	it	
doesn't	really	matter	that	I've	got	two	[citizenships]	because	so	many	people	do.	I	
had	a	friend	who	grew	up	here,	and	lived	here	her	whole	[life]	–	and	she	just	had	
an	 old	UK	 passport	 sitting	 in	 her	 drawer–	because	 [of]	 her	 dad.	I	 think	 even	 if	 I	
went	back,	 I	wouldn't	 then	 revoke	 it.	 I	would	 just	 think,	 ‘Oh,	 it’s	 just	 sitting	 in	a	
drawer	 in	 case	 it's	 needed’,	 but	 I	mean	 I	 don't	 really–	Well,	 hopefully	we	won't	
split	up,	so	it	won't	really	matter	[laughter][…]	Also	I	guess	the	thing	is	getting	my–	
is	even	as	a	PR	[permanent	resident],	as	I	understand,	I've	got	English	friends	that	
didn't	 have	 citizenship	 but	 were	 PR,	 and	 they	 had	 children	 and	 then	 they	 [the	
children]	automatically	get	citizenship	if	they're	here,	so	I	would	just	think,	I	would	
hate	 it	 if	 my	 kids	 were	 20	 and	wanted	 to	 come	 live	 in	 Australia	 and	 I	 couldn't	
come	back.	(Emphasis	added)	
While this fragment speaks to some of the considerations outlined in previous 
sections (as with Grant, the children that she refers to have not been born yet), she 
also mentions, that given whatever circumstances that may require her to return to 
the UK, she would not renounce her Australian Citizenship. In bringing up the story 
of a friend with ‘an old UK passport sitting in her drawer’ – highlighting once again 
the role of the circulation of imaginaries – she explains that this is where she would 
keep hers.  
The question is then, what exactly is ‘a passport in a drawer’ and how does it fit with 
other imaginaries of citizenship. Certainly this idea alludes to a conception of the 
passport as a ‘non-obliging document’ (Leuchter 2014, 781), and is one that gives very 
little consideration to the identity and community elements that this status 
traditionally implies. The ‘passport in a drawer’ represents a style of citizenship that is 
‘actively disengaged’ from the broader national context (Leuchter 2014, 782). The 
difference between this perception of citizenship, and others that conceive of it in 
terms of rights and duties, suggests that ‘multiple imaginaries can coexist within 
society’ (Jasanoff and Kim 2015, 5). 
When two different conceptions come up against one another, we witness ‘a battle of 
imaginaries’ (Amin 2012, 146). One such example occurred in 2006 where there was 
widespread outrage in Canada after hereditary dual Canadian-Lebanese citizens, who 
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had never lived in Canada, were being evacuated at the expense of the Canadian 
government, during the conflict between Lebanon and Israel (Jedwab 2007). There 
was considerable anger towards these ‘Canadians of convenience’ (Nyers 2010, 50), 
who were seen as non-contributing members of society, who had never lived in 
Canada, and had never paid taxes. While the personal dispositions of these 
individuals towards their multiple statuses is not present in the academic literature, 
this particular case does represent an occasion in which an ‘actively disengaged’ 
citizenship did provide greater security. What is of more interest to this thesis 
however, are the clues that it gives to the coexistence of multiple citizenship 
imaginaries and the possible future consequences of these ‘battles of imaginaries’. 
 Interrupted/Ruptured Imaginaries 
The possibility of the co-existence of numerous imaginaries as well as the ways in 
which these individual conceptions undergo continual re-evaluation and 
reinterpretation, requires an understanding that is non-deterministic and open to 
ambivalence, and can also help understand the impact of action, inaction and 
rupture. This, the final substantive section in this chapter, considers the ways in 
which individuals, given the communicated strength of their belief in these 
imaginaries, come to act, or not act, upon them. Initially, the following section will 
consider the issue of ‘inertia’: why despite indicating the value of the various statuses 
and their intent to obtain them, participants ‘hadn’t got around to it’. It will also 
address the various ‘triggers’, as outlined by participants as catalysts for obtaining an 
additional status. Finally, it will consider what happens when our imaginaries are 
‘ruptured’, namely when a certain encounter makes us re-evaluate what we had 
believed to be the case. 
 Inertia and Acting on Imaginaries  
What was evident in the explanations of several participants is that despite the 
existence of a strong desire to obtain citizenship or to live elsewhere, these individuals 
simply had ‘not got around to it’. This disjoint between imagination and action, 
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highlights the need to maintain a conception of imaginaries and acts of imagination 
that is open to ambiguities and contradictions. 
Take Louis for example, after speaking extensively of his desire to obtain dual 
citizenship for his son, and the value that this status has, he comments: 
To	be	honest,	 [getting	dual	citizenship	 for	my	son]	has	been	on	the	back	burner	
probably	since	[my	son]	was	born	and	it's	been	10	years	now.		
The question is then, how can we better understand this difference, between what is 
being said and the action (or lack thereof) that follows. Initially it is important to 
remember that ‘[t]he potentialities, objectives, motivations and/or plans associated 
with mobility are constantly being disrupted and revised over the course of people’s 
lives and even more so over the course of generations’ (Amit 2014, 400). However, 
there was nothing that emerged within this encounter with Louis which suggested 
that he had changed his mind recently, and he even speaks to the fact that this has 
been his intention for the last ten years. Instead what we have here is an instance of 
‘inertia’, which does not indicate a lack of desire to undertake a particular action, but 
rather that for whatever reasons, it has not happened yet. 
Like the different modalities of waiting that were addressed in the previous chapter, 
inertia itself is a mode of stillness and pause. It suggests that there is an intention to 
act, yet it is a contradictory space, whereby, unlike waiting where stillness is enforced 
by others (waiting for something or someone), inertia suggests that the capacity to 
undertake the desired and valued action is there, yet no attempt has been made to do 
so. Thus, inertia is a different ‘modality of stillness’ (Bissell and Fuller 2013, 6), and is 
not necessarily a result of ‘lazy’ dispositions (Becker 1995, 306), but rather that these 
actions and imaginations occur in other contexts, where other actions may take 
priority, or that there is a lack of urgency for that action to take place. 
This then suggests the need to investigate its opposite. Under what circumstances are 
these acts of imagination translated into action? To further bring out these varying 
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intensities, consider another quotation from Louis,31 but this time in relation to his 
own citizenship:  
[I	got	my	citizenship	b]ecause,	when	[my	son]	was	six	months	old	we	went	back	to	
France.	He	was	born	in	2003.	And	I	remember	that	[my	wife]	and	[my	son]	were	in	
the	Australian	queue	and	I	was	in	the	foreigners	queue.	And	I	thought,	‘I	need	to	
get	my	passport.’	And	that's	why	I	ended	up	getting	this	passport.		
Here in his account, he gives a clear case, of a particular moment in time which 
spurred him into action. This was common among the participants where a particular 
encounter, or life event, was highlighted as a trigger or tipping point. These catalytic 
moments may speak to the force of particular encounters with regards to imaginaries, 
but also how imaginaries evoke specific encounters as part of their explanatory 
capacities. Furthermore, one cannot fully understand the impact of previous 
encounters which led to these tipping points. 
Take another example, here Agatha relates the moment, after decades of being a New 
Zealander living in Australia, that she decided to become an Australian Citizen: 
So	I'm	going	backwards	and	forwards	[parking	the	car]	 just	 listening	to	the	radio	
and	there's	an	advertisement	that	says	there's	never	been	a	better	time	for	New	
Zealand	citizens	to	become	Australian	citizens	[…]	I	heard	they're	going	to	change	
the	 law,	 because	 I	 don't	 trust	 governments	 very	 much.	 [So	 I	 thought]	 They're	
going	to	change	the	law.	They're	going	to	make	my	life	difficult,	so	I	better	go	in	
and	get	it.		
Like David, from the previous section, she is trigged by an imagined change in policy. 
In the full version of this encounters she spends some time relating the difficulty she 
was having in parking the car. She speaks of being stuck, and being forced to inch 
backwards and forwards, and the force with which she relays the physicality of her 
parking may suggest a tangential relationship, between the way in which she is 
constrained in her car, and the possibilities of her being constrained by not having 
Australian Citizenship. Furthermore, had someone not parked in her assigned spot at 
her workplace, she may not have had ‘space’ provided by the difficult parking 
encounter, and been listening to the radio at that time. Others may argue that this 
event was the trigger for a build-up of encounters that pushed her towards this point, 
which may be hinted at by her comments regarding her general mistrust in 
government. Regardless of the actual circumstances, which in this context are 
																																								 																				
31 This piece also appeared in the chapter on bureaucratic waiting in relation to the importance of 
queueing. 
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impossible to fully comprehend, what these examples suggest is the importance of 
specific events in the recounts of individual actions as part of citizenship narratives. 
 
This section has illustrated that one cannot draw clear conclusions from the 
relationship between action and imagination. Actions may happen without engaging 
in extensive imaginative acts, and strong desires, embedded in repeated imaginative 
acts, do not necessarily result in action. Furthermore, when action does take place, 
often a particular moment is highlighted as catalytic, which may obscure other 
encounters and acts of imagination, that led to that point. 
 Ruptured Imaginaries 
So what happens when those future plans and those longstanding imaginaries prove 
to never eventuate or turn out to be ‘wrong’? Of this there is one clear example from 
the fieldwork, that of Pierre. Pierre has three citizenships, and relatively recently 
decided to spend some time in France where he has a hereditary citizenship, but does 
not speak the language. Despite getting help from an Aunt, a native speaker, he came 
up against difficulties regarding healthcare: 
He	 [the	 bureaucrat	 at	 the	 health	 office]	 basically	 said	 that	 I	 can’t	 get	 health	
insurance	 and	 I	 was	 confused	 as	 I	 thought	 that	 a	 passport	 was	 an	 automatic	
entitlement	to	everything	[…]	I’m	still	not	sure	to	be	honest,	I’ve	thought	about	it	
quite	a	bit	lately.	(P)	It’s	confusing,	the	term,	to	me.	When	I	was	in	France,	so	they	
didn’t	want	to	give	me	the	healthcare	just	because	I	hadn’t	paid	tax,	so	I	am	not	
really	even	sure	what	the	government	thinks	citizenship	is.	It	is	a	bit	confusing,	it	
is	a	confusing	word	that	is	thrown	about.	Is	a	passport	a	citizenship?	I	am	almost	
thinking	there	is	a	little	bit	of…	how	important	is	national	citizenship	these	days,	is	
it	more	 to	do	with	 just	border	 control,	 then	 it’s	 also	 this	 thing	about	 rights	 and	
responsibilities,	 but	 I	 just	 don’t…	 so	 I	 guess	 I	 think	 I	 identify	 it	 as	 being	 about	
people	movement	mainly,	otherwise	I	am	pretty	confused	by	the	term.	(Emphasis	
added)	
As is illustrated from this testimony, his experience was quite rattling. It caused him 
to re-evaluate not only the way that he understood that particular encounter, or 
French Citizenship more generally, but rather his conception of citizenship in its 
entirety.  
In this context, the disruption – as illustrated by his confusion – is made very clear. 
His situation has left him so confused that he uses the word five times in the small 
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extract above. We can see how ‘[t]he moment of interruption […] marked a disruption 
and a calling into question of that feeling of belonging’ (Dawney 2013, 632). It is 
possible to argue that the embodied violence of the rupture is caused, at least in part, 
by the conviction with which he held the imaginary that existed prior to it. In this 
context it is also important to mention that it is not possible to diagnose his initial 
imaginary as objectively ‘wrong’, as ‘wrong’ is only a diagnosis against a particular set 
of circumstances, in this case his interactions with a bureaucrat in the health office. 
Given also the analysis that the previous chapter made regarding the role and impact 
of ‘street-level bureaucrats’ and bureaucratic encounters more generally, the outcome 
of the encounter may have been different if it has occurred under slightly different 
circumstances.  
In the same way that disappointment increases with heightened expectations, the 
impact of the rupture reflects the strength of the original imaginary, as it has built up 
force over time. It also suggests how when these moments of rupture occur they have 
repercussions across diverse temporalities. They cause a re-evaluation of the past and 
perhaps a different orientation to the future. Finally, this approach is somewhat 
similar to Dawney’s work where she theorises interruptions. In this context she states 
‘[w]hat is interesting in this incident is how other histories, other imaginaries, other 
institutional contexts are brought to presence, such that the moment of intensity — 
the moment when the body responds in fear and anger — can be read as the 
conjuncture of relations that stretch far beyond the bodies here and now’ (2013, 640). 
As such, when theorising the existence of these multiple citizenship imaginaries, 
awareness is required of just how they come to interact and react in different contexts. 
 Conclusion 
Imaginaries of citizenship are a crucial component of our ongoing negotiation of the 
world at large. In our attempts to make our lives liveable our citizenship becomes 
informed, not only by collective imaginaries, but also by our own countless acts of 
imagination. Thus this chapter has made the novel contribution of illustrating how 
prior theorisations of imaginaries have fallen short by failing to conceive of the ways 
Encountering Imaginaries 
	
172	
in which individual acts of imagination fit into this picture. This chapter has shown 
how citizenship can be imagined in a diversity of ways including ones which divorce it 
from the national community to which it relates. It also speaks to the co-existence of 
numerous imaginaries, and provides some indication of the impact of what happens 
when they come up against each other.  
Imaginaries and acts of imagination also serve as a reminder that citizenship is subject 
to continual and personal negotiation within lived lives: ‘[…] the notion of life course 
reminds us that people do not usually navigate the ambiguous and frequently 
contradictory controls and policies regulating borders and statuses in a bid to make 
general declarations about affiliation and identity as categorical abstractions. They are 
more likely to be pursuing personal projects and intimate relations […] the very notion 
of a ‘life course’ reminds us that the workings of these intersections are not 
constituted as singular events. Their meanings and ramifications change over the 
course of people’s lives’ (Amit 2014, 400). Thus, the concept of imaginaries, in the 
context of citizenship provides a theorisation which can not only provide an 
understanding of citizenship which fits better with its ongoing negotiation as part of 
lived lives, but one that is open to ambiguity, re-evaluation, and change.  
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7. Neoliberalism, Nationalism, and 
Encounters of Address 
Who are you?  
What do you do? 
Where are you from?  
These are some seemingly banal questions; we ask and are asked them time and again. 
They are often the very first questions we ask of others; we seek to discern them, to 
comprehend something about them, through their response. Yet in answering – and 
there is an imperative to answer – one is required to provide a particular response, an 
account of themselves that embeds them within a ‘normative scheme of intelligibility’. 
The disclosure is often formulaic: my name is Masood/Cate/Jing, I am a 
doctor/lawyer/waiter, I am from Sydney/India/Turkey. These encounters of address 
fit people into the world, and how they fit will depend not only on their responses but 
these pre-existing normative schemes. When the answers that are given do not fit with 
our expectations – when this person may not sound, look, or feel to the addresser as 
fitting the response – a follow up question may be asked: where are you really from? 
Citizenship comes into being and disappears through these and other encounters of 
address. One is not only called upon to give an account of oneself, but is addressed by 
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others and becomes subject to interpellations over which they may have little or no 
control; we come into being and are situated through these terms. This chapter will 
consider the ways in which these encounters of address and the logics and 
vocabularies that make them possible come to shape an individual’s being in the 
world, how these practices situate us and thus have significant consequences for 
agency. In focusing on these encounters of address and the transformations in forms 
of address more generally, we can better understand how citizenship is not only the 
subject of top down deployments, but comes into being and is transformed through 
situated everyday speech. 
This is far larger than a simple question of terminology. These ‘vocabularies’ are 
imbued with values and judgements, and embedded in moral authority: ‘all 
individuals ground their views of the world within some conception of moral 
authority […] Even average, non-activist secularists – ordinary people who maintain no 
religious belief, who worship no deity – live by unspoken assumptions about their 
world; they too are people of particular, even if implicit faith commitments’ (Hunter 
1992, 119, emphasis added). It is through these modes of address that moral authority 
comes into being: ‘[t]he structure of address is important to understand how moral 
authority is introduced and sustained if we accept not just that we address others 
when we speak, but that in some way we come to exist as it were, in the moment of 
being addressed, and something about our existence that proves precarious when this 
address fails’ (Butler 2006, 130).   
Drawing on the concept of performativity, that is the ‘reiterative power of discourse to 
produce the phenomena that it regulates and constrains’ (Butler 1993, xii), this 
chapter will look at the way in which moral authorities, here conceived as  ‘normative 
schemes of intelligibility’ come to shape the world and our place in it. The use of the 
term normative schemes, requires an explanation: these schemes are normative, 
because they prescribe a particular view of the world, and in doing so, they make 
things intelligible, situate them, and highlight their rightness – or wrongness – as the 
case may be. These schemes provide to us the ‘vocabularies’ and ‘logics’ through 
which we come to see the world and function in it. This concept of a normative 
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scheme first emerged in an implicit sense within several of Judith Butler’s works on 
gender (1993, [1990] 1999), but is more explicitly mentioned in her work Precarious 
Life (2006). In evoking the concept, it will be taken further to illustrate two clear 
examples of these ‘normative schemes of intelligibility’ – neoliberalism and 
nationalism – and how they come to be the building blocks of how we give account of 
ourselves as well as the accounts that we expect from, and at times impose upon, 
others. The consequences of this will then be considered in relation to encounters of 
address in the context of citizenship. 
These schemes are at times difficult to identify; they sit ‘at the limits of what we can 
know, what we can hear, what we can see, what we can sense’ (Butler 2006, 151). 
They are understood differently by different people, but there is enough of a 
linguistic, symbolic or material cohesiveness to allow them to be maintained and to 
circulate. The different forms of these schemes reinforce one another: ‘[m]atter and 
meaning are co-constitutive and mutually emergent […] as things are materialised in 
relation to discursive formations, so too are those discursive frames materialised 
through an entanglement with things’ (Darling 2014, 486). These schemes do not act 
in isolation, rather they intersect with other schemes of race, gender, ethnicity and 
come to form part of ones ‘categoric identity’ (Goffman 1983, 3). 
In consciously or unconsciously situating individuals within these schemes, they come 
to influence our behaviours: ‘public feelings of empathy or aversion towards the 
stranger are […] shown to be instantiations of a slew of personal and collective 
labelling conventions – inherited, learnt, absorbed and practised – that flow into the 
moment of encounter’ (Amin 2012, 5). Yet, these are also pragmatic categories of 
‘everyday practice’ (Hage 2000, 31): ‘without categorisation, the complexity of the 
human social world might not be manageable at all’ (Jenkins 2000, 8). This chapter 
will show how these very labelling conventions, the normative schemes in which they 
fit, and the ways in which individuals are addressed in light of them can account at 
least in part for the diversity of encounters that individuals experience as part of 
citizenship.  
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In the first instance this chapter will consider neoliberalism, as well as its ‘vocabulary’ 
and ‘logic’, and their centrality to neoliberalism’s emergence as a distinctive normative 
scheme. This section will then address the ways in which citizenship has been 
transformed by neoliberal vocabularies and logics, through various examples and 
including the emergence of ‘citizenship planning’ providers. Nationalism is then 
analysed as a further example of a normative scheme, whose success is indicated by 
the fact that it is central to the way that we identify ourselves and others. The 
hierarchical and value laden nature of nationalism is then considered along with the 
diverse ways this scheme and others render individuals subject to border imperialism 
and other consequences. The final section of this chapter will look at how these 
schemes function when we come to give account of ourselves and in the accounts we 
expect or impose upon others. Repetition is shown to be paramount to these schemes, 
before the existence and consequences of failed address are considered. These three 
sections will be interwoven with two vignettes, giving two very different accounts of 
encounters.  
 The Vocabulary and Grammar of Neoliberalism 
One of the very strengths of neoliberalism is the ubiquitousness of its concepts in 
everyday speech and understanding. We may not be aware of it, but ‘this vocabulary 
of customer, consumer, choice, markets and self-interest moulds both our conception of 
ourselves and our understanding of and relationship to the world’ (Massey 2013, 11, 
emphasis added).  The purpose of the section that follows is to address the question of 
how the vocabulary of neoliberalism has come to shape, not only citizenship, but our 
understanding of others and the world at large. In doing so, the subject will be broken 
down into three parts.  Initially questions of vocabulary will be shown to be at the 
core of what neoliberalism is, as well as foundational within its emergence: these 
vocabularies and logics materialise differently and change our understandings of 
things that we often take to be stable, in fluid and unexpected ways. The second 
section will address how these logics and vocabularies have altered the meanings and 
conceptions of citizenship through these encounters of address as well as in more 
general terms. The final section will focus on an extreme case of this – that of 
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‘citizenship planning’ providers – showing the dramatic changes to citizenship as a 
consequence of the ‘normative scheme of intelligibility’ that is neoliberalism. 
Neoliberalism, like citizenship, is an elusive term and may refer to many things in 
both content and form: it is ‘an aggregation of ideas, a discursive formation, an over-
arching ideology, a governmental programme, the manifestation of a set of interests, a 
hegemonic project, an assemblage of techniques and technologies, and what Deleuze 
and Guattari call an ‘abstract machine’’ (Gilbert 2013, 8). Given the diversity of 
things to which neoliberalism relates, this linguistic and discursive congruity is central: 
it is the vocabulary – part of which Massey has described above – that makes the term 
cohesive.  
This vocabulary however must be situated within a broader ‘logic’. ‘Logic’ makes 
reference to the subtle notions of value and hierarchy that are implicit in the use of 
these vocabularies: these terms are not neutral, but rather they are imbued and 
embedded with diverse meanings provided by these logics. According to Harvey, 
‘[n]eoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that 
proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual 
entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized 
by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade’ (2007, 2). It then 
follows that this logic, one that emphasises business, money, circulation, as well as the 
productive capacities of things, values objects and individuals that are seen to assist in 
these ends. It is within this logic that the associated vocabulary is understood. This is 
not so say however that logics and vocabularies are static; quite the opposite, they 
undergo transformations depending on their particular contexts and the purposes for 
which they are articulated, and whom they are articulated by. 
The concepts of vocabulary and logic also go some way to explain the origins and 
spread of neoliberalism. Here in this passage, Nicholas Rose outlines neoliberalism’s 
materialisation across Britain: ‘They were, rather, contingent lash-ups of thought and 
action, in which various problems of governing were resolved through drawing upon 
instruments and procedures that happened to be available, in which new ways of 
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governing were invented in a rather ad hoc way, as practical attempts to think about 
and act upon specific problems in particular locales, and various other existing 
techniques and practices were merely dressed up in new clothes. But, in the course of 
this process, a certain rationality, call it neo-liberalism, came to provide a way of linking up 
these various tactics, integrating them in thought so that they appeared to partake in a coherent 
logic. And once they did so, once a kind of rationality could be extracted from them, made to be 
translatable with them, it could be redirected towards both them and other things, which could 
now be thought of in the same way […] And such rationalities were then embodied in, or 
came to infuse, a whole variety of practices and assemblages for regulating economic 
life, medical care, welfare benefits, professional activity and so forth’ (N. Rose 1999, 
27, emphasis added). Rose’s ‘rationalities’ makes reference to these logics, and it is 
through ‘these contingent lash-ups of thought and action’, and the vocabularies in 
which they are embedded that neoliberalism becomes materialised. Perhaps more 
interestingly, this account illustrates how these notions come to infiltrate already 
existing processes and institutions: these logics and vocabularies build on the sites that 
are already occupied, but continuously reinterpret these spaces in their own terms. 
In expanding on how logics and vocabularies come to shift meaning and create 
change, we need to not only consider how new vocabularies come to (re)inscribe that 
which pre-exists, but also how these normative schemes repeat and echo as they 
become linked to other diverse forms. To once again quote Massey, ‘these 
vocabularies which have reclassified roles, identities and relationships – of people, 
places and institutions – and the practices which enact them embody and enforce the 
ideology of neoliberalism’ (2013, 11). As such we must also acknowledge the role of 
repetition in the use of these vocabularies: the more a given action is conceived of and 
explained in these terms, the more it may influence subsequent actions and how they 
are explained and understood. Thus the greater weight that is given to ‘neoliberalism’ 
further obscures the countless other ideas, assumptions and small acts that brought it 
into being, and that continue its existence. This logic also becomes embedded in 
‘affective atmospheres’ which ‘are part of the conditions of formation for neoliberal 
reason/objects, and, as such, are central to understanding the momentum of policies, 
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programmes and so on’ (Ben Anderson 2015, 16). It is through these repeated 
vocabularies and the logics that underlie them that brings the formidable 
‘neoliberalism’ into being, and having emerged, the repeated use of this vocabulary in 
encounters of address and speech acts ensures the ongoing echo of neoliberalism 
through countless other – potentially unrelated – forms. 
Just as the materiality of citizenship in the context of bureaucracy has been discussed 
in a prior chapter (Chapter Five), so too has the normative scheme of neoliberalism 
become materialised in different ways: ‘we cannot ignore the power of past discourses 
and their materialisation in durable technologies, infrastructures and behaviours’ 
(Gibson-Graham 2008, 623). Thus, caution is required; the ways these logics and 
vocabularies come to take material forms may veil and even misrepresent other 
relationships, identities and processes. In terms of economic calculations, Gibson-
Graham indicate very clearly how neoliberal modes of establishing value have 
obscured the fact that ‘‘marginal’ economic practices and forms of enterprise are 
actually more prevalent, and account for more hours worked and/or more value 
produced than the capitalist sector’ (Gibson-Graham 2008, 617). As such, these 
normative schemes, such as neoliberalism, can misrepresent, obscure, and even render 
that which does not fit into them, invisible. 
The extent to which these vocabularies are used can cause their related normative 
scheme to seem greater and more all-encompassing than it really is: ‘critics interested 
in the ways structural forces materialise locally often turn the heuristic ‘neoliberalism’ 
into a world-homogenising sovereign with coherent intentions that produce subjects 
who serve its interests, such that their singular actions only seem personal, effective, 
and freely intentional, while really being effects of powerful forces’ (Berlant 2011, 15, 
emphasis original). The repetitive force and explanatory power of these vocabularies 
and logics as well as their circulation can make the normative scheme seem both more 
cogent and formidable. They also, after a time, come to feel like the ‘natural’ way of 
doing things: ‘Neoliberal ideas seem to have sedimented into the western imaginary 
and become embedded in popular ‘common sense’’ (Hall, Massey, and Rustin 2013, 
17). Once a logic has become embedded – becomes ‘common sense’ to echo the 
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quotation above – it comes to be mobilised to describe experiences, events, actions 
and objects that it may not necessarily relate to, or rather may only be a small part of. 
Using these vocabularies obscures the sheer diversity of the forms that it is claimed to 
both cause and explain, and as such even variations in the scheme itself may be 
concealed.  
These complex and overarching schemes emerge not through top down deployments 
– though they have their role – but rather through speech acts, encounters of address, 
and everyday speech. The implication is then that one must pay attention to those 
small repeated acts and habits that are the clearest illustration of how these logics 
unfold; change occurs through countless seemingly minor encounters which both 
come to explain and are explained away by these schemes. It is the cohesiveness of the 
‘vocabulary’ and the ‘logic’ that gives the impression of a static concept to 
neoliberalism and other schemes that may not be static at all. The same can be said of 
citizenship, whose origins some trace to antiquity, yet, as the following section will 
show, is in a constant state of evolution and change. These functions of naming and 
speech acts through designation and repetition, work to bring these schemes into 
being, cement them, and provide the basis of a moral authority where individuals, 
events and even objects are judged. 
 Citizenship and Neoliberalism  
In	 this	 world,	 shipmates,	 Sin	 that	 can	 pay	 its	 way	 can	 travel	 where	 it	 will	 and	
without	passport;	whereas	Virtue,	if	a	pauper,	is	stopped	at	all	frontiers..	(Melville	2008,	48)	
	 	 	 	 	 	 						-	Herman	Melville,	Moby	Dick,	pg.	48	
Citizenship has not escaped the reach of the normative scheme which is 
neoliberalism. This section will make the novel intervention of considering the ways 
in which the vocabulary and logic of neoliberalism have come to infuse not only 
conceptions of citizenship, but have become central to its encounters of address. 
Initially, the impact of the normative scheme of neoliberalism on that of citizenship 
will be considered; while focusing on these changes and the links between the two, it 
will also make a further point regarding the intersection, evolution and mutual 
influence of these schemes over time. Finally, the argument will be made that despite 
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the focus on the linguistic, these ‘vocabularies’ and ‘logics’ move beyond the linguistic 
in a diversity of ways. 
There is a risk when invoking the notion of vocabulary that some may think that the 
influence of these normative schemes may start with and end with the linguistic. Far 
from it: ‘[w]ords and oft-repeated phrases carry, and reinforce, understandings that go 
well beyond them’ (Massey 2013, 18). These vocabularies and logics that organise 
normative schemes have embedded within them notions of value. Words carry with 
them the connotations of the acceptable and the detrimental, the justified and the 
harmful; they carry with them implications. In relation to the intersection between 
citizenship and neoliberalism, the logic of the neoliberal suggests that there are certain 
types of people who may be desirable in the national space and others that are not. 
Consider these idealised types: the expat, the guest worker, the labour migrant, the 
refugee and the asylum seeker. In the context of neoliberalism, all of these types have 
inherent meaning with regards to the (productive) position that these individuals have 
within the state, even if some of them may predate the primacy of neoliberalism. To 
provide just one possible and very crude sketch: the ‘expat’ is seen as a high earner 
and an investor, who is heavily involved in ‘business’; the ‘migrant worker’ is only 
desirable for the labour that they provide and thus is interchangeable and easily 
replaced; finally the ‘asylum seeker’ is often portrayed as someone who does not make 
a contribution, and is therefore a drain on the system. These terms, whose meanings 
circulate between individuals and within the logic of neoliberalism, provide us with an 
image of their ‘value’.  
These vocabularies also create expectations around what sort of individual falls into 
this category and of what precisely these categories constitute, and can thus intersect 
with notions of gender, race and ethnicity among others. These conceptions are also 
reinforced by a whole range of materialities from circulating media to hearsay. Explicit 
cases of these stereotypes are not hard to find: one such example is a recent study that 
has shown how women only make up 11% of the Google Image Search results for the 
term ‘CEO’ (Kay, Matuszek, and Munson 2015). Furthermore, expectations around 
race have led people to ask: ‘[w]hy are white people expats when the rest of us are 
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immigrants?’ (Koutonin 2015). Stereotypes around gender, race, social class and 
ethnicity among others become embedded within these logics and vocabularies. 
Within the logic of neoliberalism, the circulation of capital is desirable, thus 
individuals that are present in spaces with clear ‘neoliberal’ purpose are seen as having 
justified access to that space. This once again focuses on their productive capacities 
within these spaces. Those that are not there for productive reasons are seen as 
problematic: ‘[s]trangers are suspicious because they ‘have no purpose’, that is they 
have no legitimate function within the space which could justify their existence or 
intrusion. Strangers are hence recognisable precisely insofar as they do not enter into the 
exchanges of capital that transforms spaces into places […] You can recognise a stranger 
through their loitering gait: strangers loiter, they do not enter the legitimate exchanges 
of capital that might justify their presence’ (Ahmed 2000, 31, emphasis original). Thus 
those that fall into categories that are considered either not to advance the circulation 
of capital, or even worse, to impede it, are seen as both undesirable and problematic 
where as those who are seen to exemplify the opposite traits are encouraged: ‘[t]he 
cosmopolitan, if urbane, culturally dextrous, articulate, light footed, and well 
connected, is largely left alone to contribute to the multicultural nation as doctor, 
nurse, engineer, teacher, waiter or knowledge worker.’ (Amin 2012, 103). 
Furthermore concessions are made by individuals and governments to allow those 
who exemplify these neoliberal virtues to have access to these spaces. 
These perceptions of the legitimate and illegitimate access to spaces have significant 
consequences for our notions of citizenship. As Ong clearly articulates in her book 
Neoliberalism as Exception: ‘[o]n the one hand, citizenship elements such as 
entitlements and benefits are increasingly associated with neoliberal criteria, so that 
mobile individuals who possess human capital or expertise are highly valued and can 
exercise citizenship-like claims in diverse locations. Meanwhile, citizens who are 
judged not to have such tradable competence or potential become devalued and thus 
vulnerable to exclusionary practices’ (2006a, 6–7). Away from the more traditional 
ideal of the equality of all citizens, the vocabulary and logic of neoliberalism has 
enforced qualitatively different perceptions of certain types of citizens and non-citizens 
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which have become embedded within the materialities of those spaces and the policies 
which are used to govern them. 
This is made even more explicit in the case of the airport, where we see how the 
corporate traveller is given priority or engaged in processes that facilitate their 
movement at the cost of others. Mobilities research shows the clear relationship 
between power and movement: ‘[i]n the airport, the corporeality of mobility – the way 
the body feels – interacts with categorisations of types – citizen, alien, tourist, business 
traveller, commuter’ (Cresswell 2006, 223). Here the ‘kinetic elite’ make use of the 
multiple available concessions that facilitate their movement that have emerged from 
the logic of these neoliberal schemes.  Even the use of the term ‘business class’ with 
regards to air travel is telling, and it has its origins in the late 1970s (Brancatelli 2012), 
the same period that is cited by many scholars as the rise of neoliberalism. Perhaps 
even more emblematic is the fact that many airlines are doing away with the labelling 
of ‘first class’ altogether, but are keeping the premium option under variations of the 
business class title, while introducing an interim class of premium economy 
(Garfinkel 2008). The ‘common sense’ of business class has come to obscure its 
subtler (neoliberal) meanings and its (contextual and historically constituted) nature. 
Yet the comparison that we need to be making here is not that between the fast and 
slow immigration lanes at the airport, or between business and economy class 
passengers. These individuals are already in an advantageous position of having made 
it past security and onto the plane. What this conception does not include is the 
passengers who fail to even make it past the check in counter; those ‘desperate 
passengers’ (C. Martin 2011, 1046) who may not be passengers but stowaways that 
ride – and die – within the landing gears of planes. These schemes come to be 
materialised in these diverse ways, and as such the ‘will of those whose precedence is 
assumed becomes embedded in the materiality of worlds […] The modifications 
required for spaces to be opened to other bodies are often registered as wilful 
impositions on those spaces. We learn from this: when wills become wordly, we do 
not recognise how the world has already adjusted to those wills’ (Ahmed 2014, 146–47, 
emphasis original). 
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Many of the points made above can be clearly illustrated by Grant in the extract that 
is presented below. Here in recounting the process by which he became a permanent 
resident, he illustrates just how pervasive these neoliberal influences are at both a 
systemic level and through his own understanding. Some of the clearer neoliberal 
influences have been highlighted in bold: 
With	the	working	holiday	visa,	you	can	work	for	a	company	for	six	months.	They	
said,	‘Look,	if	 it	goes	well	and	we	like	you	and	you	like	it,	then	we'll	sponsor	you	
on	 a	 457.’	 So	 I	 turned	 up	 on	 the	 working	 holiday	 visa,	 started	 work	 at	 [my	
company]	straight	away,	did	three	or	four	months,	and	everything	was	going	well.	
So	they	applied	to	make	the	457,	skilled	migrant	visa	for	four	years.	They	did	that,	
they	sponsored	me.	I	was	probably	on	that	for	about	18	months,	and	after	about	a	
year	or	so,	I	think	things	weren't	going	particularly	well	in	terms	of	the	economy,	
so	there	wasn't	much	in	the	way	of	salary	increases	available.	I	negotiated	that,	
instead	 of	 a	 salary	 increase,	 could	 we	 try	 and	 get	 through	 and	 pay	 for	 my	
permanent	 residency	 instead,	 because	 [my	 company]	 does	 it	 as	 a	 service	 to	
clients	 -	 they	 have	 an	 in-house	 team	who	 does	 it	 -	 so	 they	 sell	 that	 service	 to	
international	companies	who	are	bringing	over	people.	They've	got	an	in-house	
team,	so	it's	internal	costs,	so	although,	if	I	were	to	go	and	do	it	myself	externally,	
it'd	 cost	 about	 $7000	 -	 it	 would	 have	 lawyer's	 fees	 and	 what	 have	 you	 -	 but	
because	it	was	done	in-house,	they	gave	it	to	some	graduate	[chuckles]	to	practice	
on.	They	did	my	application,	I	signed	a	few	forms,	and	they	paid	for	that,	and	I	got	
my	permanent	residency.		
There are several points relating to the intersection of neoliberalism and citizenship 
that need to be highlighted that have emerged within this fragment alone. The most 
obvious of these is the existence of visa regimes that have developed in order to meet 
the ‘needs’ of businesses. The two initial visa types he mentions – those of Australia’s 
Working Holiday Visa Program, and the 457 Skilled Migrant Visa – both show how 
occupying certain neoliberal categories allow individuals greater ease of entry. If 
further evidence is needed for the different ways in which these different groups are 
valued, one need only look at the turn-around times for the different visa statuses, 
such as in the Australian context where 457 visas currently have an average 
turnaround time of a few months (DIBP 2016b), with some visas being processed in 
as little as three weeks (Walsh 2014, 590), while those who are applying externally on 
humanitarian grounds may have to wait a year (DIBP 2016a), and often much longer. 
These speeded up circuits for mobile individuals are something that has been 
illustrated clearly in the mobilities literature (Cresswell 2006), as well as in the context 
of citizenship (Ong 2006b). 
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Grant’s more personal considerations are also telling. His account focuses on the 
transactional: the relationships are highlighted in monetary terms and permanent 
residency in his case is something that is negotiated as part of a salary package. His 
explanation of the monetary equivalent – ‘it’d cost about $7000’ – reflects on just 
how obtaining permanent residency fits with the other calculative aspects of 
neoliberalism. We also see how this process – one which is largely based on speed, 
certainty and convenience – differs from many of those which were described in the 
Encountering Bureaucracy chapter; he has not had to encounter the state bureaucracy 
directly, but rather this whole process is done through the ‘graduate’ intermediary. 
The company that he works for has even taken over some of the roles of the state in 
processing and organising these applications, and while this is beyond the scope of 
this thesis, it serves to mention that this can strongly influence the nature of these 
encounters (Bloom 2015). Finally, a point needs to be made about what is missing: he 
makes no mention of the traditional notions of responsibility, of community, and of 
membership, which are often central to discourses around citizenship. Citizenship 
due to the vocabularies and logics of neoliberalism is changed, and these changes 
become embedded not only within these speech acts, but also as part of a whole range 
of situated material practices. 
While Grant’s recount provides us with a specific case, we cannot underestimate how 
this logic plays out at other diverse sites of citizenship, and in countless quotidian 
encounters. A significant number of my participants saw their primary (and in some 
cases only) contribution to the state in terms of taxation. Taxation was also a key 
aspect in their decision making around citizenship: Miranda clarifies that ‘between 
the two countries tax is a big, big question’. Louis explained how he renewed the 
passport which was ‘better value for money’ and Natalie and Steve saw the downside 
to dual citizenship as ‘having to pay twice for things’. One participant, Mathew, even 
made the distinction between himself and ‘that headline grabbing couple of hundred 
poor people’. Thus neoliberal logic in the context of citizenship plays out in a vast 
range of sites, from the types of visa schemes that are on offer, to the ways in which 
Neoliberalism, Nationalism and Encounters of Address 
	
186	
individuals see their contribution to the state. The pervasiveness of these logics and 
vocabularies in the context of citizenship cannot be in doubt.  
 Citizenship for Sale 
‘[w]ealthy	 clients	 are	 very	 familiar	with	 financial	 planning,	with	 estate	 planning,	
with	 tax	planning,	but	are	 they	 familiar	with	 residency	and	citizenship	planning?	
[…]	 Ultimately,	 quality	 of	 life,	 education,	 mobility,	 security	 and	 tax	 [are	 the	
reasons	for	citizenship	planning][…]	In	this	international	and	global	world	that	we	
are	in,	these	are	the	tools	you	want’.	
				 			-	Eric	Major,	CEO	of	Henley	and	Partners,	(Henley	&	Partners	Ltd	2014)	
One of the most extreme indications of the impact of neoliberalism as a normative 
scheme and its vocabulary and logic has had on citizenship is the existence of 
companies that offer ‘citizenship planning’, which is a process by which they broker 
the sale of citizenship. There are several businesses that offer these services, all of 
which have a target market of High Net Worth Individuals; they do not work with a 
single country, instead they offer various ‘packages’ and consult on particular needs. 
Henley & Partners was the first company to offer these services in a comprehensive 
way, but more recently we have seen the emergence of competing firms such as Arton 
Capital and CS Global Partners. The services offered by lawyers and others to smooth 
the process towards citizenship have existed in various forms in the past, however the 
novelty of these companies comes not from their role with regards to facilitating a 
specific process in a certain country, but rather their offering of a smorgasbord of 
diverse packages which have largely been disintermediated the cultural and 
geographical context of that particular citizenship. In short where pre-existing 
examples of ‘citizenship assistance’ helped with a particular process; ‘citizenship 
planning’ companies are selling a ‘lifestyle’, and providing clients with diverse 
packages for countries all over the world. Furthermore, these companies also offer 
their services to states to help them better ‘monetise’ their citizenship. 
What is perhaps most fascinating about these companies is less their specific services 
and more the ways in which they have gone about commodifying citizenship. In doing 
so, they have disrupted the conventional notions of what citizenship is for and what it 
entails. This is done in part through their creation of fact-sheets, figures and indices: 
Arton Capital publishes the Passport Index, ranking the strength of various passports 
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with regard to how many countries they provide visa free access to, while also allowing 
dual and multiple citizens the opportunity to obtain a score for their multiple statuses 
(Arton Capital 2016); Henley & Partners have their QNI (Quality of Nationality 
Index), which evaluates each country as based on various criteria, such as ease of travel 
or the ‘external value of the nationality’ (Henley & Partners 2016); CS Global 
Partners produce ‘fact-sheets’ for the various countries through which the citizenship 
regimes are outlined on the basis of different criteria (CS Global Partners 2016). The 
uses of information within these schemes – the visualisations, ranking systems, and 
different means of scoring – establishes citizenship as a comparative ‘product’ and 
creates competition between the different ‘options’ or ‘packages’ offering the buyer 
those very choices which are so inherent within the logic of neoliberalism. However in 
doing so, they have managed to strip citizenship of much of its historical and cultural 
specificity, which stands in direct contrast to earlier conceptions.  
This elimination of the cultural contents of citizenship, is also present in visual form: 
CS Global Partners in a short explanatory video on their website open with an image 
of a non-descript passport with exotic pictures and text overlaid inside it. It 
comments: ‘[t]here is a little book that can make a big change to your life. Enabling 
you to enjoy greater freedom, increased security, mobility, and to make the most of a 
world of opportunities. Start a new chapter in the story of your life, with help from 
the experts in second citizenship’. Before finishing, this image of the black 
nondescript passport – without any reference to a particular state – is shown again 
once more (CS Global Partners 2016). The absence of identifying content in and on 
the document is quite telling, and is perhaps a clear indication as to this shift in 
conceptions of citizenship, where the cultural and community elements have lost their 
primacy due to more neoliberal concerns. This commodification of citizenship – 
stripped of its notions of equality and membership – has become something that can 
be materialised on a factsheet and can be presented against others using colourful 
diagrams and numeric ranking systems. 
There is also a certain irony that these businesses are expanding at the same time that 
the very same states are putting up barriers to refugee settlement. One such example is 
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Austria which has worked hard to obstruct the arrival of refugees (Politi and 
Ghiglione 2016), and yet offer substantial citizenship by investment schemes (Henley 
& Partners Ltd 2016). It then becomes evident that the issue is not just accepting 
others within the nation, but being accepted depends on who that individual is and 
where they sit within these normative schemes. In the aforementioned promotional 
video for Henley & Partners, two clients, Drs Dale and Mary Chappell, express their 
views about these services while seated comfortably on a beach in St Barts in resort 
wear. They comment: ‘[i]t is the ability to live where you want, to travel where you 
want, raise your kids where you want and not subject your family to the fate of where 
you happen to be born; you actually get to choose’ (Henley & Partners Ltd 2014, 
emphasis added).  However, these are not choices that are available to everyone; as 
Ong suggests ‘[n]eoliberal calculations are introduced as exceptions to the prevailing 
political system, separating some groups for special attention’ (2007, 6). Those who 
occupy privileged positions within these normative schemes have the luxury of choice. 
 Interlude: Mathew and Greta  
There are countless examples of the ways in which this neoliberal vocabulary plays out 
at a whole range of levels from institutions and their policies, right down to the ways 
in which individuals understand their own experiences and construct their own 
narratives. The following interlude is taken from Mathew and his wife Greta, who are 
recent Australian Citizens, and Canadian Citizens in their 50s. Here, in explaining 
their story we see the impact that neoliberal logics and vocabularies have made. In 
both this interlude and the one that follows I have included some of the more 
contextual elements of the encounter to better introduce the participants. 
----- 
I arrived at the address that I was given, and was overwhelmed by the property’s 
stunning position overlooking the harbour. This was a very well-to-do neighbourhood, 
and I carefully parked my conspicuously old vehicle between a BMW and a Lexus. I 
was a few minutes late in making it inside, as the gated complex in which they lived 
  Chapter Seven 
	
189	
required three different doors be passed through before you entered their home. 
Having never met Mathew and Greta prior, I had no idea what to expect 
Once I arrived, Greta warmly invited me inside we sat at the kitchen bench; she 
apologised for the fact that her husband had yet to arrive and offered me a cup of tea. 
Next to me on the table sat her purse and through our short conversation across the 
bench I could see her glancing at it. I gathered her dilemma: to move it to a safe place, 
would be rude, yet, likely in her mind at least, leaving it there may be risky. She solved 
the dilemma by directing me to the vast dining table, and picked up her wallet and 
put it in a kitchen drawer as we moved places. 
Shortly after we were seated across the grand dining table, her husband joined us; he 
had been out playing golf, and had taken longer than expected. Following more initial 
pleasantries we began the interview. Mathew was dominant from the start, forthright 
with his opinions. He lectured more than spoke, and commented expansively, and 
needed comparatively little prompting from the questions. While his assertive speech 
meant less work for me as an interviewer, the way in which he interrupted his wife, 
‘corrected’ her and dominated the conversation began to raise my ire. After a more 
general introduction, he continued with his narrative:  
Mathew:	 I	was	 transferred	 from	Switzerland,	 so	 I	was	Canadian	working	 in	 that	
office	in	Switzerland.	Job	came	up	here,	so	I	was	an	expat	they	transferred	in,	so	it	
was	fairly	–	it	looked	for	us,	it	was	relatively	simple.	Paperwork	is	handled	by	the	
organization	so	the	visas	and	everything,	you	provide	them	with	all	the	necessary	
information.	 […]	 I	 can't	 remember	 the	 length	 of	 time	 for	 the	 visa,	 but	 it	 was	 a	
fairly	quick	process	compared	to	some	places.	It	was	maybe	two	months	or	so	for	
the	visa,	and	in	order	to	get	it	all	cleared.	So	it	was	basically	paper	work,	doctor,	
but	because	the	organisation	has	–	we	employ	a	third-party	to	do	that,	you	simply	
give	them	the	papers	and	they	provide	all	the	457	data.	
Greta:	We	spoke	to	these	migration	people,	and	they	gave	us	advice.	
Mathew:	We	went	to	two	migration	companies.	I	went	to	the	one	that	Fritz	told	
me	to	go	to.	
Greta:	Yes,	but	 they	didn't	give	us	much	advice.	 It	was	the	 lady	that	NASA	uses,	
she	was	the	one	that–	our	source	of	information	frankly	that	we	use.	
Mathew:	 I	got	a	fair	amount	from	the	other	guy	but	you	were	–	 I	went	to	 lunch	
with	him,	we	had	a	 long	discussion.	But	 the	other	 thing	 that	was	 really	obvious	
was	that	the	evolution	of	the	law	was	changing	pretty	progressively.	I	think	it	was	
almost	 like	 quarterly	 there	 was	 another	 announcement,	 so	 I	 think	 after	 the	
Federal	Government	announced	that	there	was	a	significant	restriction	on	–	they	
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restricted	the	number	of	categories	that	they	were	considering.	That	I	believe	the	
locals	 states,	 said,	 ‘Well	 bugger	 you,	 this	 doesn't	 fit	 our	 needs.’	 So	 now	 they've	
created	 a	 separate	 series	 of–	 we	 need	 more	 bricklayers	 and	 we	 need	 more	
teachers	 in	 Perth	 than	maybe	 the	 Federal	 Government	 thinks	 we	 need,	 so	 will	
then	start	to	create	opportunities	for	people	under	those	particular	circumstances	
to	come	down	here,	so	the	states	have	done	their	own	—	So	a	guy	said	you	look,	
you	 can	–	 I've	a	guy	–	we	have	a	guy	here	 from	 Italy,	 a	businessman	 from	 Italy	
applying	under	the	business	–	because	I	looked	under	also	the	business	application	
when	I	started	business	and	it	was	fairly	–	you	had	to	have	fair	amount	of	money.	
Greta:	And	plus	it	had	to	make	up,	you	had	to	be	a	growing	concern,	and	you	had	
to	take	on	take	on	a	certain	number	of	employees,	wasn't	it?	
Mathew:	Yes	a	number	of	employees,	so	he's	going	through	that	right	now,	and	
incidentally	he's	been	accepted	by	Queensland.	
Anna:	Really?	
Mathew:	He's	been	accepted	by	the	state	of	Queensland	and	he's	applying	to	the	
state	of	Perth?	
Anna:	WA	[Western	Australia]?	
Mathew:	 WA,	 yeah,	 so	 he's	 applied.	 Queensland	 has	 accepted	 him,	 he's	 still	
waiting	to	see	if	he'll	be	accepted	in	WA.	They'll	sponsor.		
Greta:	The	State	will	sponsor	him?	
Mathew:	Effectively,	 the	state	says,	 ‘I	give	you	permission	and	will	 sponsor	you.	
We	will	give	you	permission	to	open	your	business	here.	Therefore,	that	qualifies	
you	for	the	Federal	[visa].’	So	it's	a	fairly	–	basically,	I	think	the	Federal	policy	was	
–	what	 I	 can	see	of	 it,	was	 fairly	 ineffective	 for	 those	areas	of	high	employment	
needs,	so	you've	got	[Gina]	Rinehart	standing	up,	saying,	 ‘I	need	25,000	workers	
here.	You	guys	are	out	of	touch	with	reality.	I'm	going	to	get	on	a	plane,	so	bingo’.	
So,	 you've	 a	 got	 fair	 amount	 of—power	 […]	 the	 Government's	 methodology	 is	
much	more	based	on	employment.	[…]	It	was	extremely	–	for	the	process,	it	was	a	
relatively	 easy	 process	 for	 us	 from	 the	 standpoint	 of	 a	 –	 from	 the	 point	 of	
agreeing	with	the	organisation	to	the	point	of	getting	the	PR.	That	was	a	relatively	
simple	process	-	expensive,	but	simple.	The	part	leading	into	that	negotiating	with	
the	company	was	extremely	difficult.	So	the	part	-	that	the	view	the	organization	a	
major	 international,	 you	 would	 think,	 would	 be	 much	 more	 open.	 It	 was	
extremely	close	door.	Not	interested….	the	consultant	that	I	spoke	to	just	looked	
at	me	and	said,	‘Get	a	sponsor,	it's	done	and	dusted.’	He	was	just	very	fair	about	
that,	he	said,	‘You	are	in	the	ideal	situation.	You	get	your	company	to	sign.’	and	I	
kept	the	letter.	It's	a	one	and	a	half	line	letter.	So	you	have	to	look	at	it,	because	
the	other	overriding	thing	for	me	is	that	although	I'm	an	Australian	citizen	from	an	
employment	 standpoint,	 I'm	 an	 International	 expat.	 There's	 a	 number	 of	
implications	 on	 how	 I'm	 compensated–	 my	 benefit	 plan,	 basically	 pension	 and	
things	 like	 that	 are	 still	 actually	 linked	 to	my	 domestic	 country,	 those	 types	 of	
considerations	would	have	to	go	on	the	table.	Because	you'd	say,	‘Well,	you'd	give	
this	up,	don't	I	give	all	this	and	this	up?’	Because	honestly	to	give	up	–	just	to	give	
up	the	457	visa	was	a	decision	as	well.	There	was	a	significant	financial	factor.	 It	
was	 a	 fairly	 substantial	 financial	 impact	 us.	 I	 don't	 know,	 it's...	 It's	 all	 those-	 it's	
pretty	 difficult	 to	 make	 a	 distinct	 –	 or	 make	 a	 clean-cut	 one	 way	 or	 the	 other	
because	again	–	There	are	so	many	laws	that	apply	under	different	circumstances.	
It's	not	 so	clean,	you	know?	But	 it's	not	an	emotional	 issue.	 I	 think	 that	 the	key	
thing	is	–	
  Chapter Seven 
	
191	
Greta:	For	me,	it'd	be	emotional,	for	you,	it'd	be	financial.			
Mathew:	Well,	I'm	saying	finance	–	the	financial	would	enter	into	it.	I'm	not	saying	
it's	 the	 only	 thing,	 I'm	 saying	 you	 just	 got	 to	 make	 sure	 that	 what	 you	 sign,	
something	that	says	‘your	bill	and	go	boy’,	I	didn't	expect	that	[laughter].	I'm	not	
22	years	old	here,	I've	worked	for	44	years.	
––––- 
While other aspects may be focused on, this brief analysis will consider the allusions 
in this fragment to the normative scheme of neoliberalism. Firstly, this text, and 
especially Mathew’s responses bear considerable similarities with Grant’s explanation 
that was presented earlier; it highlights the transactional nature of this process, which 
ignores notions of membership and community. Mathew explains how there was a 
‘significant financial factor’ in making the decision to undertake this process. He even 
makes reference to his exceptionality as an ‘expat’:  ‘although I'm an Australian citizen 
from an employment standpoint, I'm an international expat’. His adherence to this 
notion of expat – and it is mentioned several times over by Mathew – shows both its 
value more generally and the connection that he feels with the term, but also, its 
enormous influence. Furthermore, unlike many other participants Mathew explains 
that he was in no rush to become a citizen. This speaks to the fact that ‘[e]xpatriate 
talents constitute a form of movable entitlement without formal citizenship’ (Ong 
2006a, 16). Finally, in referring to his acquaintance, Mathew feels compelled not only 
to clarify that he is from Italy – which will be the subject of the next section of this 
chapter – but also that he is not just a ‘guy’ but a ‘businessman’, further evidence of the 
normative scheme of neoliberalism at play. 
What is keenly evident within this text is the how enabled both Greta and Mathew are 
with regards to this process. They face very few constraints: they see numerous 
consultants for assistance – even mentioning the reference to NASA, as a not so 
subtle reference to their standing. They are aware of the concessions that their 
position within these neoliberal schemes make: they explain how the threat of 
financial ‘flight’ can compel governments to give into individual demands (‘I’m going 
to get on a plane, so bingo’) and suggests the position of privilege of these individuals 
because of it (‘you’ve a got fair amount of power’). They are aware that they are 
privileged (‘You are in the ideal situation. You get your company to sign.’), and use it 
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to their advantage. The position that they occupy within these schemes is enabled, 
and there is a very active sense of agency within their account. 
 Vocabularies of Place: Nationalism as a ‘Normative 
Scheme of Intelligibility’ 
In many of the fieldwork encounters discussions of the nation and questions of 
nationality came up repeatedly, but it was Kaori who addressed it most explicitly. She 
explained:  
Kaori:	 I	mean	two	people	can	be	the	same,	but	coming	 from	different	countries	
changes	 their	 situation	and	 this	 can	even	 change	 the	way	 that	 they	act	 and	 the	
way	that	others	act	towards	them.	I	have	this	feeling,	I	mean	with	the	way	I	look	
now,	 if	 I	 went	 around,	 and	 just	 as	 a	 joke,	 started	 to	 declare	 that	 I	 was	 from	
somewhere	 else;	 that	 I	 was	 Japanese,	 or	 Filipino,	 or	 Korean,	 I	 feel	 that	 people	
would	act	differently	when	 they	 found	out	where	 I	 came	 from.	So	 isn’t	 in	 some	
ways	 the	 first	 judgement	 or	 assessment	 we	 have	 on	 a	 person	 based	 on	 this	
identity?	 From	 where	 they	 are	 from?	 Of	 course,	 this	 doesn’t	 mean	 that	 when	
someone	finds	out	where	you	are	from	they	treat	you	in	the	same	way	that	they	
treat	everyone	from	that	country,	but	it	certainly	is	informing	in	some	form.	
Anna:	So	it	is	a	reason	for	people	to	treat	you	differently?	
Kaori:	I	can’t	explain,	sometimes	we	are	so	simple	its	easy,	other	times	we	are	so	
complex	 that	 we	 don’t	 have	 a	 hope	 of	 understanding	 things.	 But	 to	 make	 this	
understanding	easier	people	tend	to	categorise	you	on	the	basis	of	where	you	are	
from.	 It	 is	 just	 one	 of	 the	 ways	 that	 we	 try	 to	 simplify	 things	 in	 order	 to	
understand	 the	 person	 in	 front	 of	 us.	 They	 say,	 ‘Oh!	 You	 are	 Japanese’,	 the	
Japanese	are	this	and	that,	and	they	do	this	and	that.	They	have	this	idea,	but	it	is	
this	 stereotyped	 image,	 but	 it	 isn’t	 real.	One	of	 the	 first	 images	 people	 have	 of	
you,	especially	when	identity	cards	are	concerned	comes	from	the	nationality	that	
you	declare,	but	in	some	way,	every	individual	has	these	stereotyped	images	of…	
the	country	let’s	say.		
Here, Kaori articulates how the national vocabulary is central to the ways in which we 
understand people: ‘isn’t in some ways the first judgement or assessment that we have 
of a person based on this identity? Where they are from?’. As her comment suggests, 
one of the key ways in which we understand others in everyday encounters is by 
‘actively territorialising our identities’ (Malkki 1992, 31) – something that Liisa 
Malkki calls a ‘sedenterist metaphysic’ (1992, 31) – where the reference points 
through which we comprehend those spaces and the people in them are embedded 
within a national vocabulary. We understand the world and those in it through the 
use of national vocabularies, and through the logic of nationalism. 
  Chapter Seven 
	
193	
Nationalism, and the vocabulary that accompanies it is incredibly pervasive: ‘notions 
of nationhood are deeply embedded in contemporary ways of thinking […] 
nationalism has seeped into the corners of our consciousness; it is present in the very 
words that we may use for analysis […] the powers of an ideology which is so familiar 
that it hardly seems noticeable’  (Billig 1995, 11–12). Currently the world is divided 
up into discrete nation states, and as a result we find ourselves subject to ‘the 
Westphalian ideal of a system of interlocking nation states that traverse the globe, 
implying that the experience of not being under any state’s authority and protection is 
both absurd in theory and unusual in practice’ (Gill 2010, 626). These national 
designators refer not only to particular places, but individuals who ‘originate’ from 
them and the languages that are spoken there. As a section of Chapter Five has 
reinforced, these terms and their symbolic likenesses are found on paperwork, identity 
documents and in countless material forms, and yet their ordinariness and their fluid 
and contrived nature often gets overlooked. As such we can see this as a ‘reflection of 
the success of the state to present itself as a universal political and social reality, a form 
of disinterested domination that is set apart from other political and social practices’ 
(Jeffrey 2012, 22). 
There is a certain irony that as the more mobile people become and the more likely 
they are to be living further away from their place of birth, the more forcibly these 
territorialised identities are held to. In order to understand these increasingly mixed 
populations there is a growing ‘rel[iance] on the spatialisation of identities, the 
relationship between the territorialisation of identity, [and] the territorialisation of 
power’ (Bell 1999, 23). The new technologies of globalisation have further reinforced 
the use of this national vocabulary with which to understand the world, and these 
naming practices are both in part due to the ways in which states attempt to reinforce 
these identities as well as a result of the wider governance structures. Citizenship too, 
uses these national and spatial designators for its naming practices; the territorialised 
identity, and the convenient national vocabulary is the central means by which we 
seek to understand individuals. 
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From the earliest days of our schooling we are shown maps and atlases that illustrate 
clearly – often in bright colours – the national segmentation of the world: ‘[t]he world 
of nations is thus conceived as a discrete spatial partitioning of territory; it is 
territorialised in the segmentary fashion of the modern school atlas’ (Malkki 1992, 
26). And while the map is only one of the many material technologies which enforce 
the national vocabulary, it provides a very clear image of the way individuals 
understand the world and those within it: divided into discrete groups. Benedict 
Anderson explains in his much cited text Imagined Communities how maps aided in the 
foundation of these national communities: ‘European-style maps worked on the basis 
of a totalizing classification’ ([1983] 2006, 173) furthermore, the ‘map and the census 
[…] shaped the grammar which would in due course make possible ‘Burma’ and 
‘Burmese’, ‘Indonesia’ and ‘Indonesians’ (Benedict Anderson [1983] 2006, 185). We 
moved towards a vision of the world where ‘[a] man must have a nationality as he 
must have a nose and two ears; a deficiency in any of these particulars is not 
inconceivable, and does from time to time occur, but only as a result of some disaster, 
and it is itself a disaster of some kind’ (Gellner 2006, 6).  In addition, there are 
countless material ways in which these vocabularies are reinforced, whether it be 
through sporting teams, what is written on the outside of our passports, or even 
articulated within our notions of multiculturalism where the foods, and costumes and 
music and stalls are all indicated as coming from conveniently and nationally labelled 
locations. However, it is the political world map – a material technology which we use 
to understand the world – that is most clearly indicative of the distinct borders that 
we assign to places and how the normative scheme of nationalism fits people and 
things into national spaces.  
These normative schemes also go some way to obscure the incredible diversity that 
exists within these national spaces. As Deleuze and Guattari explain: ‘[t]he State […] is 
a phenomenon of intraconsistency. It makes points resonate together, points that are not 
necessarily already town-poles but very diverse points of order, geographic, ethnic, 
linguistic, moral, economic, technological particularities. It makes the town resonate 
with the countryside. It operates by stratification; in other words, it forms a vertical, 
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hierarchized aggregate that spans the horizontal lines in a dimension of depth. In 
retaining given elements, it necessarily cuts off their relations with other elements, 
which become exterior, it inhibits, slows down, or controls those relations’ (1987, 
433, emphasis original). Here these forms of address render countless examples of 
internal diversity invisible; these hidden elements may include the differences 
between rural and urban populations, regional differences, differences of language or 
dialect, differences in customs or worldviews, and of age and generation and social 
class. As a result of this national vocabulary the differences between individuals within 
the nation-state are concealed. 
National vocabularies also obscure the qualitatively different ways diverse individuals 
are situated within these vocabularies: ‘[o]ne of the most sociologically unhelpful 
aspects of the usage of the formal conception of citizenship to refer to national 
belonging is that the either (a national)/ or (not) logic it embodies, and which is 
uncritically taken on board by many analysts, does not allow us to capture the 
subtleties of the differential modalities of national belonging, as they are experienced 
within society’ (Hage 2000, 51, emphasis original). In this formulation Hage evokes 
the notion of cultural capital, Bourdieu’s well known concept (1986), but explains 
how it is interpreted within a national field. As Hage explains, this national 
vocabulary obscures the diverse ways in which individuals fluidly inhabit these spaces. 
This also further reinforces the efforts this thesis has made to step away from the 
binaries associated with the dichotomous ‘us’ and ‘them’ categorisations, as explained 
in greater depth in Chapter Three. 
How can we account for the circulation of this vocabulary and logic? Just as Benedict 
Anderson claimed that spread of nationalism was a result of print capitalism ([1983] 
2006), these vocabularies circulate in a similar ways through both material 
technologies and everyday speech. Finally, and perhaps most effectively, these are 
circulated and reinforced through modes of address: ‘‘we’ are constantly reminded 
that ‘we’ live in nations: ‘our’ identity is constantly being flagged’ (Billig 1995, 93). 
One may even make the claim that the clearest evidence of the success of a normative 
scheme is precisely the universality of its vocabulary as a mode of address as will be 
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developed in the final parts of this chapter. Even those who do not fit comfortably 
into one of these categories are often presented with hyphenated identities – such as 
Greek-Australian – which reinforce the essentialism evident in national designators, 
even when these individuals may differ from both the national categories that this 
name suggests (Tsalapatanis 2011). 
Even academic research reinforces these notions of the national. It is not uncommon 
for studies to provide national comparisons or for research to come out of national 
institutions. This ‘methodological nationalism’ (Wimmer and Schiller 2003) ensures 
that economic figures are calculated based on ‘national’ expenditure and the average 
income of nationals are compared to the average income of nationals from other 
nations. It is also central to the ways in which we recognise others. People often speak 
of a ‘Chinese’ friend or an ‘Italian’ colleague, as if without the essentialist national 
identifier the individual just would not make sense: ‘‘national identity’ is short-hand 
for a whole series of familiar assumptions about nationhood, the world and ‘our’ 
place in that world’ (Billig 1995, 93). These terms also serve more practical ends even 
in a more everyday sense. As Ghassan Hage suggests: ‘popular racist categorisations 
are not out to explain ‘others’ for the sake of explaining them. They are not motivated 
by some academic yearning to knowledge. They are categories of everyday practice, 
produced to make practical sense of, and to interact with, the world’ (2000, 31). 
 Hierarchies of Nationality: Being in Place and Being Out 
of Place 
As a guide for a reputable bus touring company, Adam has had the opportunity to 
meet people from all over the world, and has also seen them safely across numerous 
national borders. Furthermore, as someone who is a dual citizen, he has ‘put [his] 
citizenships to use’ over the last few years. From his experiences, he illustrates just one 
of the material ways in which hierarchies are both illustrated and embedded: 
There's	 instances	where	you	can	choose	which	one	you	want	 to	use,	depending	
on	which	one	is	more	accessible.	It's	more	a	question	of,	not	only	to	save	the	cost	
of	 your	 visa	 which	 would	 influence	 it,	 but	 also	 if	 you	 think	 it	 is–	 I	 do	 it	 too	
sometimes	when	 I	grab	everyone's	passports	 to	hand	 in,	 say,	 to	a	border	guard.	
Sometimes	they'll	just	ask	you,	instead	of–	they	see	it's	a	tourist	bus,	and	from	a	
reputable	company	that	they	know.	Sometimes	they	won't	come	on	the	bus	at	all	
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to	 check.	 They'll	 just	 ask	 you	 where	 the	 passengers	 are	 from.	 You	 say	 then,	
‘Australia	and	New	Zealand’–	well,	Europe	first,	then	Australia,	New	Zealand.	Then	
if	they	go,	‘Okay,	that's	fine’,	you	go.	Just	depending	on	the	countries	that	you	go	
to,	 you	might	 then	 leave	 off	 other	 countries	 until	 the	 end.	 And	 the	 same,	 you	
know	 as	 well,	 when	 they're	 doing	 the	 passports,	 you	 can	 see	 sometimes	 that	
certain	passports,	 they	 take	 longer	 to	 check,	 to	 stamp,	particularly	 if	 it's	 from	a	
country	that	is	not	as	well-known,	or	maybe	the	diplomatic	relationships	are	not	
as	well	established.	You	can	sometimes	see	that.	They'll	put	the	European	ones–	
sometimes	they	don't	even	get	scanned	or	stamped.	They	get	put	straight	away,	
or	 even	 handed	 back	 to	 you	 straight	 away.	 The	 Australian	 and	 New	 Zealand	
passports	are	done	 fairly	quickly,	 and	 then	 the	miscellaneous	are	 checked	more	
thoroughly.		
	
Here, Adam explains how in presenting passports at the border he organises them in a 
certain order. These are not simply equivalent but different documents, rather they 
are situated within a hierarchy, depending on the different nationality that appears on 
the front of them. Adam himself works within this system of value when he presents 
himself and his passengers at the border, starting his account with ‘Europe first, then 
Australia and New Zealand’ and ‘leav[ing] off other countries to the end’. This section 
will build on the arguments that have been made in the previous parts of this chapter 
to illustrate how – just like the vocabulary of neoliberalism – national vocabularies are 
far from neutral. These hierarchies emerge within countless daily encounters whether 
they be echoes of metrics such as Gross Domestic Product or development indices, 
colonial legacies, or simply through the vernacular hierarchies that are imbued within 
daily encounters and everyday speech. Furthermore, these vocabularies are saturated 
with notions of qualitative difference, where being associated with a certain national 
designator indicates certain traits or qualities that an individual or object may have.  
Nationalism is strongly intertwined with notions of the hierarchy of states which are 
the consequences of countless historical, geographical, and economic discernments. 
In addition, terms have emerged to categorise these states which further reinforces 
these hierarchies: ‘the common-sense sequence of ‘underdeveloped – developing – 
developed’ places ‘developing’ countries behind ‘developed’ ones, in some kind of 
historical queue, rather than just co existing in their differences’ (Massey 2013, 20) or 
as Hannah Arendt put it ‘[t]he third world is not a reality, but an ideology’ (1970, 21). 
This of course was not meant to detract from the diverse material conditions of 
different states, but rather to attest to the fact that that these differences come to us 
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full of relatively invisible ideological content, including obvious legacies of 
colonialism. While some states are conceived of within a negative light, others may 
even be unintelligible to certain individuals; the incomprehension with which many 
in the western world speak of ‘Africa’ as a whole while failing to understand not only 
the diversity within the nations, but the differences between the states themselves. So 
here, worse than having a bad name, is not being recognised at all: ‘sometimes these 
normative schemes work precisely through providing no image, no name, no 
narrative’ (Butler 2006, 146). 
These hierarchies also exist as qualitative judgements within everyday speech; as 
outlined in the previous chapter, participants spoke of good and bad passports, as 
they became associated with the cosmopolitan opportunities for work and travel. 
These ‘vernacular’ hierarchies indicate how this vocabulary comes embedded with 
different stereotypes, ‘histories of dislike’ and patterns of domination. Take the 
following excerpts from Miltos, a 30-something Greek-Australian, living in Athens: 
Miltos:	I	enjoy	saying	that	I	am	Greek-Australian,	but	I	think	it	makes	a	difference	
of	 where	 you	 come	 from	 and	 what	 people	 think	 about	 those	 places.	 I	 mean	
someone	 from	 Australia	 living	 in	 Greece	 and	 having	 a	 Greek	 passport,	 is	 more	
respected	 than….	 say	 being	 an	 Albanian	 and	 having	 an	 Albanian	 and	 Greek	
passport,	because	Greeks	and	Albanians	have	a	well…	you	know…	
Anna:	Yeah…	have	a	history.	
Miltos:	Yeah	certainly.	A	history	of	dislike.	
So, while he says he enjoys saying that he is Greek-Australian (because it is 
‘respected’), he is mindful of the fact, that had his dual citizenship come from 
elsewhere, such as Albania – a country that neighbours Greece and became infamous 
for mass-migration to Greece from the late 80s through to the 90s – the reception 
would not be as warm. So his willingness to identify with these terms relates to the 
context in which he is situated, but also the broader geopolitical circumstances: 
‘classifications emphasising ‘undesirability’ cannot be conceived independently of a 
national spatial background against which they acquire their meaning, it is equally 
true that they cannot be conceived without an idealised image of what this national 
spatial background ought to be like’ (Hage 2000, 38–39, emphasis original). This means 
that certain foreign ‘nationals’ are more welcome in the national space than others. In 
the Greek context this fits with an image of ‘Albanians’ as clandestine migrants, and 
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‘Australians’ as either tourists or former emigrants or children of emigrants turned 
national returnees. The ‘appeal’ of these particular types illustrates the importance of 
the intersection between these and other normative schemes, such as neoliberalism. 
The point is that these ‘categories’ within these normative schemes are not neutral. 
They are imbued with layers of meaning and expectations; they can be at times 
hierarchical and value laden. In addition, these modes of address are contextual – 
they are temporally and spatially situated. Thus, they may transform over time and we 
may be addressed very differently in the different spaces we inhabit. Words are never 
neutral, they carry with them connotations, associations and vast histories that differ 
between time and place. Furthermore, this vocabulary is not only one of national 
designators, where you name one and the interrogation ends; it is one of a world 
vision where certain nationalities possess certain innate skills. To illustrate this point 
consider the following well-known joke: 
Heaven	 is	 where	 the	 police	 are	 British,	 the	 cooks	 are	 French,	 the	
mechanics	 German,	 the	 lovers	 Italian	 and	 it's	 all	 organised	 by	 the	
Swiss.	 Hell	 is	 where	 the	 chefs	 are	 British,	 the	 mechanics	 French,	 the	
lovers	Swiss,	the	police	German	and	it's	all	organised	by	the	Italians.	
While humour of all sorts is strongly based on stereotype, the national stereotypes 
that exist here are embedded within popular imaginaries and become central to the 
ways in which people understand themselves and others within this nationalist frame: 
‘[s]ince belonging to an ethnic category implies being a certain kind of person, having 
that basic identity, it also implies a claim to be judged and to judge oneself, by those 
standards relative to that identity’ (Barth [1969] 1998, 14). This joke also speaks to 
how these ‘nationals’ are relationally constituted, but it also shows how national 
vocabularies do not just assign individuals to a place, but are also seen to reflect some 
of the capacities and traits of these individuals. Furthermore, those without these 
capacities or traits may have their account of belonging contested. 
The pervasiveness of the national vocabulary is further emphasised by personal traits 
that are explained in national terms. As Hage suggests: ‘[individuals] recognise 
themselves as more national than some people and less national than others’ (Hage 
2000, 52). This even occurs within family units, where siblings conceive of themselves 
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as being more or less of one nationality than the others. Take Eve’s comments below, 
both in relation to national stereotypes – she even admits just how much these 
stereotypes appeal to her – but also how she situates herself and her siblings: 
Eve:	 I	 think	 from	 primary	 school	 age,	 I	 really	 liked	 the	 idea	 that	 I	 had	 a	 Swiss	
passport	 and	 I	 think	 that	 had	more	 to	 do	with	 Switzerland's	 role	 in	 history,	 the	
way	that	it's	perceived	to	be	a	nation	that's	peaceful,	neutral,	and	all	that	jazz.	
Anna:	Good	banks	[laughter].	
Eve:	Yeah,	totally.	Great	cheese,	great	watches,	full	of	engineers.	
Anna:	Swiss	army	knives.	
Eve:	Mountains,	Alps	[chuckles].	
[…]		
Eve:	As	I've	grown	up,	and	I've	recognised	elements	of	my	identity	that	have	come	
through	from	dad	and	the	Swiss	culture,	I	think	identity	plays	more	of	a	role.	And	
then	 it	 becomes	 more	 balanced	 at	 the	 moment.	 [My	 sister]	 is	 probably	 more	
Indonesian	actually	than	she	is	Swiss	in	her	way	of	thinking	and	behaviour	and	so	
on,	 just	 by	 living	 over	 there	 for	 a	 little	 while.	 	Well	 and	 Switzerland	 for	 a	 little	
while.	I	think	it's	intrinsic	to	her.	Even	though	she's	living	in	Switzerland	now,	she	
lived	in	Switzerland	longer	than	she's	lived	in	Indonesia	-	if	you	were	we	to	count	
out	the	years	of	her	life.	I	think,	though,	the	way–	and	again	I	don't	know	whether	
or	 not	 I'm	 just	 allocating	 certain	 personality	 traits	 of	 hers	 to	 being	 more	
Indonesian.	Out	of	the	three	of	us,	I'd	say—[my	brother’s]	mind	is	really	logically-
ordered,	 so	 I'd	 say	 my	 mind	 and	 his	 mind	 are	 quite	 similar	 but	 it	 seems	 a	 bit	
disrespectful	to	say	that	I'd	attribute	that	to	the	Swiss.	
While individuals that do not fit into these expected forms may find their position 
within the state contested, it also creates expectations around certain predispositions 
and traits that an individual might have, or as Miller puts it ‘[c]ategories create 
assumptions’ (Miller 2013, 4).32 
 Border Imperialism and the Consequences of Categories 
Through this national vocabulary there is a not so subtle built-in logic that these 
nationally-defined individuals belong in their corresponding nation states. The 
consequence of which is a far more sinister corollary: those that identify with, or are 
identified with, another national category do not belong in these places. Yet, once 
again, the consequences of these schemes are not solely linguistic, ‘[t]he powerful 
metaphoric practices that so commonly link people to place are also deployed to 
understand and act upon the categorically aberrant condition of people whose claims 
on, and ties to, national soils are regarded as tenuous, spurious or non-existent’ 
(Malkki 1992, 27). Inherent in national vocabularies and logics is the idea that those 
																																								 																				
32 Here one can perhaps make a link between the ways in which ‘national’ traits are seen as hereditary and 
the emphasis that is placed on the bestowal of citizenship by birth as outlined in Chapter Three.  
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who are not of the nation have a contested role within that national space, and thus 
these individuals become subject to diverse forms of exclusion, including ‘border 
imperialism’ which will be addressed in greater detail later in this chapter. 
The fact that both people and place are conceived of in the same (national) terms 
suggests that it requires no great stretch of the imagination to come to a conclusion 
about who has rights to those spaces. In this way, citizenship and nationalism 
empower certain individuals – those who are identified as ‘belonging’ to those spaces 
– while disempowering others through these schemes. Thus: ‘lived experiences of 
otherness are shaped by imaginings about who is entitled to protection from the 
nation-state because they represent the national identity, and who faces violence by the 
nation-state because their bodies are deemed not to belong’ (Walia 2013, 63, 
emphasis original). Furthermore, the normative scheme of nationalism also allows 
citizens/nationals to conceive of themselves as being within a particular position of 
power and thus of agency: ‘the person who deploys his or her hand on the scarf [of a 
Muslim woman to remove it] is clearly someone who believes that they have the right 
to manage the space of the nation in this way’ (Hage 2000, 47). Nationalism is a 
normative scheme which not only links people to (certain) places, but also gives 
authoritative weight to certain individuals’ forms of address, and subsequently their 
actions.  
The problem with some examples of research on racism, is that it often fails to give 
enough weight to the context of nationalism. Questions of racism are not simply 
about race, but rather about the conception of what national spaces should look like 
and who has a right to them:  ‘[a]s soon as I begin to worry about where ‘they’ are 
located, or about the existence of ‘too many’, I am beginning to worry not just about 
my ‘race’, ‘ethnicity’, ‘culture’ or ‘people’, but also about what I consider a privileged 
relationship between my race, ethnicity and so on and a territory. My motivation 
becomes far more national than racial, even if I have a racial conception of the 
territory […] such practices are better conceived of as nationalist practices than racist 
practices, even if racist modes of thinking are deployed within them’ (Hage 2000, 32). 
While one cannot deny the racist categorisations within these actions, it is often how 
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these racial taxonomies fit within these national schemes, which is at least in part 
responsible for the presence of racist speech and acts. 
As a result of these normative schemes of intelligibility, we have few opportunities to 
dictate the categories that we fall into and have even less power to dictate the content 
of those categories which exist beyond us. While one may be a citizen of a certain 
country, race is one of the ways in which people come to occupy a contested 
categorisation within that space. Of this there are countless examples, such as those 
from Andall’s study of black second generation youth in Milan where ‘being black 
and Italian were seen as mutually exclusive categories […] people encountered disbelief 
that [these youths] could be both black and Italian’ (2002, 400) or as expressed 
through Ong’s work: ‘[b]ecause there is dissonance between their personal features 
and their possession of cultural capital – for example, an apparently Asian subject 
who speaks fluent Dutch – such individuals may be judged culturally incompetent’ 
(1999, 91). These forms of racial coding, despite efforts to the contrary, not only exist, 
but maintain their othering roles as ‘coding habits from the past are deeply etched 
into the institutional and social unconscious’ (Amin 2012, 88). Furthermore, as Hage 
suggests: ‘[n]o matter how much national capital a ‘third world looking’ migrant 
accumulates, the fact that he or she has acquired it, rather than being born with it 
devalues what he or she possesses compared to the ‘essence’ possessed by the national 
aristocracy’ (Hage 2000, 62). Thus the exclusion of these individuals, or their 
assignation as not belonging, is driven more by active processes of their being 
identified as other instead of just simple incomprehension: ‘we recognise someone as 
a stranger, rather than simply failing to recognise them […] Strangers are not simply 
those who are not known in this dwelling, but those who are, in their very proximity, 
already recognised as not belonging, as being out of place’ (Ahmed 2000, 21, emphasis 
original). 
Yet one must be careful not to apply too determinist an analysis of the role of race. 
There is an incredible diversity within these interactions, while the schemes may have 
the function of dictating who does and does not belong, this becomes operationalised 
differently, and these individuals are subject to diverse encounters: ‘[t]he harms of 
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race are never the same in time and space, and, in general, the variability has been 
considered the product of the situation, of the swirl of forces at any conjecture’ (Amin 
2012, 87). One also needs to be aware of the ways in which certain racial 
categorisations may actually work as an advantage, as Cabot suggest: ‘informal 
classification categories […] both enable and restrict access’ (2012, 15). 
This understanding of nations and nationals creates a scheme in which certain 
individuals who live within the nation state are constructed in ways which make them 
not just out of place, but ‘undesirable’, and this often comes as a result not just of 
nationalism, but of the intersection of these schemes: ‘circulations of capital and 
labour stratifications in the global economy, narratives of empire, hierarchies of race, 
class, and gender within state building, all operate in tandem to lay the foundations of 
border imperialism’ (Walia 2013, 39). Thus regardless of whether it is a neoliberal or 
a national scheme ‘mobility is still framed within a moral geography of place’ 
(Cresswell 2006, 37), and thus the very same movement may be seen as either 
desirable or undesirable depending on who this movement is undertaken by and their 
context. 
Border Imperialism is a means by which we may better understand how these forms of 
categorisation function in terms of allowing individuals access to spaces: ‘[w]hether 
through military checkpoints, gated communities in gentrified neighbourhoods, 
secured corporate boardrooms, or gendered bathrooms, bordering practices delineate 
zones of access, inclusion, and privilege from zones of invisibility, exclusion and 
death’ (Walia 2013, 9), but also conceives of how, even if entry into these spaces is 
obtained, they are encountered in very different ways: ‘[w]ithin border imperialism, 
migrant and undocumented workers are included in the state in a deliberately limited 
way creating a two-tier hierarchy of citizenship’ (Walia 2013, 72). Extending this, one 
can  understand how these schemes come to create both internal and external 
exclusion: ‘[citizenship] is the cold instrument of exclusion to those outside its 
borders, both internal borders based on race and gender exclusion, as well as nation 
state ones base on xenophobia and nationalism’ (Somers 2008, 5) 
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Finally, we need to be careful in considering these normative schemes that we do not 
strip individuals of agency. Just because one may occupy a very difficult and marginal 
position within these regimes does not mean that they are incapable of action. They 
are constrained by their circumstances yet they also act in ways to make their lives 
liveable within these conditions and may defy these schemes: ‘[e]very time an 
undocumented mother walks into a school to enrol her child, it is an act of resistance 
and defiance’ (Walia 2013, 281). As Cabot explains: ‘individuals attempt to make 
tolerable lives within a set of conditions and constraints’ (2012, 24). 
 Interlude: Paheer 
In Paheer’s story, we see the result of his multiple encounters – with bureaucrats 
(‘they don’t want to give me the papers’), with the police (‘I go in there and know that 
I have to wait. I try to think of it as my house’), and with the ‘Greeks’ (‘It is very 
difficult in the economic world, and they [the Greeks] don’t like the Indian men’) – 
has helped him to make sense of himself and his situation, but also of the broader 
schemes of governance and their vocabularies (‘I don’t plan to stay here, not at all, I 
want to go to Canada. One time I tried, but the police caught me so I stayed here to 
work, and I am waiting for my papers […] I will try after three years or so to go to 
Canada). It suggests a very different vocabulary and mode of address to that of 
Mathew and Greta, who were featured in the previous vignette. As with Mathew and 
Greta’s account I will start with some context from the encounter. 
----- 
Paheer looks tired; he had asked me to come to the restaurant where he worked in the 
late afternoon so he could talk to me during his break between lunch and dinner 
shifts. We sat down on the table at the back of the restaurant which was littered with 
dirty coffee cups and an ashtray that was near to overflowing; this was where the staff 
took their breaks.  
He sat down. He still had his apron on, and I could see and smell the grease that was 
on his cook’s uniform. Paheer speaks to me in a messy and intermingled combination 
of both English and Greek; he indiscriminately switches between the two languages. 
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He is softly spoken, and that, in addition to his accent and rapid changes between 
English and Greek, makes him at times, hard to understand. After several initial 
questions I ask him about his arrival in Greece: 
Anna:	When	did	you	arrive	in	Greece?	
Paheer:		In	2003,	on	April	11.	
Anna:	How	did	you	end	up	coming	to	Greece?	
Paheer:	First	I	went	to	Malaysia,	then	I	went	to	Iran,	and	then	from	Iran	to	Turkey.	
Anna:	Oh	ok,	so	it	was	a	long	trip…	so	how	long	did	that	trip	take?	
Paheer:	I	stayed	in	Turkey	for	five	years.	I	stayed	in	Malaysia	for	one	year.	I	stayed	
in	Iran	for	5	years.	
Anna:	So	was	your	plan	to	come	to	Greece	from	the	beginning?	
Paheer:	No,	I	don’t	plan	to	stay	here,	not	at	all,	I	want	to	go	to	Canada.	One	time	I	
tried,	but	the	police	caught	me	so	I	stayed	here	to	work,	and	I	am	waiting	for	my	
papers.	
Anna:	What	exactly	is	the	process,	to	get	papers	here	in	Greece?	
Paheer:	First	I	get	one	card,	that	I	get	from	the	police	station,	and	then	I	apply	for	
the	work	permit.	 I	then	had	to	send	it	to	the	government	in	order	to	get	the	tax	
papers.	In	2004,	I	got	the	sticker,	where	they	check	the	sticker.	In	2004	they	gave	
papers	to	everyone.	They	gave	paper	to	everyone	that	applied.	
Anna:	So	between	2004	and	now	do	you	have	to	go	every	year,	do	you	have	to	
renew	your	papers	at	all?	
Paheer:	After	 two	years	you	have	to	get	new	papers	and	then	after	10	years,	 in	
2005	or	2006,	I	applied	for	the	10	years,	and	after	2016	I	will	be	able	to	have	full	
papers.	The	sticker	is	for	two	years;	I	need	to	work	for	two	more	years	to	be	able	
to	get	the	forever	sticker.	I	can	work	in	Greece	or	Europe,	wherever	I	like.	
Anna:	But	you	don’t	get	a	passport?	
Paheer:	No,	no	passport.	
Anna:	So	this	card	that	you	are	about	to	get,	do	you	know	what	it	is	called?	
Paheer:	Adeia	Paramonis	[Residency	Permit],	that’s	it.	
Anna:	So	you	were	saying	that	you	have	two	more	years	to	get	your	papers,	after	
you	get	your	papers	do	you	have	any	plans	for	once	you	get	them?	
Paheer:	I	don’t	know….	I	really	don’t	know.	Maybe,	I	will	try	after	three	years	or	so	
to	go	to	Canada.	I	have	relations	in	Canada.	I	have	a	cousin	and	a	sister.	Maybe,	I	
am	not	sure,	maybe.	
Anna:	What	about	Europe?		
Paheer:	 Europe,	 maybe	 somewhere	 like	 Switzerland.	 I	 know	 that	 it	 is	 a	 very	
beautiful	country,	it	is	also	a	very	lucky	country.	In	Greece	some	of	the	people	are	
very	bad.	In	Germany	also,	maybe	only	80%	good,	but	in	Switzerland	it	is	100/100.	
Anna:	Can	you	work	in	Europe	now?	
Paheer:	No,	after	two	years…	when	I	take	my	papers.	
Anna:	You	have	spent	quite	a	few	years	in	Greece.	Do	you	feel	that	you	relate	to	
the	Greeks	now?	
Neoliberalism, Nationalism and Encounters of Address 
	
206	
Paheer:	 I	 like	 the	 Greeks,	 but	 now	 is	 very	 difficult.	 It	 is	 very	 difficult	 in	 the	
economic	world,	and	they	don’t	like	the	Indian	men.	Everything	is	different	now,	
because	of	money.	
Anna:	What	do	you	think	of	these	papers	in	general?	
Paheer:	We	have	no	chance.	It	is	very	difficult.	No	chance	at	all.	It	is	crazy,	after	10	
years	 all	 you	 get	 is	 some	papers,	 and	 even	 then	 it	 is	 hard	 to	 get	 the	 papers.	 In	
Paris,	France,	after	10	years	you	get	the	nationality,	here	no	chance.	There	 is	no	
chance.	The	government	doesn’t	want	to	give	it	to	me.	I	don’t	know,	I	think	there	
is	 a	 50%	 chance,	 I	 have	 some	 friends	 that	 have	 been	waiting	 20	 years,	 and	 he	
doesn’t	get	the	paper.	He	has	been	having	trouble	with	the	documents	and	they	
still	haven’t	given	him	the	paper.	
Anna:	Which	year	did	you	leave	Sri	Lanka?	
Paheer:	I	left	in	1996.	
[…]	
Paheer:	A	week	ago,	they	[the	police]	stopped	me,	they	brought	me	in	and	made	
me	wait	for	six	hours.		
Anna:	Can	you	tell	me	a	bit	about	these	experiences?	How	many	times	have	they	
happened?	
Paheer:	Three	times	I	have	been	in.	Previously,	once	they	saw	the	sticker,	things	
were	 fine,	 I	 was	 fine.	 But	 the	 problem	 is	 now	 there	 many	 duplicate	 [forged]	
papers.	So	they	pick	me	up	and	we	go	there,	and	they	put	me	in,	and	don’t	tell	me	
anything.	Then	one	hour	turns	to	six	and	they	still	haven’t	told	me	anything.	Then	
the	big	man	came	 in	and	he	put	my	numbers	 into	 the	computer,	and	 then	 they	
saw	that	everything	was	real,	the	numbers	and	the	photo,	and	then	they	say	‘ok	
bye’.	This	last	time,	when	the	police	caught	me	on	the	road,	they	took	me	to	his	
office	 to	 do	 some	 checking.	 Then	 they	 took	 me	 to	 the	 big	 police	 station	 at	
Petralona,	and	we	went	there,	they	didn’t	check	anything,	they	asked	me	if	I	had	
papers,	I	said	yes	and	then	they	let	me	go.		
Anna:	What	do	you	feel	when	this	happens?	Are	you	afraid	of	the	police?	
Paheer:	No,	nothing	like	that.	I	have	been	in	three	times,	I	go	in	there	and	know	
that	I	have	to	wait.	I	try	to	think	of	it	as	my	house.	
Anna:	The	first	time	it	happened,	where	you	worried?	
Paheer:	The	first	time	it	happened	they	kept	me	inside	for	three	months.	
Anna:	Three	months!	
Paheer:	 Yes,	 three	months.	 In	 2000	 I	 came	here,	 I	 came	here	with	 a	 boat	 from	
Turkey	and	we	arrived	on	Horse	Island.	
Anna:	Horse	Island?		
Paheer:	It	was	one	or	two	hours	from	Turkey.	It	was	Horse	Island.	
Anna:	Was	this	a	Greek	Island?	
Paheer:	Yes,	yes,	a	Greek	island.	It	is	one	day	from	Alexander’s	city.	
Anna:	Alexandroupolis?	
Paheer:	Yes	yes	one	day	away.		
Anna:	If	I	showed	it	to	you	on	a	map,	would	you	be	able	to	find	it?	
Paheer:	Yes	yes.	I	was	there	for	one	month	and	then	the	police	said	that	I	had	my	
freedom	and	to	go	Athens,	and	then	one	day	I	caught	a	ferry	to	Piraeus,	but	the	
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boat	went	 round	 and	 round.	 It	 went	 first	 to	 Alexandroupolis	 then	 Thessaloniki,	
but	we	 had	 to	 get	 off	 at	 Alexandroupoli.	 They	 didn’t	 give	 us	 anything,	 no	 food	
nothing,	we	couldn’t	get	a	 round.	They	people	didn’t	know	anything	 they	didn’t	
understand.	 Then	 after	 some	 time	 the	 big	 guy	 came	 and	 said	 ‘freedom’.	 They	
didn’t	give	us	food	or	anything.	Then	the	human	rights	people	came.	
Anna:	Which	island	was	it?	[presents	iPad	with	map]	
Paheer:	No,	no,	on	the	Turkey	side,	near	Ismir.	
Anna:	Oh	Chios	island.	
Paheer:	They	put	me	in	[detention]	for	three	months.	The	lawyers	came,	and	they	
wouldn’t	 let	 them	 in.	 They	 told	 us	 that	 he	 had	 to	 leave	 because	 they	wouldn’t	
allow	the	lawyers	 in.	But	then	they	let	us	out,	but	there	was	nothing	around,	no	
houses,	but	we	had	to	get	food.	A	truck	came	and	we	got	some	food.	It	was	like	
this	 for	 three	months.	Then	 they	put	us	 in	a	 truck,	all	of	us	 in	a	 truck,	and	 then	
they	took	us	to	the	border.	I	then	came	back	from	Turkey	in	2003.	On	the	Turkey	
side	 there	 is	 a	 small	 river,	 then	 we	 crossed	 and	 all	 the	 night	 we	 were	 walking	
walking	 walking,	 for	 three	 days.	 It	 took	 three	 days	 and	 nights	 to	 get	 back	 to	
Alexandroupolis.		
----- 
Here he makes reference to the vernacular hierarchies that had been mentioned 
earlier. He explains that ‘[Switzerland] is a very beautiful country, it is also a very lucky 
country. In Greece some of the people are very bad. In Germany also, maybe only 
80% good, but in Switzerland it is 100/100’. Once again we see how these national 
vocabularies become responsible for significant generalisations about them. 
Despite the agency suggested by Paheer’s multiple acts of clandestine migration, what 
is striking about this excerpt is the passivity of his tale: he waits, he treats the prison 
cell like home, and one gets the feeling that he has seemingly little recourse for action. 
There are parts of his narrative that are both shocking and sad, yet his recount of 
them is given without outrage or anger, but rather what could most closely be called 
resignation. If we are to compare it to the discussion with Mathew and Greta where 
they outline their possibilities of choice and opportunity, Paheer’s refrain is one of ‘no 
chance’, a phrase that he mentions four times in the space of a couple of lines. Even 
within the actions that he does undertake, there is a passivity: he does not contest the 
fact that he has been put in a prison cell despite having the right documentation, 
instead he treats it like home. This has similarities with Andall’s work where she 
describes how ‘[y]oung black men in Milan were frequently stopped by police and 
forced to undergo routine checks [and] […] for some [of these] young men, routine 
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checks by the police became so normalised that they did not remember to talk about 
it’ (2002, 399). The encounters that we are exposed to have a bearing on what we 
conceive of as ‘normal’ and what constitutes rupture. 
While there may certainly be personality differences, comparing the two cases shows 
how the place which one occupies within these normative schemes of intelligibility 
plays a role within the capacities that individuals feel that they have. Given that in 
both accounts we see these repeated circumstances; Greta and Mathew are repeatedly 
assisted and enabled by their contexts, whereas Paheer on the other hand, despite his 
desire to be elsewhere is repeatedly constrained. As Sara Ahmed explains, and as is 
evident here in Paheer’s account, ‘[a] story of walls is a story of being worn down, of 
coming up against the same thing’ (Ahmed 2016). 
 ‘Giving an Account of Oneself’: Naming and 
Encounters of Address 
‘Action	and	speech	are	so	closely	related	because	the	primordial	and	specifically	
human	act	must	 at	 the	 same	 time	 contain	 the	 answer	 to	 the	question	 asked	of	
every	newcomer:	‘Who	are	you?’	(Arendt	[1958]	1998,	178)	 	 	 	
																																																																-	Hannah	Arendt,	the	Human	Condition,	p.	178	
There is an old adage ‘that sticks and stones may break my bones, but names will 
never hurt me’, but names do hurt; they situate people into categories and they may 
create greater difficulties (or opportunities) in navigating the world. The outcomes will 
depend on circumstance; on how these names are understood, and in how they are 
positioned within these normative schemes. Largely we might be able to shrug them 
off: they leave no visible scars, usually they do not send us into a panic and most of 
the time they are not used with any intention to cause harm; though sometimes they 
do. Speech acts can be damaging. 
The taxonomic impulse of assigning a name and the desire to know which name to 
assign adds a further layer of analysis to the broader ideas of ‘confession’ that emerged 
within previous chapters. We are forced to confess our identities not only to the 
bureaucrat at the border, but to countless others who demand we situate ourselves 
within a vocabulary. Like with the bureaucratic encounter, these individuals have the 
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capacity to either accept or deny our terms of address, and doing so may have 
considerable repercussions. While one has some capacity to influence the terms with 
which they are addressed – for example one may have the opportunity to fit 
themselves within a neoliberal scheme rather than a national one – one is also subject 
to the address of others.  
Rarely is enough weight given to the role of encounters of address by others in the 
ways in which we conceive ourselves: ‘problematising the group-category distinction – 
put crudely, self-determination versus domination – emphasises the centrality of 
power to processes of identification. External, or categorical, dimensions of 
identification are not only vitally important, but they have been underplayed in most 
theorisations of social identity. Self-identification is only part of the story (and not 
necessarily the most important part)’ (Jenkins 2000, 10). As such ‘[t]he daily fact of 
societal description ‘from the outside’ – how I’m reported by others, what’s 
expectantly in place, already chatting about me before I appear on stage – is integral to 
the dialectic of self-description. External imposition of a harsher sort – above all the 
force of political change, which is always a linguistic violence – may wring from me 
some new self-description as well as utter its own hostile naming against me’ (Riley 
2000, 7–8). Like the confessions that were considered in the context of bureaucratic 
encounters, here too are considerations of power at play. 
There is also the need to clarify that the word ‘name’ is perhaps a misnomer; this does 
not refer to specific names, such as first names, and surnames – though they do 
certainly have an effect – rather they speak of the terms by which individuals and 
groups are identified within a society. Specific names do play a role. Gender 
categorisations are frequently understood through naming practices, but in the 
context of the normative scheme of nationalism, names also suggest a certain 
nationality, and in some cases names persist long after other cultural markers have 
fallen away. Ages or socioeconomic backgrounds may also be implicit depending on 
the particular name or context. For example, in considering some of the fieldwork 
encounters in this thesis, readers may have come to conclusions regarding the 
nationality of some participants based on their names even when the nationality itself 
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was not explicitly referenced: ‘Pierre’ may have been ‘read’ as French and ‘Kaori’ as 
Japanese. Furthermore these schemes can be used in nicknames, such as in Pierre’s 
case where, as he explains: ‘people called me ‘Frenchie’, even though I did not speak 
French [laughter] just because I was born there’. This categorisation is reinforced with 
each use of the name, and Pierre himself hints at it being problematic with his 
reference to not speaking the language. Thus even though one’s name may be situated 
within these normative schemes, the focus of this section will be on the taxonomic 
naming practices that assign people to categories. 
Much of this conception of giving an account of oneself is based on the work of 
Judith Butler, in her book Giving an Account of Oneself (2005). In this text she 
indicates the ways in which these normative schemes must be evoked when giving an 
account: ‘[w]e are not mere dyads on our own, since our exchange is conditioned and 
mediated by external language, by conventions, by a sedimentation of norms that are 
social in character and that exceed the perspective of those involved in the exchange’ 
(2005, 28) and that ‘I will, to some degree, have to make myself substitutable in order 
to make myself recognizable’ (2005, 37). We must situate both ourselves and others 
within these schemes and their vocabularies. These categories are then subject to 
ethical negotiations: ‘[a]n account of oneself is always given to another, whether 
conjured or existing, and this other establishes the scene of address as a more primary 
ethical relation than a reflexive effort to give an account of oneself. Moreover, the very 
terms by which we give an account, by which we make ourselves intelligible to ourselves and to 
others are not of our making. They are social in character, and they establish social norms, a 
domain of unfreedom and substitutability within which our ‘singular’ stories are told’ (Butler 
2005, 21, emphasis added) thus these normative schemes which have been the subject 
of this chapter so far, are the resources that we must draw upon in our encounters of 
address. 
When we do not comfortably fit into a specific category we are often asked to give a 
narrative account as to why this is the case, something that may be reminiscent of the 
mention of confession in the chapter on bureaucracy: ‘[g]iving an account thus takes a 
narrative form, which not only depends upon the ability to relay a set of sequential 
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events with plausible transition but also draws upon narrative voice and authorship, 
being directed towards an audience with the aim of persuasion’ (Butler 2005, 12). For 
some there is also some flexibility in the way they may construct their address: in 
Ong’s work she evokes the Hong Kong Taipan:33 ‘his very flexibility in geographical 
and social positioning is itself an effect of novel articulations between regimes of the 
family, the state, and capital, the kinds of practical-technical adjustments that have 
implications for our understanding of the late modern subject’ (Ong 1999, 3). For 
others, and depending on the relationships of power between individuals and the 
possible terms to which they can relate, this flexibility is less apparent. 
Power is present in encounters of address in many ways. There is power in the ability 
to demand an account of someone. In being asked to give an account it may reinforce 
the fact that we do not ‘belong’ in this space. There is at times violence in our modes 
of address, and these modes can be othering even when they were not necessarily 
intended that way. There are also numerous modes of address that situate the 
individual within different fields. We come into contact with these schemes through 
the living exchanges that we have with others, and by having our position articulated 
through this national terminology. We become embedded within official and non-
official forms of account, and this documentation gives an account of these particular 
forces. ‘I could not just ‘be’. I had to name an identity, no matter that this naming 
rendered invisible all the other identities – of gender, caste, religion, linguistic, group, 
generation […] The discourse of the interview was not concerned with these. Nor 
would my interlocutor have asked this question of someone who ‘looked African’’ 
(Brah 1996, 3). The reality is that not everyone is required to give an account, and 
some are subject to greater labour in situating themselves within these national 
vocabularies: ‘[s]ocial privilege is like an energy-saving device: less effort is required to 
pass through. No wonder that not to inherit privilege can be so ‘trying’’ (Ahmed 
2014, 148). There are however certain individuals who are not asked, and are not 
required to give an account: ‘[o]nly fame will eventually answer the repeated 
complaint of refugees of all social strata that ‘nobody here knows who I am’; and it is 
																																								 																				
33 For those unfamiliar with the term, ‘taipan’ is used in Hong Kong and China to refer to business leaders 
or successful entrepreneurs. It is often translated as ‘tycoon’. 
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true that the chances of the famous refugee are improved just as a dog with a name 
has a better chance to survive than a stray dog who is just a dog in general’ (Arendt 
[1951] 1973, 287). 
In addition the cohesiveness of these ‘names’ – the terms and vocabularies in which 
we use to give an account – obscure the at times complex and ‘unnatural’ historical 
processes which brought them about:34 ‘the collectivity which appears sealed and fully 
rounded is the outcome of a struggle in which its articulation might have been no 
triumph of progressive thought but an accident, a compromise, something which has 
sprung up between casual cracks in the slabs of earlier monoliths, like a weed’ (Riley 
2000, 6). Therefore these encounters can be as everyday as being introduced as 
someone’s ‘Italian’ friend, or as dramatic as in the case of Paheer where his address 
led him to serve a several-hour stint in a cell. We can see how address can be 
dangerous in a physical sense.  
 How Encounters of Address Make Difference 
When we are asked to give an account of ourselves, we are often forced to do so in 
specific ways, and adhering to a specific vocabulary. Take the following recollection 
from Eve: 
I	just	remember–	that's	my	clearest	memory	of	any	question	that	I	had	all	through	
my	 teenage	 years,	 it	 was	 more	 or	 less	 all	 reflecting	 on	 my	 identity	 and	 my	
place.	Because	one	of	the	first	questions,	if	you	met	someone	new	when	I	was	in	
high	 school,	 was,	 ‘What's	 your	 natio?’,	 was	 the	 first	 question.	 ‘Where	 are	 you	
from?’	 ‘Oh,	 down	 the	 road	[laughter].’	‘I	 live	 -	 see	 that	 street	 over	
there	[laughter].	 Where	 are	 you	 from?	 What's	 your	 natio?’	 It	 was	 perfectly	
acceptable,	for	whatever	reason,	it	was	an	important	question	to	everybody	that	I	
hung	around,	and	everybody	who	I	happened	to	meet.’		
This fragment of Eve’s recollection shows the extent to which this taxonomic need 
forces us to situate ourselves within particular normative schemes. Here it is clear that 
the answers that she wishes to give – ‘just down the road’ and ‘see that street over 
there’ – are not the responses sought. In giving her account of herself, they demand 
that she fits herself into national designators, which is made increasingly problematic 
by her mixed Eurasian heritage. As Butler explains: ‘I give an account of myself to 
																																								 																				
34 A similar argument was made in Chapter Two where the complex historical processes behind the 
development of citizenship were discussed. 
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someone, and that the addressee of the account, real or imaginary, also functions to 
interrupt the sense that this account of myself is my own […] No account takes place 
outside the structure of address, even if the addressee remains implicit and unnamed, 
anonymous and unspecified’ (Butler 2005, 36). 
These normative schemes and the encounters of address that emerge out of them have 
enormous consequences for our being in the world; not only do these encounters 
come to highlight differences, but they construct them as well. In the case of Eve’s 
description above, we see how the demand for her to associate herself with an external 
identity shatters her desire to situate herself ‘here’. Thus, these ‘encounters make 
difference’ (Wilson 2016, 5) and can at times help construct the ways in which we 
understand the world. As Massumi suggests: ‘[p]ower doesn’t just force us down 
certain paths, it puts the paths in us, so by the time we learn to follow its constraints 
we’re following ourselves. The effects of power on us is our identity’. This becomes 
entrenched through multiple similar encounters ‘where repetition itself is productive 
of difference’ (Dewsbury and Bissell 2015, 24). 
The lack of intense or dramatic events does not negate the impact of these 
encounters, and, as has been illustrated in relation to bureaucracy in Chapter Five, 
even waiting can cause significant distress: ‘dispossession is a matter of non-eventful 
and non-catastrophic disruptions that accumulate to reshape experience’ (Ben 
Anderson 2016, 5) and again, but slightly differently ‘the insidiousness of social 
suffering is that it gets under the skin. We acclimatise to it, deny it, ignore it, play it 
down. It is one of those slow burning accumulative types of hurt’ (Gunaratnam 2015, 
1937). Thus many of these encounters may seem exceedingly unremarkable on their 
own, and greater attention needs to be paid to these smaller events in constructing 
individuals. This approach has been taken up by several scholars including Michael 
Billig whose concept of banal nationalism exemplifies this: ‘[b]anal nationalism 
operates with prosaic, routine words, which take nations for granted, and which, in so 
doing, enhabit [sic] them. Small words, rather than grand memorable phrases, offer 
constant, but barely conscious reminders of the homeland, making ‘our’ national 
identity unforgettable’ (Billig 1995, 93).  
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Through the ‘ghosts’35 of previous encounters, these experiences are not tied to 
particular movements in time or space, but rather they echo, build on one another, 
emerge and evolve. This may also help us understand some of these broader effects of 
these regimes in enforcing differences: ‘[h]abit provides precisely the suture through 
which we can consider how singular situated encounters draw something from the 
history of previous encounters and tend towards future encounters. Because of this, it 
is habit that provides a way of thinking how the encounters that individuate and 
differentiate bodies become part of their very constitution. In this sense, habit 
provides a powerful way of thinking how endemic forms of inequality, for instance, 
might be experienced in ways that progressively and incrementally change through 
time, leading to tipping points or breakdowns’ (Dewsbury and Bissell 2015, 23). In 
this way, we need to consider not only their number, but rather their frequencyunder 
certain conditions such as a specific period of time or within a particular space which 
exacerbates their meaningfulness. Furthermore attention needs to be given to the ways 
in which these encounters re-emerge overtime: ‘[a] single speech event doesn’t work in 
isolation, but darts into the awaiting thickness of my inner speech to settle into its 
dense receptivity’ (Riley 2001, 49). 
As a very recent campaign by the Diversity Council of Australia explains: ‘[s]peech is a 
form of action. Whether we like it or not, our words have consequences. They can 
include or exclude, even if we do not intend them to’ (2016, 3). The issue is that 
those who suffer from these failed forms of address, or from negative forms of address 
as a result of these normative schemes, usually have very little recourse for correction. 
In the first instance, much of their suffering goes unnoticed, and while failed address 
may simply be the act of another functioning within a complex world without any 
intention of harm, the impact can still be one of violence. These encounters of 
address reinforce these differences. Take this example from Hage’s White Nation: 
‘‘[y]ou’re having fun with your friends and you see them as just that, your friends, and 
then suddenly you realise that they look at you and what they see is a Lebanese. Look, 
																																								 																				
35 This is an oblique reference to another part of Riley’s work: ‘[t]here are ghosts of the word which always 
haunt any present moment of enunciation, rendering that present already murmurous and populated’ 
(2001, 45). 
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it’s not that I am not proud to be Lebanese, it is just sometimes it is used to make you 
feel on the outside. You know… well… that’s how I felt anyway’’ (2000, 64). Thus, 
while the encounter of address above, was likely not to have intended offense, the use 
of that particular national designator situates the individual as other. It may also have 
ongoing repercussions: ‘the peculiarity of violent words, as distinct from lumps of 
rock, is their power to resonate within their target for decades after the occasion on 
which they were weapons’ (Riley 2001, 41). 
 When Address ‘Fails’ 
Given the previous content of this chapter, it should come as no surprise that one 
may be addressed in ways that they neither agree with nor enjoy. The diversity of 
forms of address, as well as the fluidity of these vocabularies and logics, make it likely 
that some become subject to ‘failed’ addresses. This notion of the failure of address is 
present within Butler’s original conception: ‘something about our existence proves 
precarious when this address fails […] what binds us morally has to do with how we 
are addressed by others in ways we cannot avert or avoid; this impingement by the 
other’s address constitutes us first and foremost against our will or, perhaps more 
appropriately, prior to the formation of the will’ (Butler 2006, 130). The remainder of 
this section will consider types of failed address – including double alienation, 
incongruence and absconding from forms of address – and their consequences. 
There is often very little control over the ways one is addressed: ‘there is a certain 
violence already in being addressed […] [n]o one controls the terms by which one is 
addressed, at least not in the most fundamental way. To be addressed is to be, from 
the start, deprived of will’ (Butler 2006, 139). As the previous arguments have shown, 
both power and violence are inherent in these speech acts, and there is a lack of 
power in being addressed. Furthermore, these failures of address do not only relate to 
those forms of address which are embedded within the normative schemes. Even the 
use of people’s actual names can also be subject to failure by mis-naming, or 
renaming, denying the use of a name because it is too difficult or too foreign, 
enforcing a simpler name, or calling them something else. It is for the same reasons 
that Spivak in her text Can the Subaltern Speak? problematises the failed 
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representations  of ‘the pathetically misspelled’ (1988, 306) and ‘grotesquely 
transcribed names’ of the subaltern women (1988, 297). Being deprived of one’s own 
name, and being subject to the naming of others speaks to the power within these 
encounters. 
Double alienation in the context of encounters of address emerges when the forms of 
address that we use for ourselves are not the forms that are imposed on us by others; 
this can be illustrated with regard to the normative scheme of nationalism. With the 
increasing diversity of populations, and the growing numbers of instances of dual 
citizenship (Faist and Kivisto 2007; Spiro 2016), it is unsurprising to find that there 
are individuals who either identify themselves or are identified by others into more 
than one of these national categories. However, while the individual themselves might 
identify with both, they will be subject to different forms of address within different 
national contexts. Of this, Andrea is an example. She is a Greek Albanian, and 
explains how, despite being a citizen of both places, she has become subject to 
different forms of address in both locations: 
Let’s	 just	 say,	 in	Albania	–	here	we	are	 in	 the	Balkans,	 you	 know,	we	have	 very	
strong	notions	of	ethnicity	–	they	always	considered	us	as	Greeks,	they	saw	us	as	
foreigners,	 and	 when	 we	 came	 here,	 they	 always	 saw	 us	 as	 Albanians.	 Many	
times,	in	our	faculty,	I	have	felt	this	way	–	‘Aaaa,	from	Albania,	yes,	from	Albania’.	
I	 told	 them	 that	 I	was	 homogeneis	 [lit:	 of	 the	 same	birth,	 i.e.	 ethnically	Greek],	
they	would	reply	with	 ‘well,	 it’s	 still	Albania’	 […]	There	 is	always	disrespect.	 ‘Ah,	
you	got	the	identity	card?	But	you	are	still	from	Albania,	because	that’s	where	you	
were	born’.	 It	 is	 like	you	never	really	belong	[…]	you	always	seem	to	be	stuck	 in	
the	 middle.	 Always	 a	 foreigner;	 here	 you	 are	 a	 foreigner	 and	 there	 you	 are	 a	
foreigner.	 You	 know	what?	 It	 is	 especially	 with	 the	 Albanians	 here	 [in	 Greece],	
that	 we	 have	 these	 sorts	 of	 issues.	 Generally	 I	 don’t	 understand	 why	 it	 is	 so	
strong,	why	 they	 see	 us	 in	 a	 bad	 light.	Many	 times,	 I	 have	 felt	 awful.	Or	 in	 the	
shop,	many	times	 [I	have	heard]:	 ‘Oh	the	Albanian	has	arrived	to	 take	our	place	
[job]’		
In some of my previous work, I outlined this concept of ‘double alienation’ 
(Tsalapatanis 2011), whereby an individual is ‘othered’ using these national markers, 
of which the above statement by Andrea is a perfect example. Though she identifies as 
both, she is seen as an ‘other’ by both groups: ‘[a]lways a foreigner; here you are a 
foreigner and there you are a foreigner’. Thus there is a rupture between her account 
of herself as ‘homogeneis’ and the denial of it by others.  
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The consequence of both these forms of address is that she is deemed not to belong 
in either category, which may even become internalised: ‘[t]here is an anxiety of 
interpellation, in which the subject ponders incessantly to herself, ‘Am I that name, 
am I really one of those?’’ (Riley 2001, 45). She also speaks to the repetitiveness of 
these encounters, the impact of which was considered in the previous section of this 
chapter; in the short fragment above she uses the phrase ‘many times’ on three 
occasions and ‘always’ five times, as well as the words still and never, enforcing the 
fact that that these are not one-off instances, but repetitive and reinforcing. Social 
Psychological approaches have also engaged with this phenomenon and they explain 
how ‘we experience psychological threat when we are miscategorised – that is when 
others fail to recognise or categorise us in terms that are consistent with how we see 
ourselves’ (Hopkins and Blackwood 2011, 218). Furthermore, this highlights the fact 
that just because she is recognised as being a citizen by the state, it does not necessarily 
follow that the population does as well. This is what Ngai refers to as ‘alien 
citizenship’ (2014, 2): the status of being a citizen in law, but otherwise not being 
recognised as such. In this instance however, both national groups fail to recognise 
Andrea: ‘[a]h, you got the identity card? But you are still from Albania’. This shows 
how: ‘[i]n a representative democracy where the power to grant citizenship is delegated 
to the state, there is an important, and historically growing, incompatibility between 
the state’s formal acceptance of new citizens and the dominant community’s everyday 
acceptance of those people’ (Hage 2000, 50). 
However, ‘double alienation’ does not only emerge from the address of others, but 
can also occur through forms of internalised address. For example, alienation can 
occur when an individual lives away from their ‘homeland’36 for a long period of time, 
yet still identifies with it. Any differences that they have with the dominant ‘host 
country’ community may be explained away by both the individual themselves and the 
dominant national community – showing once again the interconnection of the ways 
we address ourselves as well as the address of others – using the home country’s 
																																								 																				
36 Here the word ‘homeland’ is presented in inverted commas to interrupt these notions of ‘home’. It is 
precisely these experiences that in returning to ones ‘home’ – their country of ethnic origin – these 
individuals realise that it is far less of a home than they had been led to believe. 
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national designator. When they ‘return’ to the country that they have always 
conceived of as home, they find that they are once again othered: what they imagined 
were the cultural objects and acts of national culture that they partook in as markers 
of home in the host country are different to those found in the home destination on 
return (Tsalapatanis 2011). At its most extreme, this can cause a ruptured sense of 
self, and while not explicitly using this terminology, these shattered notions of 
nationhood are well-illustrated by Christou in her article American Dreams and 
European Nightmares (2006). Here once again the concepts of interruption or rupture 
are useful: ‘[where t]he moment of interruption […] marked a disruption and a calling 
into question of that feeling of belonging' (Dawney 2013, 632).  
To this list of possible failures of address one needs to include the concept of 
incongruence. One such example is where the terms by which an individual gives an 
account of themselves falls outside this normative scheme of intelligibility. Of this, 
one participant – Bogdan – is a good example. The evidence of the failure of these 
normative schemes in his case is subtle: where people speak of coming from ‘France’, 
being ‘Australian’ or speaking ‘Greek’, Bogdan instead refers to ‘my language’, ‘my 
people’ and ‘my country’. The difference is made noticeable by the felt absence of the 
‘anchor points’ which situate him within a certain part of the world.37 Very briefly, 
Bogdan, now in his 50s migrated to Australia at a time when Yugoslavia was breaking 
up; he lived in what now is geographically Croatia, but his Orthodox Christian faith 
meant to many that he should be categorised a Serb, but he himself does not identify 
comfortably with either. This is addressed briefly in this testimony: 
This	 [using	national	descriptors]	 is	how	people	understand	the	world	 today;	 it	 is	
the	questions	that	they	ask	and	the	responses	that	they	expect.	[…]	You	have	to	
realise	 that	 I	 came	before	 all	 of	 this;	 I	 came	on	 a	 Yugoslavian	 passport,	 the	 old	
passport,	and	it	then	became	Croatia,	and	I	can’t	take	another	this	way.		
Here he reinforces for us both the importance of these normative schemes, and 
suggests the fact that he does not feel he fits comfortably within them. Bogdan’s case 
provides clues as to what happens when these naming conventions break down. 
																																								 																				
37 For further discussions on the ways in which the national is informing please see the earlier parts of this 
chapter, methodological discussions as they relate to nationalism (p.64) as well as the discussion of 
nationalism in Chapters Two and Three. 
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Categories of all sorts are problematic due to ‘the paradoxical role categories play 
cognitively as containers with fixed boundaries while emphasizing the inchoateness of 
bounding processes’ (Jones 2009, 185).  
There will always be certain individuals, ideas, and things that defy categorisation; 
either they do not fit comfortably within any particular category, or in the case of 
individuals or groups in the context of encounters of address, this may be because 
they contest the categories to which they become assigned. Riley experiences this 
problem herself due to her mixed ethnic background: ‘[a]m I to agree to be designated 
as ‘Black British’, or do I refuse this designation as in itself unwittingly racist because I 
am in fact ‘English’ and as English a citizen as everyone else, whatever my skin colour, 
and I don’t want that racialized difference; do I settle for ‘Afro-Caribbean’ or for 
‘British of African descent’, or should I fight, tongue in cheek to introduce ‘Afro-
Saxon’, or had I better specify ‘born in Holloway, London, of an Antiguan-born 
mother and a father from Jamaica’? Or do I give up, and tick wryly that small square 
for all categorical residues which is marked as ‘Other’?’ (Riley 2000, 7). Thus, as she 
expresses, none of the available categories are really able to comfortably classify her 
within this scheme. 
There are different ways in which individuals attempt to abscond from encounters of 
address. They have consequences, and the aforementioned violence from these 
addressing encounters may not only be linguistic: identifying and being identified 
with certain categories by certain individuals or ‘street-level bureaucrats’ (Lipsky 1983) 
may lead to physical violence, imprisonment or deportation. Thus for some of these 
precarious individuals it may be easier to abscond from certain encounters of address. 
Of this there are many possible examples. One of the most dramatic is the burning of 
identity documents. The violent act of setting fire to one’s paperwork, is done largely 
to escape from official modes of address, ones which may have them deported. 
Among the places where this is prevalent, including Morocco and Algeria, they have a 
collective name for these people who burn their documents, Harrag (another mode of 
address), in Arabic literally meaning ‘a burner’ (Omoniyi and Omoniyi 2016, 88), but 
due to the commonness of the this practice it is used more generally for those who 
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undertake clandestine migration. By burning these documents, and thus removing the 
documentary traces of their identity, they limit the possibility of their identification 
and thus their deportation. The very existence of these acts illustrate developed states’ 
‘reliance upon the passport itself [and] a certain faith in the notion that people are 
who their documents proclaim them to be’ (Cho 2013, 240).  
Those who undertake clandestine migration also have the option to further evade 
encounters of address by limiting themselves to certain groups of people or living 
within certain communities: ‘few irregular migrants have ready access to a life lived 
openly and in public’ (Álvarez 2013, 148). Furthermore these limitations impact on 
options and life choices, whether it be questions of family or employment or simply 
‘safely’ visiting certain public spaces, leading to what is described as ‘a life full of holes’ 
(Charhadi 1999) characterised by periods of hiding, especially from police. Paheer’s 
case illustrates how these forms of address can be limiting despite having all the 
required legal paperwork; the fact that he is ‘third world looking migrant’ (Hage 2000, 
133) has led to periods of incarceration. As Riley explains ‘[t]here’s a proximity 
between ‘being called’ as a description and ‘being called’ as an aggression’ (2000, 10). 
This too has implications for citizenship, as ‘if citizenship is to mean anything in an 
everyday sense it should mean the ability of individuals to occupy public spaces in a 
manner that does not compromise their self-identity, let alone obstruct, threaten or 
even harm them more materially’ (Painter and Philo 1995, 115). 
In being subject to failed forms of address these individuals are experiencing vastly 
different citizenship encounters. They may cause feelings of insecurity, anxiety about 
their belonging, difficulties of being understood, or simply behaviours that make 
hiding preferable to certain forms of address. Despite what may be only good 
intentions, there is a violence and a powerlessness that can emerge from forms of 
address: ‘[i]n its violently emotional materiality, the word is indeed made flesh and 
dwells among us’ (Riley 2005, 9). Thus the seemingly inconsequential act of 
addressing individuals and groups in certain ways, even if done with the very best of 
intentions can be othering and may cause exclusion. This section has shown the 
diverse consequences of address and how the linguistic intersects with the material, 
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the affective and the emotional in a myriad of ways. What it shows is that words must 
not be taken for granted.  
 Conclusion 
No	 one	 today	 is	 purely	 one	 thing.	 Labels	 like	 Indian,	 or	 woman,	 or	Muslim,	 or	
American	 are	 not	 more	 than	 starting-points,	 which	 if	 followed	 into	 actual	
experience	 for	 only	 a	moment	 are	 quickly	 left	 behind.	 Imperialism	 consolidated	
the	mixture	 of	 cultures	 and	 identities	 on	 a	 global	 scale.	 But	 its	worst	 and	most	
paradoxical	 gift	 was	 to	 allow	 people	 to	 believe	 that	 they	 were	 only,	 mainly,	
exclusively,	 white,	 or	 Black,	 or	 Western,	 or	 Oriental.	 Yet	 just	 as	 human	 beings	
make	 their	 own	 history,	 they	 also	make	 their	 cultures	 and	 ethnic	 identities.	 No	
one	can	deny	the	persisting	continuities	of	long	traditions,	sustained	habitations,	
national	 languages,	and	cultural	geographies,	but	 there	 seems	no	 reason	except	
fear	and	prejudice	 to	keep	 insisting	on	their	 separation	and	distinctiveness,	as	 if	
that	 was	 all	 human	 life	 was	 about.	 Survival	 in	 fact	 is	 about	 the	 connections	
between	things;	in	Eliot’s	phrase,	reality	cannot	be	deprived	of	the	‘other	echoes	
[that]	 inhabit	 the	 garden’.	 It	 is	 more	 rewarding	 -	 and	 more	 difficult	 -	 to	 think	
concretely	and	sympathetically,	contrapuntally,	about	others	than	only	about	‘us’.	
But	 this	 also	means	 not	 trying	 to	 rule	 others,	 not	 trying	 to	 classify	 them	or	 put	
them	 in	 hierarchies,	 above	 all,	 not	 constantly	 reiterating	 how	 ‘our’	 culture	 or	
country	is	number	one	(or	not	number	one,	for	that	matter).	(Said	1994)	
																																														-		Edward	Said,	Culture	and	Imperialism,	1994,	p.407-408	
	
This chapter has introduced Butler’s notion of ‘normative schemes of intelligibility’ in 
order to understand how these vocabularies and logics impact on everyday 
encounters. They have influenced our notions of ourselves as well as the substance 
and understanding of citizenship. Initially it considered the ways in which logics and 
vocabularies were central to both the birth and the maintenance of the normative 
scheme of neoliberalism, as well as how this scheme has come to transform that of 
citizenship. Secondly, the normative scheme of nationalism was considered, along 
with the ways it plays a rather contradictory role of spatialising individuals at a time 
which they are more likely to be less restricted to a particular place. It also considered 
the ways in which these national designators are embedded within notions of 
meaning and value, and how these categories, through border imperialism, and other 
forms of exclusion come to dictate just who has access to certain spaces. Finally, this 
chapter considered the notion of encounters of address more generally considering 
how these forms of address come to make change and the impacts of failed forms of 
address. 
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By conceiving of the ways the vocabularies and logics of neoliberalism and 
nationalism have impacted on individual modes of address, we are better able to 
conceive of the extreme variations in the citizenship encounters of these diverse 
individuals. In doing so we have also come to realise the power (or powerlessness) of 
the individual within these ‘modes of address’ and the intensities of these impacts on 
a lived life, especially when these encounters of address construct certain individuals 
and groups as marginal. With life’s increasing uncertainty and speed (Bauman 2000; 
Virilio [1977] 2006), these vocabularies and logics have become even more important 
tools with which to understand and navigate the world, but the corollary of this is that 
we address others in ways that are overly simplistic and using vocabularies that are 
arbitrary and the result of historical accident.  
What this chapter has done is to delve below the surface to see how these ‘normative 
schemes of intelligibility’ come to function, as well as the ways in which they enable 
certain individuals, and value certain things, within these schemes and yet are 
increasingly dismissive or critical of those that fall outside of them. Mathew and Greta 
have come to exemplify the able neoliberal individual for whom life is open to 
countless possibilities. Their very agency can be heard in the words they use and the 
activeness with which they describe their position. On the other hand, the encounters 
of address as faced by Paheer restrain him. They position him within a certain space 
and they limit his possibilities. Despite his agency in travelling from Sri Lanka 
through various parts of the world, his narrative tells a tale of passivity, of negative 
and constraining address, of being addressed in ways which limit his freedom. These 
schemes strike at the heart of who we are, and yet, from them, there is little means of 
escape. Through interpellation we both situate ourselves and become situated within 
these schemes often without realising it. However, the outcomes of these interactions 
are nondeterministic, and as limiting as these case may be, we need to be aware of 
both the fluidity and contingency that are inherent to these terms. 
In returning to our topic of citizenship, the content of this chapter can also account, 
at least in part, for how citizenship evolves over time. Stepping away from grand 
notions of policy and legal transformations, these naming encounters highlight how 
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citizenship emerges and is shaped by these everyday practices. This occurs at the level 
of how an individual may have their citizenship contested, but speaks of how these 
can create broader shifts such as the way in which neoliberalism has altered 
conceptions of what citizenship entails to be more in line with neoliberal thinking 
and values. This further emphasises the point that was made at the very start of this 
thesis, that despite claims to its long and prosperous history, citizenship is in a 
constant process of re-articulation and re-invention. 
Finally, we can see how citizenship is itself one of these normative schemes, which, as 
has been illustrated, intersects with the schemes of neoliberalism and nationalism. It 
also fits people within a hierarchy – similar to those articulated in colourful diagrams 
produced by the citizenship planning companies. Citizenship is based in a conception 
of moral authority that embeds us in the world as a subject of a particular state. What 
has emerged at numerous points during this chapter is the fact that as individuals 
these are processes over which we have very little control; these categorisations impact 
on how we are defined, the spaces we have access to, and the way in which we identify 
ourselves and others. 
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8. Conclusion 
‘Ok!	Everyone	off	the	bus.	Leave	your	stuff	we	will	see	you	on	the	other	side!’.	It	
was	 the	 very	 early	 hours	 of	 a	morning	 in	 the	 summer	 of	 2009	 and	 after	 a	 long	
journey	 from	a	small	 town	 in	Brittany	 through	St	Malo,	Rennes,	and	Paris,	 I	had	
arrived	at	the	port	of	Calais.	We	were	being	ushered	off	the	bus	by	the	driver	to	
pass	through	immigration	control	before	boarding	the	ferry	for	Dover.	Somehow	
with	my	 sleep-addled	brain	 I	managed	 to	 be	 one	of	 the	 first	 to	 enter	 and	wind	
through	 the	 vacant	 zig-zagging	 railings	 as	 I	 dug	 one-handedly	 in	my	 bag	 for	my	
passport.	 It	was	not	 forthcoming.	Upon	arriving	at	a	desk	 I	 smiled	apologetically	
and	 asked	 the	 immigration	 officer	 to	 ‘please	 wait	 a	 tick’	 moments	 before	
producing	 my	 passport.	 He	 received	 it	 with	 a	 frown	 and	 then	 checked	 the	
document	 a	 few	 times	 over;	 he	 looked	 at	me	 and	 looked	 back	 at	 it,	 asked	me	
where	I	was	going	and	who	I	was	staying	with.	He	checked	each	of	the	pages,	held	
it	up	to	the	light,	scratched	at	it.	I	was	concerned;	his	demeanour	was	aggressive,	
his	questions	barking.	A	couple	of	minutes	in	and	he	shoved	the	passport	back	at	
me,	saying	harshly	‘I	don’t	know	how	you	got	this,	but	it	seems	real	so	I	am	letting	
you	 through’.	 I	 grasped	my	 passport,	 and	 shuffled	 along	 to	 the	 other	 side.	 His	
response	had	disturbed	me,	especially	his	aggression;	I	continue	to	wonder	what	
it	 was	 about	 me	 or	 the	 documentation	 that	 he	 found	 so	 problematic.	 This	
experience	often	returns	to	me	in	the	moments	before	I	come	face	to	face	with	an	
immigration	officer.38	
	
By focusing on encounters in the context of citizenship, we can illuminate the social, 
material, and temporal aspects of it, while retaining the presence of ambiguity that is 
rendered invisible by other approaches. Take the above vignette for example. In using 
a political science lens, this may simply be presented as a citizen transiting from one 
state to another. From a binary perspective on border crossing, this vignette suggests a 
successful outcome to the interaction: I made it through immigration and eventually 
																																								 																				
38 This, like the vignette that opened this thesis, is also auto-ethnographic, but this time from a few years 
earlier. 
Conclusion 
	
226	
back onto the bus and the ferry. However, from the perspective of encounter, the 
richness of the specifics of this situation come to light. The power differences are felt 
and made evident by the border official’s demeanour. We also have some indication 
of the role that spaces may play, through the presence of ‘zig-zagging railings’ and the 
physicality of the boundary expressed by ‘passing through’. Furthermore, the impact 
of the encounter does not end with the return to the bus, but rather resonates when 
facing similar experiences in the present or perhaps in imagining like possibilities in 
the future. The analysis of encounters in the context of citizenship can illustrate how 
it is a complex social process that involves both labour demands and diverse intricate 
social relations. It also suggests the limits to assuming deterministic outcomes, and the 
importance of integrating individual difference into our understandings. 
While it may seem perverse to compare this particular encounter with the ‘desperate 
passages’ (C. Martin 2011) of irregular migrants, that are usually in the news, when 
places such as ‘Calais’ are mentioned, there is a pressing need to. Considering the at 
times horrific circumstances of these individual migrants as something isolated from 
more general considerations of citizenship obscures the fact that their conditions are 
at least in part dictated by the same global system: the system which allows me to cross 
the border is the same one that leaves them constrained. Thus we require an approach 
to citizenship that is able to theorise not only dramatic experiences – such as that of 
the irregular migrant trying to cross to the UK – but also relatively banal or repetitive 
encounters. Studies into the treatment of irregular migrants and asylum seekers have 
shown how it is sometimes the most quotidian parts of these processes that have a 
considerable impact on the ways in which these individuals understand themselves 
within their new communities (Darling 2014; Cabot 2012). Furthermore, the notion 
of encounter also allows insight into the hidden differential modes of inclusion 
among citizens of the same country, an area of study that requires greater attention.  
When people are asked to talk about their citizenship – as they were as part of this 
research – they start with the common sites and narratives: they reproduce the 
dominant conceptions relating to visas, passports, naturalisation ceremonies and the 
like. Yet, as the discussion continues, they speak of the direct points of intersection 
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that citizenship has had in their everyday lives; these narratives are not necessarily 
rational, nor linear. They are both personal and interpersonal, and are shaped by their 
understandings of themselves and their place in the world, as well as more complex 
contextual circumstances. Greater attention needs to be paid to the role of encounter 
in conceptions of citizenship as status in lived lives. 
 What this Thesis Covered  
By focusing on the ways that citizenship is encountered within lived lives, this thesis 
has provided a novel approach to the study of citizenship that can better grasp the 
fluidity as well as the transformative capacities of the emergent encounters that make 
up individuals’ ongoing negotiations of citizenship. This being said, the various parts 
of the thesis have contributed to this argument in diverse ways, so this section will 
first consider the specific contributions of each chapter, before building on the 
contributions made by the thesis as a whole.  
The first three chapters of this thesis set the scene for the later discussion chapters by 
introducing the historical development of citizenship, as well as the key literature and 
methodological foundations. Chapter Two – Historicising Citizenship – investigated 
the subject from a genealogical point of view highlighting periods of transformation, 
reinvention and rupture in its history, disrupting the myths of both its ‘naturalness’ 
and its linear development. This chapter also outlined the transformations of 
citizenship at the two locations where interviews were undertaken – those of Australia 
and Greece – once again highlighting this diversity as well as how citizenship is subject 
to ongoing processes of change. Chapter Three – Encountering Citizenship – further 
develops the concept of encounter that is so central to this thesis, as well as more 
broadly introducing the existing conceptions of citizenship, highlighting the subject’s 
two interlinked dilemmas that emerge from the current scholarship: the breadth of its 
application and the all-too-common reliance on binaries and strict forms of 
categorisation. Methodological considerations were the subject of Chapter Four which 
reflected on these more practical aspects. This chapter engaged with the 
methodological implications of using encounter as a point of investigation, as well as 
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some broader reflections regarding the nature of qualitative work. This discussion was 
underpinned by the desire to give an honest and reflexive account of the research 
process.  
Chapters Five, Six and Seven, each drew heavily from the empirical content 
investigating particular sites of encounter and directly addressing this thesis’ four 
specific research questions. Chapter Five, the Encountering Bureaucracy chapter, 
answered the question of what role encounters with bureaucracy have in the lived 
experiences of citizenship. It problematized the existing conceptions of the neutral 
bureaucracy, such as those found in the work of Weber (1991), as well as the idea that 
these processes are simply ‘gates’ that one has to pass through. Through using 
considerable empirical material, and engaging with diverse but related literatures, this 
chapter showed how the materiality of the bureaucratic encounter, its emotional force 
and the temporalities of these experiences, have complex and ongoing implications 
for conceptions of citizenship. 
Chapter Six addressed the notion of imaginaries and answered the question of how 
citizenship is imagined differently by diverse individuals and what this can tell us 
about citizenship more generally. It investigated the diverse ways in which citizenship 
is imagined, both collectively and individually, and the relationship this has to action. 
In doing so it built on existing conceptions of imaginaries (Castoriadis [1975] 1997; 
Taylor 2004; Jasanoff and Kim 2015; Benedict Anderson [1983] 2006, among others), 
and introduced the concept of ‘acts of imagination’ to better reflect these 
individualised encounters. These were then considered through the investigation of 
cosmopolitan mobile imaginaries, inheritance imaginaries and interrupted/ruptured 
imaginaries. 
Chapter Seven addressed the two final questions of how the normative concept of 
citizenship changes over time and the role of encounters of address with regards to 
individual conceptions of citizenship. The development of citizenship was explored 
through the impact of ‘normative schemes of intelligibility’ and their ‘vocabularies’ 
and ‘logics’, concepts that emerge within the work of Judith Butler (2005, 2006, 
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among others), which was initially mapped out using neoliberalism as an example. 
The influence of neoliberalism and nationalism on the substance of citizenship were 
then considered further and used to account for the changes in the content of 
citizenship over time. The later parts of this chapter illustrated how address is 
determined not only by the accounts that we give of ourselves but by the at times 
violent address of others, highlighting the key ways difference is created and 
maintained in the context of citizenship through these encounters of address.  
There are several ideas which transcend individual chapters and that are developed by 
the thesis as a whole. Linking together these three sites of encounter that are outlined 
in Chapters Five, Six and Seven, we gain insight into the impact of both rupture and 
repetitive encounters, the role of language and performative interactions, and finally, 
the impact of taxonomies in obscuring both diversity and ambiguity.  
What this thesis has emphasised above all is the role of encounter as a site for the 
emergence of citizenship, and how the content of these encounters can help us better 
understand citizenship more generally. It has also illustrated how the common focus 
on grand acts and points of rupture, fails to understand the context in which most 
conceptions come into being. While dramatic events are telling, the scale of the 
impact of ‘rupture’ reflects the conviction with which the original conceptions were 
held. These points of rupture cannot be understood outside the flow of previous 
encounters (Dawney 2013), thus highlighting the impact of the banal and the 
everyday with regards to citizenship. Furthermore, it is within a complex landscape of 
fluid negotiated human perceptions that individuals use their citizenship and, as such, 
encounter is central to so many of the experiences in which citizenship emerges. 
There are also performative aspects to citizenship – whether they be ephemeral 
performances of the state in the context of bureaucracy (Jeffrey 2012), or in ‘the 
performative dimensions of society’s self-reproduction […] the enactment and re-
enactment of its imaginaries’ (Jasanoff and Kim 2015, 7) or the ways in which naming 
practices are performative of the power of different groups and of citizenship more 
generally. While each chapter has highlighted a different aspect of this performativity, 
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these come together to suggest the diverse ways in which citizenship comes into being. 
These performative aspects of citizenship have also highlighted the importance of 
language, and more specifically speaking encounters on individuals. To speak is an act 
of power, and both the speaker, and the terms that they employ, have considerable 
repercussions: the language and categories we use have implications on who has voice 
(Spivak 1988). Finally, we must remember how ‘neat’ understandings and clinical 
definitions come to render certain individuals invisible: ‘[i]f institutional and public 
spaces assume certain bodies, then history becomes concrete by enabling those bodies 
to flow through spaces […] [m]aybe an institution is like an old garment it acquires the 
shape of those who tend to wear it, and as such it becomes easier to wear if you have 
that shape. Privilege can be thought of in these terms: that which is wearing’ (Ahmed 
2014, 147).  
Another overarching topic covered by this thesis is how studies of citizenship have 
contributed to the concept’s abstraction through the use of rigid terms, and by 
ignoring individual experience. While the taxonomic desire to understand and 
organise is quite natural, for many there is a failure to consider how putting people 
and things into categories is both a powerful act on the part of the classifier, and a 
deprivation of sorts on the part of the classified.  There is no way to do away with 
many of these categorisations as they are often the tools with which we navigate the 
world, but there are certainly methods that we can use, as individuals, and as social 
scientists, to move past them. This provides a much-needed openness to contingency: 
‘[a]t the ground of quotidian experiences and life courses, the enactment of 
citizenship may appear as much, or even more, a matter of serendipity and 
improvisation than of formal abstractions of rights, statuses and identities’ (Amit 
2014, 407). Thus this approach has allowed the consideration of the roles of material, 
affective, and temporal influences; it gives an understanding that moves beyond the 
shallowness of binary conceptions and allows us to realise the ambiguity and 
indeterminacy that exist in relation to citizenship. 
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 Evaluation of Contribution 
The contributions of this thesis can be seen in three key domains. Broadly speaking 
this thesis contributes to the qualitative literature on citizenship, further develops the 
concept of encounter, and provides novel approaches to the three thematic areas of 
bureaucracy, imaginaries, and encounters of address. The key contribution of this 
thesis comes from its work in understanding citizenship: in highlighting how 
encounter can help us step away from binary and universalising definitions and 
perspectives, this thesis has been able to account for fluidity and change within the 
various articulations of the concept. It provides a theorisation which is able to connect 
the experiences of the under-privileged to those who are more privileged in conceiving 
them as part of the same system. By ensuring that a diversity of experiences are 
included, this thesis has provided a more comprehensive account that is able to 
engage with the multiplicity of these encounters. Furthermore, the inclusion of non-
English speaking participants has moved away from the English language accounts 
that often pervade this sphere. 
Citizenship does not have and will never have an objective external referent. It is 
created in words, and occasionally takes material forms, but in the end, it is 
understood by individuals through the ways that they encounter it, how they are 
exposed to it, and how it is imagined. Thus qualitative research, and more specifically, 
the approach used in this thesis, offers a unique way of providing an account of the 
detail and individual circumstances that may be missed by other methodologies. This 
thesis has contributed by providing an account of the ambiguities as they exist, as well 
as better being able to theorise change. The thesis also steps away from national 
accounts of citizenship that are the focus of much of the academic literature. While 
this thesis recognised the importance of the ‘national’ frame (Malkki 1992) – 
citizenship is after all the relation of the individual to the nation-state – it has 
illustrated how citizenship ranges from small everyday experiences, to a greater 
‘normative scheme of intelligibility’ which spans the globe, allowing this research to 
deal with this enormous range in scale. This approach allows us to see the impacts 
above and below the national frame, as well as beyond the context of an individual 
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state. Other more minor contributions involve the insights into the role that ethics, 
and more specifically ethics documentation, play in these interactions, which is 
missing from the literature. Furthermore, the experimentation with the use and 
presentation of fieldwork extracts, all suggests new possibilities for the ways in which 
we can convey the more empirically oriented aspects of our research within these 
contexts. 
In terms of the original contributions of the three thematic areas, they have all built 
upon the existing literature of their respective subjects. In the case of bureaucracy, this 
thesis expands on some of the previous work in the field (notably Herzfeld 1992), and 
shows how bureaucratic processes present a misleading image of objectivity and 
neutrality, and how these encounters are more likely to be full of emotional and 
affective content, that has implications on how individuals understand themselves 
and their environments. This is even more important in our context where we are 
moving towards biometric forms of identification and population management. In the 
context of imaginaries, the primary contribution is the inclusion of individual acts of 
imagination within the conceptual framework of social imaginaries. So many of these 
existing accounts abstract imagination from the individual (Adams 2004), and thus 
fail to deal with the fluidity of these conceptions, but also the ways in which 
imagination may change over time.  
Finally, the interrogation into encounters of address has provided a novel way to 
understand the influence of both neoliberalism and nationalism within citizenship. 
Conceiving them in terms of ‘logics’ and ‘vocabularies’ provides a means to theorise 
the way that citizenship changes over time. Furthermore, the illustration of how the 
address of others impinges on the ways in which we present ourselves has implications 
for scholarship in the area of identity. It also reinforces the social and socialised 
nature of citizenship which is often absent from other literature on the topic that 
focuses on these state-individual interactions. 
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 Limitations 
In acknowledging the novelty and contributions of this thesis to the field, it is also 
important to acknowledge its limitations. Firstly, I wish to emphasise that this process 
was very much a learning curve for me – steep at times – and as such I have made 
missteps and errors along the way. Each mistake was useful in terms of the insight that 
it provided me as a learning experience, but given my time again there are certainly 
some things that I would have done differently. This feeling, I believe, is particularly 
acute for those who undertake qualitative interviewing, as listening back to these 
interviews highlight the possibilities of what avenues could have been pursued and 
were not, and which questions were asked, and perhaps should not have been. I 
aimed to address the impact of the lack of honest accounts as to the messiness of the 
interview process in research more generally in my methodology chapter, and I wish 
to reinforce this here: the process of doing this research was complex with twists and 
turns, false starts, and dead ends. 
While I have made it clear that the participants chosen for this research were never 
meant to be representative, I am still very much aware, that even though there were 
contributions from individuals who were more marginalised in terms of citizenship, 
many of those who were interviewed come from relatively advantageous positions, 
either by having higher levels of education or income, or simply by virtue of their 
European heritage or the particular official statuses that they may have.39 
Furthermore, due to issues of length and scope, I have purposefully decided not to 
engage with questions regarding the citizenship of indigenous communities (except 
for in passing, in relation to the Australian citizenship context in Chapter Two) and 
some might consider this a deficiency. Applying this approach to how indigenous 
communities experience citizenship would be a fascinating area for further research, 
yet is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
																																								 																				
39 For a more comprehensive overview of the sorts of individuals who were interviewed see the appendices 
that follow (p.249). 
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 Future Possibilities 
It is heartening to see that in the years since this research started there have been 
some new contributions that are taking steps towards filling the qualitative gap in the 
‘citizenship as status’ literature,40 but there is still a great deal to do in this field. While 
this is certainly not the first piece of work to use the notion of encounter, it will 
hopefully be an encouragement to others to see how these everyday interactions come 
to play out in individual contexts. The ways in which citizenship interacts with and 
‘comes up against’ these aspects in lived lives are all inherently crucial to the ways in 
which it is understood. 
While this thesis has at times been critical of other approaches in citizenship studies, 
this methodology is not intended to supersede them, but to rather provide an 
engagement with the topic that can help illuminate some of the gaps that exist within 
the academic literature, and this will certainly be an ongoing process. The sheer 
multiplicity of things that citizenship entails, and the difficulties outlined in the 
earlier parts of this thesis, all highlight the need for a diversity of perspectives on the 
topic. This thesis is not – and never intended to be – a complete and comprehensive 
account of citizenship in its entirety, rather it is one among many, which work 
together to illuminate this many faceted subject. It may however be used as a starting 
point to further investigation on the impact of our assumptions with regards to our 
research. 
All this talk of doing away with binary approaches has perhaps alluded to some of the 
theorisations within gender studies. While there has been some consideration of 
performativity within this thesis, considering the ways in which analysis of gender can 
better help us understand the reproduction of citizenship as status in everyday life, 
may provide fruitful ground for further scholarship. Take these two quotations from 
the work of Judith Butler for example, where the word gender has been substituted 
for the world citizenship: ‘[citizenship] is, thus, a construction that regularly conceals 
its genesis. The tacit collective agreement to perform, produce, and sustain discrete 
																																								 																				
40 Here I am thinking of works such as (Benson 2012) and (Hepworth 2015), but also more generally on the 
work being done on encounter (Bissell 2016; Wilson 2016; Villegas 2015). 
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and polar [citizenship- i.e. citizen and non-citizen] as cultural fictions is obscured by 
the credibility of its own production. The authors of [citizenship] become entranced 
by their own fictions whereby the construction compels one's belief in its necessity 
and naturalness. The historical possibilities materialized through various corporeal 
styles are nothing other than those punitively regulated cultural fictions that are 
alternately embodied and disguised under duress’ (Butler 1988, 522). And in another 
example: ‘[citizenship is] a set of repeated acts within a highly regulatory frame that 
congeal over time to produce the appearance of substance, of a natural sort of being’ 
(Butler [1990] 1999, 33). These two quotations and others suggest that there is 
certainly ground for research into how theorisations of gender can inform the 
investigation of citizenship.  
Finally, as this thesis has suggested more broadly in the introduction, and elsewhere, 
more work needs to be done around the impacts of taxonomies and categorisations 
within the social sciences more generally. In the context of citizenship, this means 
acknowledging the normative implications of these taxonomies. In trying to move 
beyond them we need to diversify the sort of narratives of citizenship that are available 
in the public, whether this be through academic, or more literary means. By stepping 
away from approaches to citizenship that restrict it to binary concepts, we will be 
better able to conceive of the diverse ways in which citizenship is encountered within 
lived lives. But in doing so, we require greater awareness of how the taxonomic desire 
for order, in research as in life, renders certain individuals and their circumstances 
invisible. These ‘categorical’ impulses speak to a broader sense of discomfort that 
comes from dealing with ambiguity, but it is only in embracing this ambiguity, that we 
may better come to conceive of complex topics such as citizenship.  
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9. Appendices 
 Participants41 
Name	 Citizenship	Statuses	 Age	 Sex	 Education	 Language	
of	
Interview	
Adam	 Australian	Citizen	by	Birth,	Dutch	
Hereditary	Citizenship	obtained	in	his	
20s	(5)	
28	 m	 Tertiary	 English	
Adelaide	 UK	Citizen	by	Birth,	Australian	Citizen	
(10)	
50	 f	 Tertiary	 English	
Agatha	 New	Zealand	Citizenship	by	Birth,	
Australian	Citizenship	(10)	after	a	long	
period	living	in	Australia	without	it.	
60	 f	 Tertiary	 English	
Amanda	 UK	Citizenship	by	Birth,	Australian	
Permanent	Residency	(5),	Australian	
Citizenship	(25)	
55	 f	 Tertiary	 English	
																																								 																				
41 The citizenship statuses, ages, and educational backgrounds included here is what is self-reported by the 
participants or inferred as best as possible from their interviews. All names indicated are pseudonyms to 
protect their confidentiality, however efforts have been made to select names with a similar ‘style’. The 
bracketed numbers next to certain statuses reflect the years that particular individual had the status that 
precedes it.  
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Amir	 Iranian		Citizen	by	Birth,	Australian	
Temporary	Visas	(4),	Australian	
Permanent	Resident	(1),		
30	 m	 Higher	
Tertiary	
English	
Andrea	 Albanian	Citizenship	by	Birth,	Greek	
Hereditary	Citizenship	(1),	extended	
residence	in	Greece	prior.	
26	 f	 Higher	
Tertiary	
Greek	
Anne	 Australian	Citizenship	by	Birth,	French	
Temporary	Residency	Visa	(2),	United	
Kingdom	Permanent	Residency	(5)	
27	 f	 Tertiary	 English	
Antonis	 Bulgarian	Citizenship	by	Birth,	Greek	
Hereditary	Citizenship,	obtained	at	a	
very	young	age	
27	 m	 Tertiary	 Greek	
Arjun	 Indian	Citizen	by	Birth,	various	
Australian	Visas	(6),	Australian	
Permanent	Resident	(2)	
29	 m	 Vocational	 English	
Bogdan	 Yugoslav	(Croatian)	Citizenship	by	
Birth,		Australian	Citizen	(10)	
60	 m	 Secondary	 English	
Cristina	 Romanian	Citizenship	by	Birth,	Greek	
Resident	through	Spouse	(5)	
33	 f	 Tertiary	 Greek	
Daniel	 South	African	Citizenship	by	Birth,	
Australian	Citizenship	(9)	
53	 m	 Vocational	 English	
David	 Australian	Citizenship	by	Birth,	New	
Zealand	Hereditary	Citizenship	(11)	
30	 m	 Vocational	 English	
Diana	 Bulgarian	Citizenship	by	birth,	
Naturalised	Greek	Citizen	due	to	
Spouse	(20)	
48	 f	 Tertiary	 Greek	
Emilia	 Greek	Citizen	by	Birth,	American	
Hereditary	Citizenship	obtained	at	a	
young	age		
45	 f	 Secondary	 Greek	
Emma	 British	Citizenship	by	Birth,	Australian	
Permanent	Residency	(4),	Australian	
Citizenship	(5)	
57	 f	 Higher	
Tertiary	
English	
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Eve	 Swiss	Citizenship	by	Birth,	Australian	
Citizenship	through	Naturalisation	(18),	
Indonesian	Mother	
34	 f	 Tertiary	 English	
Fotini	 Greek	Citizenship	by	Birth,	Bulgarian	
Residency	(50)	
79	 f	 Secondary	 Greek	
Grant	 UK	Citizenship	by	Birth,	Australian	
Temporary	Visas	(2),	Australian	
Permanent	Residency	(3),	Australian	
Citizen	
35	 m	 Tertiary	 English	
Greta	 Canadian	Citizenship	by	Birth,	Swiss	
Temporary	Residents	Visa	(under	
spouse),	Australian	Spouse	of	457	Visa	
Holder,	Permanent	Resident	(3),	recent	
Australian	citizen,	wife	of	Mathew	
59	 f	 Tertiary	 English	
Haris	 Bulgarian	Citizenship	by	Birth,	Greek	
Hereditary	Citizenship	from	a	very	
young	age	
27	 m	 Higher	
Tertiary	
Greek	
Heidi	 German	Citizen	by	Birth,	Greek	
Permanent	Residency	through	Spouse	
(30)	
57	 f	 Secondary	 Greek	
Hiro	 Japanese	Citizenship	by	Birth,	
Australian	Permanent	Resident	(15)	
25	 m	 Secondary	 English	
Ioana	 Romanian	Citizen	by	Birth,	Greek	
Hereditary	Citizenship	applied	for	at	
the	age	of	18	
25	 f	 Tertiary	 Greek	
Jack	 Danish	Citizen	by	Birth,	later	
relinquished	to	obtain	Australian	
Citizenship	(8)	
46	 m	 Vocational	 English	
James	 Danish	Citizen	by	Birth,	Australian	
Permanent	Resident	for	over	20	years	
45	 m	 Vocational	 English	
Joshua	 British	Citizenship	by	Birth,	Australian	
Citizenship	through	Spouse	(10)	
43	 m	 Tertiary	 English	
Kaori	 Japanese	Citizenship	by	Birth,	various	
forms	of	Greek	Residency	Permits	(8)	
35	 f	 Tertiary	 Greek	
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Lana	 Armenian	Citizenship	by	Birth,	various	
forms	of	Greek	Residency	Permits	(7)	
21	 f	 Tertiary	 Greek	
Louis	 French	Citizenship	by	Birth,	Australian	
Citizenship	through	Spouse	(12),	British	
Hereditary	Citizenship	(20),	qualifies	
for	Irish	Heredia	tray	Citizenship	
though	never	obtained.	
39	 m	 Tertiary	 English	
Lucia	 Romanian	Citizenship	by	Birth,	Greek	
Resident	through	EU	registration	(4)	
30	 m	 Tertiary	 Greek	
Mark	 British	Citizenship	by	Birth,	Australian	
Permanent	Residency	(5),	Australian	
Citizenship	(25)	
56	 m	 Tertiary	 English	
Mathew	 Canadian	Citizenship	by	Birth,	Swiss	
Temporary	Residents	Visa,	Australian	
457	Visa	Holder,	Permanent	Resident		
(3)	and	recent	Australian	Citizen,	
husband	of	Greta	
61	 m	 Tertiary	 English	
Mayumi	 Citizen	of	Japan	by	Birth,	living	in	
Greece	using	Spousal	Visas	(8)	
43	 f	 Tertiary	 Greek	
Michelle	 British	Citizen	by	Birth,	Greek	
Permanent	Residency	through	Spouse	
(20)	
45	 f	 Secondary	 Greek	and	
English	
Milena	 Romanian	Citizenship	by	Birth,	Greek	
Resident	through	Spouse	(7)	
31	 f	 Vocational	 Greek	
Miltos	 Greek	Citizenship	by	Birth,	Australian	
Hereditary	Citizenship,	obtained	when	
young	
30	 m	 Vocational	 English	
Miranda	 American	Citizenship	by	Birth,	Recent	
Australian	Permanent	Resident	(1)	
33	 f	 Tertiary	 English	
Natalia	 Romanian	Citizenship	by	Birth,	Greek	
Residency	initially	through	Spouse	and	
later	through	EU	registration	
33	 f	 Tertiary	 Greek	
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Natalie	 British	Citizenship	by	Birth,	Several	
long-term	Temporary	visas	(457,	then	
Spousal),	Australian	Citizen	a	month	
prior	to	interview	
33	 f	 Tertiary	 English	
Omar	 Australian	Citizen	by	Birth,	Greek	
Hereditary	citizenship,	obtained	
recently	
23	 m	 Tertiary	 English	
Paheer	 Citizen	of	Sri	Lanka,	Greek	Temporary	
Visa	(8)	after	a	period	of	irregularity	
40	 m	 Secondary	 Greek	and	
English	
Pierre	 French	Citizenship	by	Birth,	New	
Zealand	Hereditary	Citizenship,	and	
Australian	Citizenship	through	
Naturalisation	(3)	
25	 m	 Tertiary	 English	
Sotiris	 Greek	Citizenship	by	Birth,	Australian	
Citizenship	through	Spouse	(33)	
66	 m	 Primary	 English	and	
Greek	
Stavros	 Greek	Citizenship	by	Birth,	Bulgarian	
Residency	(50)	
82	 m	 Secondary	 Greek	
Steve	 Australian	Citizenship	by	Birth,	
Hereditary	Italian	Citizenship	(6)	
43	 m	 Vocational	 English	
Susan	 Australian	Citizenship	by	Birth,	Greek	
Citizenship	through	Spouse	(35)	
62	 f	 Tertiary	 English	
Suzie	 Born	in	Singapore,	British	Hereditary	
Citizenship,	Lived	in	US	under	Various	
forms	of	Temporary	Visas	(20),	
Australian	Spousal	Visa	(4),	Australian	
Citizenship	(7)	
44	 f	 Tertiary	 English	
Svetlana	 Russian	Citizenship	by	Birth,	Greek	
Permanent	Residency	through	Spouse	
(8)	
44	 f	 Secondary	 Greek	
Veronika	 Russian	Citizenship,	Greek	Residency	
through	Spousal	Visa	(6)	
30	 f	 Tertiary	 Greek	
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 Number of Participants from Each Country	
 
Country	 Number	
	
	
     Australia	 28	
	      Greece	 27	
	      UK	 11	
	      Bulgaria	 5	
	      Romania	 5	
	      Japan	 4	
	      New	Zealand	 3	
	      Canada	 2	
	      Denmark	 2	
	      France	 2	
	      Russia	 2	
	      USA	 2	
	      Albania	 1	
	      Armenia	 1	
	      Croatia	 1	
	      Germany	 1	
	      India	 1	
	      Indonesia	 1	
	      Iran	 1	
	      Italy	 1	
	      Netherlands	 1	
	      South	Africa	 1	
	      Sri	Lanka	 1	
	      Switzerland	 1	
	      Total	 105	
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 Age of Participants 
 
 
 Educational Background of Participants	
Highest	Attained	Level	
of	Education	
Number	
Primary	 1	
Secondary	 9	
Vocational	 8	
Tertiary	 28	
Higher	Tertiary	
(doctorate	or	masters)	
4	
Total	 50	
24% 
26% 22% 
14% 
10% 
4% 
Age	of	Participants
20-29 
30-39 
40-49 
50-59 
60-69 
70 < 
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 Map Reflecting the Origins of Statuses of Participants:  
This	world	map	represents	the	countries	from	which	participants	had	statuses.	It	is	not	intended	to	suggest	that	the	countries	that	are	coloured	have	been	
addressed	in	a	comprehensive	manner,	but	rather	to	speak	to	the	geographical	diversity	of	the	participants.	
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